Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-fvjsw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T21:15:36.844Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Leibniz and the Contingency of God Exists

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

David Werther
Affiliation:
212 South Mills Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53715

Extract

Leibniz offered two main defences of contingency, the per-se view and the analytic account.1 I argue that an acceptance of either account requires a rejection of what is now known as ‘the characteristic claim of S5 modal logic’, If possibly P then necessarily possibly P, and that apart from an affirmation of that claim Leibniz could not have either offered an a priori argument for God's existence or considered God exists to be a necessary truth. Since Leibniz considered God to be, by definition, the most perfect being and took existence to be a perfection, it follows that Leibniz could not have consistently accepted either account of contingency without abandoning theism.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable