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Leibniz on Cartesian Omnipotence and Contingency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

David Werther
Affiliation:
Department of Liberal Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Wisconsin 53706-1475

Extract

Leibniz contrasted his views of necessity, possibility, and impossibility with those of Descartes and Spinoza. On the one hand, he argued that Descartes erred by allowing that God has the ability to make contradictory claims true. On the other hand, Leibniz found Spinoza's commitment to fatalism to be counterintuitive. I show that, given his in-esse account of truth, Leibniz could not have avoided a commitment to fatalism, without affirming one of the most objectionable features of Descartes' divine voluntarism, the contingency of the law of noncontradiction.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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