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Is God (almost) a consequentialist? Swinburne's moral theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 September 2002

DAVID McNAUGHTON
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG
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Abstract

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Swinburne offers a greater-goods defence to the problem of evil within a deontological framework. Yet deontologists characteristically hold that we have no right to inflict great evil on any individual to bring about the greater good. Swinburne accepts that humans generally do not have that right, but argues that God, as the supreme care-giver, does. I contend that Swinburne's argument that care-givers have such a right is flawed, and defend the classical deontological objection to imposing evils that good may come.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press