^{page 53 note 1} Alston, William, ‘Can We Speak Literally of God?’ in Is God God?, ed. Steuer, Axel D. and McClendon, James Wm. Jr., (Nashville: Abingdon, 1981), pp. 147–77.Google Scholar Page citations in text refer to this essay.

^{page 53 note 2} I am not arguing that (3) ‘Can we form concepts of intrinsic divine properties?’ reduces to (4) ‘Is it possible that such properties are exemplified?’ A positive answer to 4 does not entail a positive answer to 3 because of the ineffability problem. That is, I assume there may be properties such that although it is possible that they are exemplified, it is not possible that we can form concepts of them. Actually, I doubt that there could be such properties.

^{page 53 note 3} Alston might just as easily and correctly have said ‘true or false’ here instead of just ‘true’. Alston, however, focuses on true literal assertions since it is unlikely one would want to deny that one can speak literally and falsely of God.

^{page 54 note 1} Alston's predicate term ‘thought of now by me’, should not be equated with ‘adequately conceived of by me’, since many would undoubtedly want to affirm the former while denying the latter.

^{page 54 note 2} According to Alston, most predicate terms are ‘open-textured’ and have meanings that are vague. Thus, literal speech may itself be vague. Speaking in the literal mode it itself no guarantee that one will be speaking precisely. See Alston, , p. 151.Google Scholar

^{page 57 note 1} Alston is interested in showing that something literal about God can be said in the relevant sense of true literal predication. Nothing he says should be taken to imply that there can not be properties exemplified by God such that they cannot be conceived of – not merely that are not conceived of as a contingent matter of fact. However, it is also important to note that in reading the theologians from which Alston extrapolates the reasons he cites as most prevalent for denying that we can speak literally of God, it is not clear whether they mean to be giving contingent or logical reasons. I think, in fact, that most should be interpreted as giving contingent reasons. If this is so, then the problem of literalness as generated by these various doctrines of ineffability vanishes. They are not really denying that, logically speaking, we can speak literally of God.

^{page 59 note 1} My thanks to Robert McKim, Robert Oakes, Philip Quinn, Sumner Twiss and members of The Society for Philosophy of Religion for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.