I am indebted to Professor Kraynak for the generous things he says about my career as teacher and scholar. I have had vague hopes for some such recognition in a distant future, but not in my lifetime. Leo Strauss, who had virtually no recognition in his lifetime except from the circle he created around himself, is having a veritable renaissance, some thirty or more years after his death. I believe that, in the last several years, there may have been more new books about Strauss than about Lincoln (the most written about of all time!).
At a banquet on Lincoln's birthday about ten years ago, Justice Clarence Thomas celebrated the prudence of the Founding Fathers. The prudence Thomas celebrated had particular reference to the compromises in the Constitution concerning slavery. Today, most justices, and most scholars, deplore the guarantees given slavery in the 1787 Constitution. This apparently immoral acceptance of slavery tells against a jurisprudence of the “original intent” of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution. It has accordingly given impetus to an alternative jurisprudence, of a “living Constitution,” one that claims to have “evolved” to a higher level of moral consciousness than that of the eighteenth-century intellectuals who framed and ratified the Constitution celebrated in the Federalist. Such a “higher level,” we are told, liberates the justices from a reactionary past. The greatest example of this liberated jurisprudence is Roe v. Wade.
Justice Thomas, in his speech, praised the Framers of the Constitution for the very thing for which others have blamed them. Following the argument and example of Abraham Lincoln, Justice Thomas noted the unvarying condemnation of slavery by the generation of the Founders, not only in the Declaration of Independence, but elsewhere in their writings.Footnote 1 But it was a political necessity in 1787 that slavery receive certain guarantees, if the Constitution was to be ratified. This was not a circumstance over which the framers had any control. They knew, however, that the failure to ratify the Constitution would leave slavery in a more powerful position, with a far greater possibility for growth and perpetuity. The concessions to slavery were made to a necessary evil. The failure to make these concessions would have assured a greater evil. The essence of prudence, or practical wisdom, is in any given case always to choose the lesser of two evils, or the greater of two goods. It is of course often difficult, sometimes even impossible, to know with any certainty which of two evils is the lesser and which of two goods is the greater. But the distinction between good and evil, however difficult it sometimes is to apply, is, nonetheless, the sovereign principle of human practical reason. Lincoln reduced slavery to “You work; I'll eat.” How can there be an obligation by a rational being to consent to an uncompensated taking from his mouth of the bread that his own hand has earned? Yielding to superior force is not consent. In his speech Justice Thomas followed Lincoln precisely, and very generously mentioned my writings on Lincoln as one source of his inspiration. He concluded this Lincoln's birthday banquet by calling for a toast, “to Abraham Lincoln and Harry Jaffa.” A Supreme Court Justice offering a toast on Lincoln's birthday to me and Abraham Lincoln together! I thought I had died and gone to heaven. Perhaps, then, Professor Kraynak is not altogether wrong concerning my supposed influence.
Turning to Kraynak's critique, he begins with my first book, Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (henceforward known as T&A). He correctly observes that this book marks the beginning of a lifelong quest for a rational and moral foundation for civic life (political and personal), one that is consistent with reason and immune to the corruption of the relativism and nihilism of a “value free” social science that claims the authority of modern natural science. He observes that I sought in Thomas Aquinas an interpreter of Aristotle who might confirm the ground in reason of Aristotle's ethics. He says I found instead a Christianized Aristotle, deferring to principles of revelation that could not be so confirmed. Kraynak's review of T&A is noteworthy for its sensitivity and accuracy, but it fails to account for a change in the author's perspective from a book written nearly sixty years ago.
I recently wrote a new introduction to the reprinting of T&A, in which I said that, when I wrote it, I thought it was Thomas's intention to make Aristotle safe for Christianity. I now think it was his intention to make Christianity safe for Aristotle. I have reason to believe that in time Leo Strauss had the same change of opinion concerning Thomas. The interpretation of Thomas in Natural Right and History, like that in T&A, reflects an earlier perspective. Strauss later came to a deeper appreciation of the complex subtleties of the mighty monk.
