^{page 144 note 1} See my paper, ‘Some Aspects of Ian Ramsey's Empiricism’, International journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. iii, No. 1, Spring 1972, pp. 2–17.Google Scholar

^{page 144 note 2} Religious Language (London: S.C.M. Press, 1957), p. 65.Google Scholar

^{page 144 note 3} Quoted in Mehta, Ved, The New Theologian (New York, Harper and Row, 1965), p. 119.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 1} Religious Language, pp. 53, 61, 73; Religion and Science: Conflict and Synthesis (London: S.P.C.K., 1964), p. 23Google Scholar; Models and Mystery (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 15–16, 57–9Google Scholar; ‘Letter to the Editor’, Theology, Vol. LXVIII, No. 536 (February 1965), p. 109Google Scholar; Christian Discourse: Some Logical Explorations (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 5, 66–67, 88–89Google Scholar; ‘Models and Mystery: a reply’, Theoria to Theory, vol. I (April 1967), pp. 264–5.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 2} Black, Max, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 222.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 3} Christian Discourse, pp. 71, 74; ‘Talking about God: Models, Ancient and Modern’, Myth and Symbol, ed. Dillistone, F. W. (London: S.P.C.K., 1966), p. 95.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 4} Religious Language, p. 62.

^{page 145 note 5} Models and Mystery, pp. 60–1.

^{page 146 note 1} Models and Mystery pp. 51–3.

^{page 146 note 2} Black, , op. cit., pp. 24–47.Google Scholar

^{page 146 note 3} Religious Language, p. 66.

^{page 146 note 4} ibid. p. 65.

^{page 147 note 1} Religious Language, pp. 57–8

^{page 148 note 1} Ramsey implicitly identifies wisdom with knowledge. Wisdom, however, can appear in the absence of knowledge. It involves not only reflection about things, but also sound judgment about a way of life that is not arrived at solely by argumentation. The terms have different, albeit related, meanings.

^{page 148 note 2} ‘Empiricism and Religion’, The Christian Scholar, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, June 1956, p. 161Google Scholar; ‘Contemporary Philosophy and the Christian Faith’, Religious Studies, vol. I (1965), p. 61.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 3} Models and Mystery, p. 30.

^{page 149 note 1} On Being Sure in Religion (London: The Athlone Press, 1963), p. 62.Google Scholar

^{page 149 note 2} Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, translated by Anscombe, G. E. M. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), section 40.Google Scholar

^{page 149 note 3} Quine, W. O., Word and Object (Cambridge: Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960), p. 109.Google Scholar

^{page 149 note 4} Geach, Peter, God and the Soul (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 81.Google Scholar

^{page 151 note 1} ‘History and the Gospels: Some Philosophical Reflections’, Studia Evangelica, vol. VIII, Pt. II, Sect. VI (1961), pp. 212–14Google Scholar; Models and Mystery, pp. 38–40.

^{page 151 note 2} Religion and Science, p. 69.

^{page 151 note 3} ‘Talking about God’, p. 90.

^{page 151 note 4} ‘On the Possibility and Purpose of a Metaphysical Theology’, Prospect for Metaphysics, ed. Ramsey, I. T. (London: George and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), p. 176.Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 1} These groupings include some qualified models discussed in Ramsey's work that are not mentioned specifically elsewhere in this article.

^{page 152 note 2} Ramsey discusses the possibility of using ‘Evil’ as a model in Religious Language, pp. 80–88. He suggests that the term may be so used if it is suitably qualified, for example, by a narrative that does not function on the descriptive level. He does not explain why the model, ‘Evil’, requires the very special qualification that he gives it.

^{page 153 note 1} Beardsley, Monroe, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1958), p. 142.Google Scholar

^{page 154 note 1} Black, , op. cit., pp. 222–3.Google Scholar