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Foundation of Religious Beliefs after Foundationalism: Wittgenstein between Nielsen and Phillips

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Yong Huang
Affiliation:
Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Abstract

Religious beliefs have often been taken either as absolutely foundational to all others or as ultimately founded on something else. This essay starts with an endorsement of the contemporary critique of foundationalism but sets its task as to search for the foundation(s) of religious belief after foundationalism. In its third and main part, it argues for a Wittgensteinian reflective equilibrium (within a belief system, between believing and acting and among people with different ways of believing and acting) as such a foundation. In this reflective equilibrium, religious beliefs are no more and no less foundational to, or founded by, other beliefs and practices. To appreciate this perspective better, I argue,in the first part, that Kai Neilsen's charge of Wittgenstein as a fideist is not accurate, and, in the second part, that D. Z. Phillips's fideistic contentions are unWittgensteinian.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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