I have illustrated what I meant by making Christianity safe for Aristotle in a lecture I gave recently at Princeton and at Notre Dame. In it I took the Jefferson of the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty to represent Aristotelian prudence.Footnote 2 (“Thomas Aquinas Meets Thomas Jefferson” was published in Interpretation, Spring 2006). I pointed to Thomas's doctrine of natural law—that it represented the rational creature's participation in the eternal law, the eternal law being the law of God's government of the universe. By this doctrine homo sapiens could by his reason (that is to say, by the perfection of his reason) participate in God's government. In this, there is no necessary participation of positive divine law. According to Jefferson's statute, a man's civil rights have no more dependence upon his religious opinions, than his opinions in physics or geometry. It seems shocking to suggest that Thomas Aquinas had similar views. Yet the possibility of the direct participation of human beings, possessed of reason (but not necessarily Christian faith) in the divine government of the universe, would certainly seem to entitle them to an equal possibility to participate in civil government. This would mean, for example, that Jews or infidels, no less than Christians, had that right. This perfectly correct Jeffersonian inference from Thomas's premises is one that Thomas did not make and would no doubt have denied. He would have denied it for the same reason that Lincoln in 1858 denied any intention to make voters or jurors of Negroes or of permitting them to marry whites. An intention to follow the dictates of a color blind Constitution would also be a perfectly correct inference from Lincoln's explicit commitment in the Peoria speech to the principles of the Declaration of Independence. These principles led him to conclude: “Allow ALL the governed an equal voice in the government, and that, and that only is self-government” (emphasis by Lincoln). However, to have explicitly endorsed direct participation by Negroes in government in Illinois in 1858, to a public with overpowering racial prejudice, a public very imperfectly committed to the principles of the Declaration, would have destroyed Lincoln as a leader of the free soil movement. Lincoln's proximate goal was arresting the spread of slavery into the territories. To have advocated voting rights for Negroes in Illinois before the Civil War would only have divided those who were united in their opposition to the extension of slavery. Lincoln made it clear that in his mind stopping the spread of slavery was only the first step on the road to its ultimate extinction. He did not in 1858 address the question of what might become prudent when the end of that road was in sight. Similarly, Thomas was engaged in a great effort to bring reason (as distinct from unreasoning prejudice) into Christian doctrine. The benefits that might eventually accrue to Jews or infidels from that effort were not something that he could prudently bring to the attention of inquisitors hunting for heretics to burn. This comparison illuminates the fact that at different times and places religious prejudice and racial prejudice are among the most powerful obstacles to reason that prudence must circumvent. Prudence counsels caution and indirection in the face of such obstacles, but compromises do not of themselves imply a lack of principle.
No better commentary on the meaning of prudence has ever been written than Churchill's essay on “Consistency in Politics.”Footnote 3
[A] Statesman in contact with the moving current of events and anxious to keep the ship on an even keel and steer a steady course may lean all his weight now on one side and now on the other. His argument in each case when contrasted can be shown to be not only very different in character, but contradictory in spirit and opposite in direction: yet his object will throughout have remained the same. His resolves, his wishes, his outlook may have been unchanged; his methods may be verbally irreconcilable. We cannot call this inconsistency. It may in fact be claimed to be the truest consistency. The only way a man can remain consistent amid changing circumstances is to change with them while preserving the same dominating purpose.
In what follows, Churchill takes Edmund Burke as an unsurpassed example of inconsistency in the service of consistency.
His Thoughts on the Present Discontents, his writings and speeches on conciliation with America, form the main body and lasting armory of Liberal opinion throughout the English speaking world. His Letters on a Regicide Peace, and Reflections on the French Revolution, will continue to furnish Conservatives for all time with the most formidable array of opposing weapons. … History easily discerns the reasons and forces which actuated him, and the immense changes in the problems he was facing which evoked from the same profound mind and sincere spirit these entirely contrary manifestations. His soul revolted against tyranny, whether it appeared in the aspect of a domineering Monarch and a corrupt Court and Parliamentary system, or whether, mouthing the watch-words of a non-existent liberty it towered up against him in the dictation of a brutal mob and wicked sect.Footnote 4
However, what Churchill says, “History easily discerns,” may not always be so easily discerned, as the vast literature of controversy on Burke himself attests. It may, however, be easy when history speaks through the rare and compelling genius of Winston Churchill. What Churchill sees, but what others do not see, is the perspective that unites Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Edmund Burke, and Winston Churchill himself. Contemporary scholarship, under the domination of historicism, regards differences of time and place as fundamental, while regarding assertions of principle, especially universal principles of right and wrong, just and unjust, as not meaning what they say, but merely reflecting the interests of the persons expressing them. It was Leo Strauss's mission to persuade us (or at least some of us) that there was a realm of principle that had no time or place, within which political philosophy had its being, and from which there was a view of the human condition which embraced all times and all places. From this view it was and is possible to judge the relative merits of the moral and political judgments of time- and place-bound partisans. From this same perspective it is also possible to see the notable intrusions within time and place of those great thinkers and actors who have illuminated the human condition by insights from beyond the veil of mortality.
