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In defence of Mumford's definition of a miracle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2003

MORGAN LUCK
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD
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Abstract

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In a recent paper in Religious Studies, Clarke criticizes Mumford's definition of a miracle as it fails to recognize a supernatural agent capable of intent. Clarke believes that in order for an event to qualify as a miracle a supernatural agent must intend it. It is my aim to dismiss this qualification and demonstrate how Mumford's intent-neutral definition is less problematic. I will do this by examining each of the three cases against Mumford's definition and give reason to reject Clarke's criticism and his own definition of a miracle.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press