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Assessing views of life: a subjective affair?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 May 2003

ARJAN MARKUS
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy of Religion, Utrecht University, PO Box 80105, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands
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Abstract

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Is the assessment of a view of life only a matter of personal preference? I argue that there is more than personal preference. I defend the position that a view of life must be useful for the ascription of meaning and therefore needs to fulfil the requirements of the process of ascribing meaning. In this article I analyse this process and its requirements and deduce from them a set of criteria by which views of life can be assessed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press