¹ Theoretical theodicy is defined by Surin as ‘the attempt by the human thinker to justify God vis-à-vis the fact of evil’, Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 142.Google Scholar It is claimed that the proposition that there is evil is – when taken along with other theistic assumptions – logically inconsistent with the claim that an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent God exists, or that the evidence for the existence of evil renders the claim that there is such a God improbable. The theodicist attempts to justify God by proposing possible or plausible rational explanations for why God allows evil to occur.

² Cf. ibid. pp. 46–52.

³ Cf. ibid. pp. 52–4, 83–4.

⁴ Cf. Rhees, Rush, ‘Science and Questioning’, in Without Answers (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 16–17.Google Scholar

⁵ Cf. Swinburne, R., ‘The Problem of Evil: I’, in Reason and Religion, ed. Stuart, Brown (London: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 92.Google Scholar

⁶ Cf. Plantinga, Alvin, God, Freedom and Evil (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974), p. 29;Google ScholarHick, John, Evil and the God of Love (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 9.Google Scholar

⁷ Op. cit. n. 1, p. 51.

⁸ O'Connor, David, ‘In Defense of Theoretical Theodicy’, Modern Theology, V (1988), p. 63.Google Scholar

⁹ Ibid. p. 64.

¹⁰ Swinburne, Richard, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 220.Google Scholar

¹¹ Op. cit. n. 8, p. 68. A similar distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive elements of religious commitment is made by Trigg, Roger, Reason and Commitment (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1973), p. 42.Google Scholar

¹² Op. cit. n. 8, p. 71. I take it that this, or a similar proposal, is supported by Richard Swinburne, since he appears to take it as the main purpose of theodicy that it complement arguments for the existence of God by showing that the existence of evil does not make the existence of God less probable (cf. op. cit. note 10, p. 220 and ch. 1).

¹³ Op. cit. n. 1, pp. 3–7. For a recent statement of Phillips', D. Z. views see Wittgenstein and Religion (London: Macmillan, 1993);CrossRefGoogle Scholar cf. especially ch. 4 ‘On Really Believing’, where Phillips counters the objection that his Wittgensteinian account is merely a non-realist reduction of religious faith to religious behaviour.

¹⁴ Op. cit. n. 8, p. 73.

¹⁵ O'Connor's argument for the scientific competitiveness of religious language is reminiscent of the argument that public services must provide ‘efficiency’, ‘value for money’ and ‘customer satisfaction’ if they are to remain recipients of tax payers' money. That these are increasingly the criteria by which the value of a public service is judged (as opposed to, say, fairness and humanity) is not, of course, an argument that establishes that these criteria are right, but only indicates the difficulties in trying to persuade people that they are wrong.

¹⁶ Op. cit. n. 1, pp. 52–3. A similar argument is developed by D. Z. Phillips against Richard Swinburne in Reason and Religion (op. cit. n. 5).

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 84.

¹⁸ Cf. Pike, Nelson, ‘Hume on Evil’, in The Problem of Evil, ed. Adams, M. M. and Adams, R. M. (Oxford: O.U.P., 1990), pp. 40–1;Google Scholar John Hick, op. cit. n. 6, ch. XIII, pt. 3. Swinburne uses God's parental relationship to human beings as part of an argument for God's right to allow human beings to suffer (op. cit. n. 10, p. 217).

¹⁹ Op. cit. n. 5, p. 116.

²⁰ Op. cit. n. 10, p. 221.

²¹ Cf. op. cit. n. 1, p. 52. Surin identifies D. Soelle and J. Moltmann as other practical theodicists.

²² Wetzel, James, ‘Can Theodicy be Avoided? The Claim of Unredeemed Evil’, Religious Studies, XXV (1989), p. 11.Google Scholar

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ The practical theodicist's refusal to speculate about God's reasons for permitting evil is not the same as asserting that God lacks sufficient reason for allowing the evils of the world to occur: it is rather to reject the practice of constructing explanations (or criticizing explanations) of evil as misguided.

²⁵ Wetzel does not, as far as I can see, spell out why it is so important that theologians should have this insight, and it is not clear to me what account he would offer, given that he agrees that silence in the face of evil ‘is sometimes appropriate’. Wetzel does claim that ‘the deepest motivation for the problem of evil’ is ‘our desire to determine the source and limits of a moral universe’ (op. cit. n. 22, p. 13). But I take it that Wetzel is not arguing that believers are somehow psychologically impelled to bring even tragedy within the sphere of human understanding, for even if this were established as a fact, it would be no answer to the moral objections to theoretical theodicy.

²⁶ Cf. op. cit. n. 13, ch. 10.