^{page 185 note 1} I have particularly benefited from discussion of this paper with Bob Rabinoff of M.I.U., and with members of my own philosophy department. None of them, of course, can be held responsible for the result.

^{page 185 note 2} Kuhn, T. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn 1970).Google Scholar For an example of the discussion provoked, see Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1970).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 186 note 1} He used ‘paradigm’ – i.e. example or pattern – to emphasize that the framework of normal science is not formally set out in rules, but rather is ultimately to be picked up (via the codifications in text-books) from the great successful examples, such as Newton's Principia Mathematica or Darwin's Origin of Species.

^{page 188 note 1} Thus when Copernicus argued that the earth went round the sun rather than vice versa, his viewpoint had various mathematical advantages, but also raised such questions as: why then can we not observe stellar parallax, i.e. changes in the relative positions of the stars? The only reply could be, that the universe must be so huge that the parallax could not be seen. Naturally this was seen by opponents as a totally ad hoc defence. On this whole issue, cf. my ‘On Taking New Beliefs Seriously: A Case Study’ (Theoria to Theory, vol. 14, p. 43).Google Scholar Such points are in general accepted even by those who are most hostile to many aspects of Kuhn's account. E.g. it is the essence of Lakatos' ‘research programmes’ that they also have a ‘hard core’ of basic assumptions which are not currently up for revision, as well as a ‘protective belt’ of others which may be abandoned if necessary. See Lakatos, and Musgrave, , op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 188 note 2} The claim that we can produce a sufficiently neutral description does not imply that there could be such a thing as one which was absolutely neutral as between all possible viewpoints.

^{page 189 note 1} E.g. if they are between different worldviews developed in different cultures.

^{page 190 note 1} We might grasp the depth of the change in outlook by the following comparison. The Middle Ages had above all centred on religion. The rise of science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was intimately bound up with a disillusionment with religion (as it was then practised), due to the appalling strife between Catholic and Protestant. Now in turn, it is science (as it is now practised) with which there is often increasing disillusionment.

^{page 191 note 1} D'Espagnat, Bernard, ‘The Quantum Theory of Reality’, Scientific American (11 1979), p. 128.Google Scholar Even if some view of this sort were accepted, there would still be many further philosophical questions. One would be that of whether the dependence was conceptual (that it was logically impossible to conceive the relevant entities without reference to consciousness) or causal (that they were merely in fact dependent on it). In the rest of this paper I aim to be neutral on such points.

^{page 192 note 1} A classic collection of cases can be found in James, William, The Varieties of Religious Experience (Fontana, 1960).Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 2} If experiment is impossible, there is only the second-best method of systematically gathering and comparing the relevant accounts.

^{page 192 note 3} Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 1953), secs. 65–7.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 4} Some traditions would distinguish between meditation and contemplation.

^{page 192 note 5} A good survey is Goleman, D., The Varieties of the Meditative Experience (Rider, 1978).Google Scholar

^{page 193 note 1} Philosophers are again likely to ask whether there is a conceptual or a merely causal connection here (d p.191, nt.). I suspect that in the end I want to deny the exhaustiveness of this hallowed philosophical distinction. However, in this paper I can only say that I regard the connection as conceptual but as less than conclusive. Essentially it raises an onus of proof, rather than itself proving the point.

^{page 194 note 1} Those who accept the validity of the experience may, e.g., argue that this direct contact with reality is in principle immune to error in a way that even the best scientific investigation is not. This claim seems to me to reflect a typical paradigm clash: to those within one viewpoint, it seems impressive; to those outside it, it seems absurd. All I have the right to assume is that the fact that the experience feels like a contact with a deeper reality is a datum to be explained, if not to be accepted.

^{page 194 note 2} An example is Melchert, N., ‘Mystical Experience and Ontological Claims’, Philosophy and Phenomeno logical Research XXXVII, (1977), 445.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 195 note 1} However, TM does offer, for those who wish to understand its theoretical position, an explicit account with more emphasis on the unity rather than the union position. My view here is consistent with it, but not committed to it.

^{page 196 note 1} See, e.g., Johnson, D. W. Orme and Farrow, J. T. (eds.), Scientific Research on the Transcendental Meditation Programme, Collected Papers, vol. 1 (MERU Press, 1977).Google Scholar

^{page 196 note 2} Cf. Campbell, A., Seven States of Consciousness (Gollancz, 1973).Google Scholar

^{page 197 note 1} Translations of Patanjali include Prabhavananda, Swami and Isherwood, C., How to Know God: The Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali (Mentor, 1969).Google Scholar Though TM uses something like Patanjali's conceptual framework, participants are not required to accept it. See also my earlier article, op. cit.

^{page 198 note 1} Though all my experience so far suggests that this search is not just chasing a distant goal we might never reach, but is a cumulative process paying dividends in our lives in terms of increased joy, integration and creativity.

^{page 199 note 1} The distinction between field and local-entity theories is not as clearcut as this suggests. E.g. a field theory may be used for some explanations but not others in connection with the same phenomena. Cf. section 6.

^{page 199 note 2} There are already intriguing similarities between descriptions of pure consciousness and of the ‘vacuum state’ in physics, i.e. that least excited state of a field which will, when excited, manifest itself as a particle. TM is doing considerable work in this area, particularly at its American university, Maharishi International University, at Fairfield, Iowa. For a discussion of such questions which makes no reference to TM, cf. Capra, Fritjof, The Tao of Physics (Fontana, 1976).Google Scholar

^{page 200 note 1} I am not saying that a monism could not accommodate these values, or else my unitive neutrality would again be lost, this time in favour of a union view. In fact I think that any sort of deeply held unitive view, by making us aware of our ultimate connection with other things, tends to produce respect for others and the virtues of concern and compassion. This issue too, of course, would need much argument.

^{page 201 note 1} For some of the wide range of disciplines in which testing has already occurred, cf. again Orme-Johnson, and Farrow, , op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 202 note 1} Cf. Orme-Johnson, and Farrow, , op cit.Google Scholar

^{page 202 note 2} It differs from many traditional views in claiming that the development of such powers is a great aid to general spiritual development, whereas they have often been regarded as a hindrance.

^{page 202 note 3} I have described the phenomena in more detail elsewhere (op. cit.). At that stage I was so surprised by them that I was inclined to think that some of what I had seen was probably paranormal. Further experience of my own ‘hops’ (which I do not regard as paranormal) leads me to believe that what I have seen are merely remarkable physiological phenomena.