^{page 593 note 1} Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, ed. by Anscombe, G. E. M. and von Wright, G. H. and trans. by Paul, Denis and Anscombe, G. E. M. (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).Google Scholar Hereafter references to passages in On Certainty will appear in abbreviated form in the body of the essay as follows: OC, followed by the numbered paragraph in the text.

^{page 593 note 2} Specific reference is made to the falsification principle which is given its clearest expression by Flew, Antony. Cf. Flew, et al. , ‘Theology and falsification’, in New Essays in Philosphical Theology, ed. by Flew, Antony and Maclntyre, Alasdair (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1955), pp. 96–130.Google Scholar

^{page 593 note 3} There has been some directly relevant work performed recently, however, with this purpose in mind. Worthy of special note are: Malcolm, Norman, ‘The groundlessness of belief’, in his Thought and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 199–216Google Scholar; Phillips, D. Z., Religion Without Explanation (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976), pp. 151–82Google Scholar; High, Dallas, ‘Wittgenstein on doubting and groundless believing’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XLIX (06, 1981), 249–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and an extremely perceptive dissertation by Whittaker, John, ‘Forms of Life’ and Religious Belief (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1974), esp. pp. 146–62 and Chapter IV.Google Scholar

^{page 593 note 4} Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. by Barrett, Cyril (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), pp. 53–72.Google Scholar Hereafter references will appear in abbreviated form – LC, followed by page number – and included in the by of the essay.

^{page 593 note 5} Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Culture and Value, ed. by von Wright, G. H. and trans. by Winch, Peter (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).Google Scholar Hereafter in the by of the paper, reference to Culture and Value will be abbreviated as follows: CV, followed by page number.

^{page 594 note 1} Included in Moore, G. E., Philosophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 126–48.Google Scholar

^{page 594 note 2} Also included in Ibid. pp. 32–59.

^{page 595 note 1} Wittgenstein is not claiming that it is an easy matter to isolate foundational propositions and mark them off from general hypotheses which are still subject to testing. (OC, 673.) ‘The lack of sharpness is the boundary between rule and empirical proposition.’ (OC, 319.) Moreover, the logical status of a judgement is not something fixed once and for all; the role it has among other empirical propositions may shift from one time or context to another. (Cf. OC, 167, 321 and especially 96, 97.)

^{page 600 note 1} The reader is here referred to the wide array of literature that has surrounded two works of Winch, Peter, The Idea of a Social Science, Studies in Philosophical Psychology Series, ed. by Holland, R. F. (New York: Humanities Press, 1958)Google Scholar and ‘Understanding a primitive society’, American Philosophical Quarterly, I (10, 1964), 307–24.Google Scholar

^{page 601 note 1} On this cf., for instance, Malcolm, , ‘The groundlessness of belief’, p. 204.Google Scholar Others already noted have pursued a similar vein of thought. Cf. note 3, p. 593.

^{page 602 note 1} In the latter source, Wittgenstein notes: ‘Christianity is not based on a historical truth; rather, it offers us a (historical) narrative and says: now believe! But not, believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather; believe, through thick and thin, which you can do only as a result of a life. Here you have a narrative, don't take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! Make a quite different place in your life for it. – There is nothing paradoxical about that!’ (CV, p. 32.)

^{page 603 note 1} On this point, cf. the closely related article by Malcolm, Norman, ‘Is it a religious belief that God exists?’ in Faith and the Philosophers, ed. by Hick, John (London: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 103–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 605 note 1} For this general line of thought I am indebted to Whittaker, John, Forms of Life, pp. 212–15.Google Scholar

^{page 606 note 1} At this juncture, it should be emphasized for the sake of completeness that the unshakeable beliefs of Christianity are integrally interwoven with the ruled uses of the pivotal concepts of the faith – ‘God’, ‘creation’, ‘judgement’, ‘sin’, ‘grace’, ‘salvation’, and countless others. Thus, for instance, one acquires the proper use of these concepts partly by learning the fundamental tenets of faith and vice versa. Besides, as already noted by Wittgenstein, rules governing use and fundamental beliefs are so alike in their function and the dignity conferred upon them that they have their respective places in any description of the grammar of language, religious or otherwise. Interestingly enough, as others have pointed out, Wittgenstein himself insinuates that theology can be seen as providing a description of the grammar of faith. (Cf. P.I., I, 373.) Such a task is manifold. At least two central aspects of the task, however, deserve mention in light of the above remarks. First, given specific occasion and purpose, theology offers a descriptive account of the rules governing concepts within the faith. Second, theology may be called upon to isolate those beliefs which are logically fundamental and to map their relation to beliefs in different logical strata. In respect to both of these facets, theology preoccupies itself with the grammar of faith. Equally important, theology leaves everything as it is and assumes a descriptive role. If stipulative decisions are necessary in certain contexts, it is not the theologian but the wider circle of practitioners of the faith which exercises such a decision – e.g. in church councils.

^{page 606 note 2} On this theme, cf. Malcolm, , ‘The groundlessness of belief’, pp. 213ff.Google Scholar

^{page 607 note 1} This topic is addressed by Phillips, D. Z., Religion Without Explanation, 164–66.Google Scholar

^{page 609 note 1} There is one very interesting exception to this general claim. Odd as it may seem, the reality of God is not an item of specific instruction in the faith. Candidates for the faith are taught that God created the starry heavens above and the earth beneath, that He providentially rules in the world, that He redeems men from destruction, etc., etc. – but not, in addition, that He is real. The reality of God is assimilated in the course of learning any number of the teachings of faith. It is not a matter which is taught directly, explained, nor, of course, called into question in religious training. In this respect, therefore, God's existence is in direct parallel with the reality of physical objects and other Moore-like propositions. On this point, cf. Phillips, , Religion Without Explanation, pp. 171 ff.Google Scholar Wittgenstein himself offers some brief, but illuminating, comments which are related in OC, 507 and CV, p. 85.

^{page 609 note 2} There is an entire philosophical literature which has emerged on the topic of indoctrination and its connections with the philosophy of education. Cf. e.g., Wilson, John, ‘Education and indoctrination’, in Aims in Education, ed. by Hollins, T. H. B. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), pp. 24–26Google Scholar; White, J. P., ‘Indoctrination’, in The Concept of Education, ed. by Peters, R. S. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 177–91Google Scholar; and a number of papers in Concepts of Indoctrination, ed. Snook, I. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972).Google Scholar

^{page 611 note 1} Doubt may also be prompted when a believer is confronted with a rival secular/scientific world–picture. This form of doubt is addressed in Jones, J. R. and Phillips, D. Z., ‘Belief and loss of belief: a discussion’, Sophia, IX, (03, 1970), 4, 6–7.Google Scholar

^{page 613 note 1} Kierkegaard, Soren, Attack Upon ‘Christendom’, trans. by Lowrie, Walter (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956), p. 105.Google Scholar