^{page 67 note 1} Nielsen, Kai, ‘The Intelligibility of God-Talk’, Religious Studies 6 (March 1970), p. 21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cf. Nielsen, Kai, Contemporary Critiques of Religion (London, 1971), pp. 60, 42–4, 66, 119–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 68 note 1} See Flew, A., God and Philsophy (London, 1966), 2–14Google Scholar; Edwards, Paul, ‘Difficulties in the Idea of God’, in The Idea of God: Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield, III., 1968), eds. Madden, E. H., Handy, R. and Farber, M., p. 48Google Scholar, and ‘Some Notes on Anthropomorphic Theology’, in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. Hook, Sidney (New York, 1961)Google Scholar; Nielsen, K., ‘On Fixing the Reference Range of “God”’, Religious Studies 2 (October 1966): 22–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Daher, Adel, ‘God and Factual Necessity’, Religious Studies 6 (March 1970): 34–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 68 note 2} Penelhum, Terence, Survival and Disembodied Existence (London, 1970), pp. 61 ff.Google Scholar, and see pp. 55–6, 64–5, 86–7.

^{page 68 note 3} ibid., chapters 5 and 7.

^{page 71 note 1} Penelhum, Terence, Survival and Disembodied Existence, p. 67.Google Scholar

^{page 74 note 1} Nielsen, , Contemporary Critiques, pp. 125–6.Google Scholar Cf. Evans, Donald, ‘Commentary on Paul Edwards' Paper’, in The Idea of God, eds. Farber, Madden Handy, p. 84.Google Scholar

^{page 74 note 2} Meynell, Hugo, God and the World: The Coherence of Christian Theism (London, 1971), p. 120.Google Scholar Cf. Penelhum, op. cit., chapter 3.

^{page 74 note 3} Nielsen, ibid., pp. 119–20.

^{page 76 note 1} Edwards, , ‘Reply to Commentators’, in The Idea of God, p. 95.Google Scholar

^{page 77 note 1} Flew, , op. Cit., 2.20.Google ScholarDaher, , loc. cit., p. 34.Google Scholar

^{page 77 note 2} Nielsen, Kai, ‘Can Faith Validate God-Talk?’ in Philosophy and Religion: Some Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Gill, Jerry H. (Minneapolis, Minn., 1968), p. 238Google Scholar (reprinted from Theology Today 20 (1963Google Scholar). Cf. Nielsen, , Contemporary Critiques, pp. 43, 119.Google Scholar

^{page 78 note 1} Nielsen, ibid., pp. 63–4. Nielsen's earlier emphasis, ibid., pp. 56–60, on empirical experience by us as a necessary condition of factual intelligibility is mistaken, as the immediately succeeding text above here indicates.

^{page 79 note 1} This is taken from Strawson, P. F., Individuals (London: Methuen, University Paperbacks, 1964), see esp. p. 16.Google Scholar

^{page 79 note 2} See e.g. Hartshorne, C., ‘Strict and Genetic Identity: An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics’, in Henle, P., Kallen, H., and Langer, S., eds., Structure, Method and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry M. Scheffer (New York, 1951).Google Scholar