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The religious option is a genuine option

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Jerome Gellman
Jerome Gellman
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Ben Gurion University of the Negev
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Extract

In ‘The Will to Believe’, the religious hypothesis for William James says, first, ‘that the best things are the more eternal things’, and second, ‘that we are better off now if we believe her first affirmation to be true’ (p.26) He later qualifies the first affirmation: ‘The more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our religions as having personal form’ (p.27).

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , December 1978, pp. 505 - 514
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

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References

page 505 note 1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to James', works are to The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover, 1956).Google Scholar

page 506 note 1 Mavrodes, George, ‘James and Clifford on “The Will to Believe”,’ The Personalist XLIV (1963). Reprinted in Keith Yandel, God, Man and Religion (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973). All citations in the text are to the latter volume.Google Scholar

page 512 note 1 From ‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’, reprinted in Alston, W. P. and Nakhnikian, George, Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy (New York: The Free Press, 1963). The quoted passage is from p. 14 of the latter volume.Google Scholar

page 513 note 1 Phillips seems to think that religious belief is regulative and therefore is not propositional. My own view is that religious belief is both regulative and propositional.

page 513 note 2 Phillips, D. Z., ‘Religious Beliefs and Language Games’, Ratio xii (1970). Reprinted in Mitchell, Basil, ed., The Philosophy of Religion (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). The quotations are from pp. 129 and 130 of the latter.Google Scholar