Professor Kraynak writes:
What I shall … argue is that in the course of development Jaffa changed strategies by moving from a defense of classical natural right—chiefly Aristotle's version—to a defense of modern natural rights—chiefly the principles of the Declaration of Independence—and that the change led Jaffa to depart from Strauss's thought (insert page numbers).
In reply I shall argue that classical natural right and the natural rights of the Declaration of Independence, properly understood, do not differ in the sense assumed by Professor Kraynak. Correctly understood, the principles of the Declaration represent the principles of classical natural right in the most perfect form possible in a political world dominated by Christian monotheism. I shall also argue that far from departing from Strauss's thought, this interpretation of the American Founding represents the fulfillment of Strauss's intention to find a means whereby classical natural right might remedy the defects of present-day constitutional thought, thought that is based upon a radical rejection of the Socratic tradition of political philosophy.
The core of Strauss's rejection of doctrinal modernity was the degeneracy of that modernity into moral relativism, legal positivism, and finally, into nihilism.Footnote 5 In the currently dominant version of modernity, individual rights become individual preferences. These in turn are called “value judgments” and are said to be rooted in our passions, which reason is said to be unable to validate or invalidate. Stephen A. Douglas was in perfect agreement with a majority of today's social scientists and legal scholars, in saying that he cared not whether slavery was voted up or voted down. However, in saying that he did care for the “sacred right” of the people to decide, he did recognize a right having a status akin to the one he denied. In this he differed from the “pure” value neutral theorists who rule the present scene.
Strauss saw no such separation of classical natural right from the American Founding as Kraynak assumes. Strauss's essay “On Classical Political Philosophy” was first published in 1945 and was reprinted in 1959 in What Is Political Philosophy?Footnote 6 There is no more profound or authoritative record of Strauss's understanding of and commitment to classical political philosophy. Its writing and publication happened to correspond with the first year I studied with Strauss, and I was certainly exposed—before publication—to its argument, both in his classes and in my visits to his home in Riverdale. The close connection between classical political philosophy and pre-philosophic political opinion articulated in this essay was decisive in shaping my scholarship. In this essay we find the most emphatic articulation of Strauss's thesis that classical political philosophy was grounded directly in the distinctions intrinsic to prephilosophic political life. This is the point of his break with Heidegger. In his quest for the roots of western philosophy, Heidegger went behind Socratic to pre-Socratic philosophy, where the moral cosmos is dissolved into the chaos out of which our world—whether created or uncreated—emerged. According to Aristotle and Strauss, we must begin our reasoning with what is known to us, prior to philosophy. The political philosopher thus comes to light presiding over the conflicts that arise in prephilosophic political life. The philosophic resolution of these conflicts preserves the prephilosophic distinctions, but preserves them in a form emancipated from the contradictions that caused the conflicts. But the continuity between the prephilosophic and the philosophic understanding is the notable difference between classical political science and today's version, which attempts to understand politics scientifically, that is, in a vernacular alien to political life itself. I never reread this essay of Strauss without seeing Crisis of the House Divided springing from its pages. Although Lincoln is a political partisan in the Lincoln-Douglas debates, he brings into his analysis of the chief question dividing them—the morality of slavery—a perspective which is nothing less than that of political philosophy. When Lincoln said that a black woman had the same right as he himself, or Judge Douglas, or any other man, to put into her mouth the bread that her own hand had earned, he was invoking natural right—and the principle of natural equality—in their purest form. In doing so, he was appealing to distinctions rooted in the human condition, that transcend ancients and moderns, and that required no recasting by modern science. In 1946, when I discovered the Lincoln-Douglas debates, at a time when I was reading Plato's Republic with Strauss, I was struck by the resemblance, nay identity, of the issue between Socrates and Thrasymachus, and that between Lincoln and Douglas. Thrasymachus had defined justice as the interest of the stronger. In a democracy that meant that whatever the people—or a majority of the people—decided was in their interest, was for that reason just. Whoever had the power—whether the people or a tyrant—had the right. According to Douglas, if the people of a territory, or a state, decided that slavery was in their interest, they had the right to make it lawful. Or they might reverse themselves and by their votes cause it to become unlawful.Footnote 7 Lincoln on the other hand, like Socrates, did not believe the people (any more than tyrants) made the moral law, but rather that the moral law made them a people, as distinct from a gang of thieves. Lincoln did not believe there was such a thing as a right to vote for what was wrong, any more than that there was a right to do wrong. In thus drawing the issue between himself and Douglas, Lincoln demonstrated the relevance of Socratic political philosophy in the postclassical world, exactly as Strauss intended.
