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Modelling complex conflicts: formalism or expertise?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Extract

The use of game theory to study international conflict has seen peaks and troughs of enthusiasm, high hopes alternating with disillusionment. A revival in recent years is evidenced by the wide interest aroused by non-technical, accessible applications—notably Axelrod’s work on cooperation. Meanwhile, the increasing use of computers to analyze many types of decision lends credence to the notion that with this new-found analytical power, one can move beyond the simplified models previously on offer. Indeed, several pieces of game-based software are now commercially available. The enthusiastic might claim that we stand on the threshold of an age in which no important decision involving conflict should be made without the backing of powerful, on-line analysis. The even more enthusiastic (of whom more below) are prone to claim that the threshold has already been crossed. However, there remain those for whom such claims cut very little ice, and there Is little consensus amongst theorists as to what sort of practical help can be offered to decision-makers.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1991

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