^{page 195 note 1} Aquinas, St Thomas, Knowledge in God in Summa Theologiae, vol. 4 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 13.Google Scholar

^{page 196 note 1} Ibid. p. 13.

^{page 196 note 2} Maimonides, Moses, The Guide for the Perplexed (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), p. 281.Google Scholar

^{page 196 note 3} Ibid. p. 102

^{page 196 note 4} Owen, H. P., Concepts of Deity (New York: Macmillan, 1971), p. 30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 196 note 5} Aquinas, , Knowledge in God. p. 13Google Scholar. Emphasis mine.

^{page 196 note 6} An earlier draft of this paper was read to a session of the American Academy of Religion, Eastern International Region, on 15 April 1978. Incisive criticism by Professor Richard La Croix, CUNY, Buffalo caused me to see the need for developing this section on two interpretations of omniscience. I thank him.

^{page 198 note 1} There is, of course, the possibility that God might suspend judgment with regard to those propositions that cannot be known, but it seems more expressive of his supremely perfect nature that he hold true opinions rather than suspending judgment when he cannot have knowledge.

^{page 199 note 1} Owen, , Concepts of Deity, p. 30.Google Scholar

^{page 199 note 2} Henceforth I will use ‘Know’ for the strong sense of the term and let ‘know’ function vaguely.

^{page 201 note 1} Maimonides, , Guide, p. 293.Google Scholar