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Pascal's Wager and the Many Gods Objection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2001

PAUL SAKA
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, Houston, TX 772004
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Abstract

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Pascal's Wager is finding ever more defenders who aim to undermine the old Many Gods Objection. It is my thesis that they are mistaken. After describing the Wager and the objection, I report on Jeff Jordan's repeated attempt to limit legitimate religious hypotheses to those that are traditional. In separate sections I criticize Jordan, first coming from epistemology and second from anthropology. Then I describe George Schlesinger's repeated appeal to the ‘simplest’ religious hypothesis, and argue that it fails for similar reasons. Finally, I summarize and reject miscellaneous defences of Pascal by Robert Anderson, Bradley Armour-Garb, James Franklin, Joshua Golding, and Nicholas Rescher.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press