The central theme of classical political philosophy, according to Strauss, is the question of the best regime. The discussion of this question is in the exact center of the essay.Footnote 8 Strauss's summary rendition of the classics’ understanding of the best regime follows:
The groups, or types, whose claims to rule were considered by the classical philosophers were “the good” (men of merit), the rich, the noble, and the multitude, or the poor citizens; in the foreground of the political scene in the Greek cities, as well as a in other places, was the struggle between the rich and the poor. The claim to rule which is based on merit, on human excellence, on “virtue,” appeared to be the least controversial: courageous and skilful generals, incorruptible and equitable judges, wise and unselfish magistrates, are generally preferred. Thus “aristocracy” (rule of the best) presented itself as the natural answer of all good men to the natural question of the best political order. As Thomas Jefferson put it, “That form of government is the best, which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of [the] natural aristoi into the offices of government.” (What is Political Philosophy, 83–84)
Surely it is remarkable that Strauss chose the author of the Declaration of Independence to express his own most profound insight into classical political philosophy. Nor could he for a moment have supposed that Jefferson had contradicted—or forgotten—what he had written in the Declaration. Our insight into Jefferson, Strauss, and the American Founding will be greater if we read the larger passage from which Strauss took his quotation. It is from a letter to John Adams of October 28, 1813.
For I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. … There is also an artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents; for with these it would belong to the first class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. And indeed it would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man for the social state, and not have provided virtue and wisdom enough to manage the concerns of the society. May we not even say, that that form of government is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government? The artificial aristocracy is a mischievous ingredient in government, and provision should be made to prevent its ascendancy.
Notice that Strauss has turned a somewhat less emphatic rhetorical question into a simple declaration. Strauss becomes even more Jeffersonian than Jefferson! More important, however, is the pure classicism of the whole passage. In saying that creation, or nature, had formed man for the social state, Jefferson rejects one of the main contentions of Hobbes's anti-Aristotelian individualism, which asserts the nature of man to be asocial, or antisocial. In some respects this passage is more Platonic than Aristotelian, as when Jefferson speaks of human beings belonging by nature to one class or another. Calling the natural aristocracy the most precious gift of nature for the government of mankind locates Jefferson's political thought—and the political thought that informed the Declaration of Independence—wholly and irretrievably within classical boundaries.
We see moreover that in Jefferson's mind—as in Strauss's—there is no impediment to the rule of the aristoi arising from the equality proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence. On the contrary, it is the consent of the governed, arising from original equality, which becomes the means whereby the people may distinguish the pseudo-aristoi from the real ones. The non-aristoi, who in the Jeffersonian republic will have full participation in the electoral process, will have the same interest in choosing real aristocrats to govern, as the layman has in choosing real doctors rather than quacks. For Jefferson, as for Strauss, the means for preventing quacks from taking over the government was by education.
When Strauss wrote “What Is Liberal Education?” he was thinking of how liberal education might rescue us from the evils that had come upon us in the name of democracy. What is now called democracy has drifted far from anything wished for by Thomas Jefferson. It is in fact democracy drugged by relativism and nihilism, and demoralized by a “value free” social science. Here is what Strauss wrote in 1959:
Liberal education is the counterpoison to mass culture, to the corroding effects of mass culture, to its inherent tendency to produce nothing but ‘specialists without spirit or vision and voluptuaries without heart.’ Liberal education is the ladder by which we try to ascend from mass democracy to democracy as originally meant. Liberal education is the necessary endeavor to found an aristocracy within democratic mass society. (“What Is Liberal Education?”)
We see here agreement between Strauss and Jefferson, both as to the desirability and possibility of aristocracy within democracy. If “democracy as originally meant” had prevailed, no counterpoison would now be required. But the relevance of classical political philosophy, as Jefferson expressed it, is endorsed by Strauss, and creates a presumption in favor of the Founding as an attempt to create a classical republic, so far as possible, within a postclassical world.
