^{page 39 note 1} For a crisp statement of this view see Plantinga, Alvin, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 156–68.Google Scholar

^{page 40 note 1} See MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘The Logical Status of Religious Belief’ in Metaphysical Beliefs (London: SCM Press, 1967).Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 1} See Berthold, Fred Jr, ‘Empirical Propositions and Explanations in Theology’ in Meland, Bernard E. (ed.): The Future of Empirical Theology (University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 115 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 2} Bartley, William W. III, The Retreat to Commitment (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1962).Google Scholar Bartley appeals primarily to writings of Karl Barth and Paul Tillich, though he mentions others. I think Bartley's reading of these men is in some important respects disputable, but that is not a point I wish to pursue here.

^{page 43 note 1} ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’ in Imre, Lakatos and Alan, Musgrave (ed.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970), pp. 91–195.Google Scholar My version of Lakatos' suggestion is a crude and simplified one. Moreover, I very much doubt that he would like the use to which I am putting it. I mention him to acknowledge my debt, not to claim his support. However, I do not think I have materially misrepresented him.

^{page 43 note 2} See Berthold, , op. cit., pp. 120 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 44 note 1} Actually, Lakatos appears to hold (op. cit., p. 155) that a degenerating problemshift cannot by itself be an adequate reason for rejecting a research programme; for that an alternative programme is required. However, he does not explicitly consider cases in which there is a very pro-longed degeneration and no alternative in sight. For purposes of this paper I shall adopt a version of sophisticated falsificationism which calls for the abandonment of a programme which has stalled unduly long.