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Response to Hasker

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2005

WILLIAM L. ROWE
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2098
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Abstract

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The issue between my view and Hasker's concerns a certain principle that he takes to be true, but I hold to be false. The principle in question asserts that failing to do better than one did is a defect only if doing the best one can is possible for one to do. I claim that this principle is false because if an all-knowing, all-powerful being were confronted with an unending series of increasingly better creatable worlds and deliberately chose to create the least good world, that being would thereby show itself to be something less than a supremely perfect world-creator. In fact, I argue that if a supremely perfect world-creator were to exist and create a world, it would have to be a world than which there is no better creatable world.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2005 Cambridge University Press