It follows that the problem of government is twofold: First to discover and empower the genuine aristoi, and then prevent the ascendancy of the spurious. Jefferson's reputation as anti-aristocratic stems from his ceaseless denunciation of the pseudo-aristocracies of the ancien regimes of eighteenth-century Europe. The rule of kings and priests, whose claims were without merit, aroused Jefferson's greatest indignation. Divine right monarchy, supporting and supported by a class system of inherited wealth and birth, constituted the negation of aristocracy, as understood by classical political philosophy no less than by Jefferson. But the true aristoi—the guardians of the republic provided by nature—still required the education that would turn their potential for rule into actual qualifications for rule. It is good to remember that the third of the three things by which Jefferson wished most to be remembered was “Father of the University of Virginia.” The success of the Jeffersonian vision—the vision by and large of all the Founding Fathers—depended upon an essentially classical education. This education would assist the people in a democracy to recognize their true representatives, and defeat the plots of the scoundrels posing as aristocrats.
However, how do we reconcile the commitment to the rule of the natural aristoi with the equality proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence? Before addressing that question directly, let us consider how differently the prudence or practical wisdom (phronesis) of political philosophy operates in the environment of the city of classical antiquity, compared to that of the state of the modern centuries. The idea of law in the ancient city is expressed by Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, when he says that “whatever the law does not command, it forbids.” There is no action which is neither commanded nor forbidden. There is no personal freedom apart from the law. What we call personal freedom is no part of the law of the ancient city. We can instantly recognize the agreement here with the law in the Books of Moses. It would also fit the ancient cities described in Fustel de Coulanges's The Ancient City, a book praised extravagantly by Leo Strauss. But the ancient polity was one that evolved from the family to the clan to the tribe, and was essentially a collection of tribes—as it was in ancient Israel. The morality of ancient law resulted from a syncretistic process, whereby the gods of the different families and tribes elided, and thus became the gods of the city. In their origin, however, the gods of the cities were family gods, and an inward looking ethnocentric patriarchalism governed the outlook of the citizens, who scarcely recognized the humanity of noncitizens. Consider the fate of the Melians at the hands of the Athenians, and of the Canaanites at the hands of the Israelites. This patriarchalism was also reproduced in the senates of ancient cities, which were constituted by the elders of the elder families, who were considered to be closer to the gods than were later comers. In the Antigone we see a conflict arising between the gods of the city and the gods of the family. The law of the family appears as the older and more authoritative, but it is anarchistic in its harm to the ability of the city to defend itself. Freedom in the ancient city is entirely preoccupied with the independence of the city itself, and it has nothing to do with the rights of individuals apart from the city or within the city. To be conquered or captured in war meant being separated from the gods of one's city, the defeat of one's city and its gods being more or less the same. There was little or no respect for the life of someone captured in war, and a captured warrior, or any citizen of a defeated city, was subject to being killed or enslaved, unless he or she had the good fortune of being adopted into a family of the victorious city.Footnote 9 Citizenship was understood as partnership in the worship of the families of the tribes that made up the city. “Whoring after strange gods” meant treason. The accusation against Socrates for not believing in the gods of the city, and of teaching his unbelief to the young men of Athens, corresponds closely to the anticommunism of the late Senator McCarthy.
The books of Moses chronicle the never-ending struggle between a jealous God and an inconstant people. A detached observer (not that such is possible) might wonder whether God needed Israel more than Israel needed God. It is clear, however, that the identities of Israel and of God were inextricably linked. God strives tirelessly (and it sometimes seems vainly) to secure the fidelity of His people, like a husband trying to domesticate a straying but yet beloved wife. The husband (God) is monogamous, but the wife (Israel) is not! It has been well said, and often said, that it was easier for Moses to get the Jews out of Egypt than to get Egypt out of the Jews. The episode of the golden calf illuminates this most essential difference between law in the ancient city and in constitutional government as we understand it. The first table of the Ten Commandments is almost entirely devoted to disciplining Israel in the exclusive worship of the One God. The making of graven images or, indeed, of any images, is prohibited because God knows that any sensible image of a sensible object, and in particular of an animal, is likely to become an object of worship. God had staked everything upon the fact that, as an invisible God, whose name could not be pronounced, he differed from every other deity. And God knew the propensities that the Israelites shared with other ancient peoples, and in particular with the Egyptians, among whom they had dwelt for so long. This was proved the moment Moses was absent upon the mountain. In the worship of the golden calf we see the crisis of the regime in its starkest form. It is difficult for us today to understand the profundity of this political crisis, which concerns something we would regard as essentially and constitutionally private. No one could tell Moses, or God, that the Israelites were exercising their natural right to the free exercise of religion. Only the discipline of God's law could turn a ragged and demoralized band of runaway slaves into the fighting force that would invade Canaan. To imagine ancient Israel, imagine a whole people subject to the same discipline as the United States Marine Corps, with the individual completely absorbed into the mission whose aim and purpose is found only in the Law. And it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell any difference between the Law as means and the Law as end. “The reward of the commandment is the commandment.” Indeed, the idea of religion, or the idea of a church as distinct from a state, was unknown to the ancient world. The words “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” are inconceivable in the law of an ancient people. Nothing better illustrates the difference between constitutionalism—ancient and modern—or better illustrates the different role of prudence with respect to these differences.
