^{page 65 note 1} Malcolm, Norman, ‘Descartes' Ontological Proof’, in Fact and Existence, ed. Margolis, J. (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1969), pp. 42–3. This paper is Malcolm's contribution to a symposium with Anthony Kenny and Terence Penelhum.Google Scholar

^{page 65 note 2} Ibid., p. 43.

^{page 67 note 1} For a fuller discussion of the need to allow nonexistent objects within the domain of variables, see my papers: ‘Plantinga's Puzzles about God and Other Minds’, The Philosophical Forum, Vol. I, number 3 (New Series), Spring 1969: 365–91; ‘Prior on Time and Tense’, Review of Metaphysics (forthcoming); and ‘Existence and Existence Attributes’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).Google Scholar

^{page 67 note 2} Kenny, Anthony, ‘Reply’, in Fact and Existence, op. cit., p. 61. This paper is Kenny's response to comments by Malcolm and Penelhum, as well as Ernest Sosa and Bernard Williams, on Kenny's lead paper of the symposium, ‘Descartes’ Ontological Argument’, pp. 18–36.Google Scholar

^{page 68 note 1} Kenny, Anthony, ‘Reply’, in Fact and Existence, Op. cit., p. 61.Google Scholar

^{page 70 note 1} Here I am pleased to record my abiding gratitude and general debt to Hector Castañeda, Alvin Plantinga, and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., my friends and former teachers. Special mention must be made of Plantinga, whose clear thinking in the philosophy of religion has served as a model ever since. I trust the lesson has been learned well.