The separation of what we would call religious worship from political loyalty or obedience to lawful government is perhaps the most momentous step in the political history of mankind. When Jesus answered the Pharisee that we should “render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's,” he drew a distinction between civil and religious authority which I believe was unprecedented. Consider that, under David and Solomon, when Israel was an independent polity, Jesus could never have made such a statement. The law of Israel came from God. There was no distinction between what Israelites might owe to God and what they might owe to lawful authority. Jesus’ response to the Pharisee was the first giant step on the long, long road to our First Amendment, to limited constitutional government, and to a prudence that affirms (contrary to the words but not to the intentions of Aristotle and Moses) that “what the law does not forbid it permits.”
The Israel Jesus knew was a province of the Roman Empire. Caesar's conquest of the world of classical antiquity left only one sovereign government in that world, the government of Rome. As the cities of the ancient world were conquered by Rome, so were their gods. By the logic of the ancient city, if there could be only one city, there could be only one god. The transformation of the ancient world from polytheism to monotheism, however long and complicated, seems nonetheless to have been in some sense predestined by the conquests of Caesar. Dante, in On Monarchy, thought the role of Caesar no less providential than that of Christ. The Gospel could not have been preached beyond the borders of Israel in cities that had not lost their gods to Rome.
However, the establishment of Christian monotheism ruptured the connection between God and law that characterized the ancient city. The Christian God, as the one and only God, would not be the author of the different municipal laws of the different peoples. The Christian God could not be to Christians what the God of Israel was to Israelites: the immediate author of their laws and of their identity as a people. While the Christian God was not seen as a legislating God, he was, nonetheless, seen as the source of legitimate political authority. Lincoln, however, saw the divine right of kings as a justification of slavery. While Lincoln may have oversimplified the history of political theories, he accurately pinpointed the prevalence for more than a millennium of the legitimation of political authority from God to rulers, from the top down. During this millennial time, the political history of the Christian West was dominated by contests as to who held the mandate to rule from God: popes against emperors, popes against kings, king against kings, and, finally, kings against peoples. In all these contests, it was never doubted that a legitimate ruler was in some way or manner anointed by God. Who was authorized to do the anointing and who was entitled to receive it were matters of the fiercest dispute, but not the requirement itself.
Shakespeare's Henry V presents the classic formulation of this dilemma of Christian statesmanship. Before the battle of Agincourt, Henry calls on God to forget his father's crime in usurping the crown of an anointed king. Henry does not doubt that that such usurpation was a crime, and that his was a tainted inheritance. Like Hamlet's uncle, however, Henry is not willing to abandon the fruits of his father's sin. His attachment to the crown is not less than that of Lady Macbeth. Henry solves his problem by attributing his victory at Agincourt to God. His forces were outnumbered by more than ten to one, so that the victory might reasonably be thought miraculous. We might reasonably attribute the victory to Henry's leadership, but it was very much in his interest to think, and to have others think, that God had given him the victory, and that this providential fact repaired the defect in Henry's title to divine right. Henry gives orders to his army that all the credit for victory must be given to God. He forbids any rejoicing or any of the looting customary in the wake of victory. We are reminded of Henry's speech before Harfleur, when he demands the surrender of the town, and warns the governor that if his troops have to take the town by storm, he will not be able to control them in the aftermath. He is very specific abut the plundering and raping, in particular the raping of virgins, that will ensue. Yet in the aftermath of Agincourt, he exercises precisely the control that he had before said that he would not possess. Yet that control is now precisely in the service of deploying God to bestow upon him the divine right of kings.
The unfortunate Bardolph (the old companion of Falstaff) is caught in the act of plunder and is promptly hanged. That God's approval was required for government to be legitimate seems never to have been doubted within the horizon of Shakespeare's English histories. That approval, moreover, seems to have been an indispensable element of political power and influence. As we shall see, the Declaration of Independence, in submitting itself to the “supreme judge of the world,” fits squarely in this mold. It was only because the signers of the Declaration were confident that the approval of the aforesaid judge was now on the side of the people, not on the side of kings, that they relied upon the protection of divine providence.
The long transition from the age of inequality to government based upon the equality of man and the rights of individuals is visible within the Declaration of Independence itself. After saying that “governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,” the Declaration continues:
[T]hat whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.
We notice that the rights with which each human being is endowed by his creator, and which are undiminished in the state of nature, are transformed into the ends of government. These are the joint possession of fellow citizens, who are now under the authority of a common government. And those ends are safety and happiness, which are the ends—the alpha and omega—of the political community in Aristotle's Politics. The reference to ends in the sense of final causes is eminently Aristotelian. This transformation of rights into ends corresponds with the movement of individuals from the state of nature into the state of civil society. The right of the people “to alter or abolish … and to institute new government” is a collective right. In the state of nature, no one could act on behalf of anyone else. Now the many can act as one, as they must in dissolving an old government and forming a new one.
This movement from the manyness of the state of nature to the oneness of political government is accomplished by a social contract or compact. In the writings of James Madison we find repeated, again and again, that all free government rests upon compact. We take this to be an axiomatic premise of the American Revolution and Founding. It is as well the prudent form of political philosophy in the circumstances faced by the Founders and Lincoln, in their postclassical, post-Reformation world. Today, the ideas of a state of nature and of a social contract are looked upon as unhistorical, the relics of eighteenth-century thought. Yet they are intrinsic to the constitutional thought of the Founding. All intelligent scholarship on this topic stands upon the foundation of Leo Strauss's refutation of historicism. The state of nature and the social contract are more immediately intelligible, however, if we understand them as necessary inferences from that most fundamental of all propositions, “that all men are created equal.” It follows that if no human being is by nature the ruler of any other human being—as any human being is by nature the ruler of any horse or dog—then legitimate political authority can arise only from consent. By this we mean that there is no rational ground of obligation other than consent. By consent we mean a rational calculation that obedience to the laws to which one is consenting is in the interest of the one consenting, and is not mere acquiescence to force or fraud. In the first Federalist Hamilton opines that the success of the Constitution will determine “whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions, on accident and force.” This messianic view of the role of America in world history runs throughout the Founding, and finds its supreme expression in the Gettysburg Address.
The condition of human beings, prior to the social contract, is what is meant by the state of nature. That there should be such a state is, to repeat, a logical necessity inherent in the proposition that all men are created equal. Whether in any given case the contract envisaged is prior in time to an existing political community, it is always prior in thought. In any legitimate polity the citizens are aware that their inalienable rights originate in a state in which there is no dominion, no lawful authority, of one human being over another. They know that their obedience to the laws depends upon their enlightened consent to replace the state of nature with that of civil society. The commitment to original equality is enshrined in both the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address. The undeniable truth of this original equality is impressed upon our minds each time we compare the origin of the authority of humans over the lower animals, with the authority of humans over humans. The transition from the state of nature to that of civil society by a social contract, it is, again, a logical necessity. It is also a voluntary action, and civil society is a voluntary association. It may be thought that this contradicts Aristotle's assertion that the polis is natural to man's humanity, and that it “grows” out of family and the tribe as much as the oak tree grows out of the acorn. Aristotle says, however, that although the impulse to form a political community is in all men by nature, nonetheless “the man who first united people in such a partnership was the greatest of benefactors.” The origins of the political community depend upon a voluntary action by a being whose nature is, above all, marked by reason, and who must, therefore, have exercised reason in fulfilling those requirements of his nature that go beyond the nature he shares with the lower animals.
The social contract theory espoused by Madison, and implicit in the Declaration of Independence, considers that human beings “created equal” with respect to the rights with which they have been endowed by their creator, assemble to form a political community. They do so recognizing that the absence of legitimate political authority means that there is nothing to defend their natural and God-given rights, other than their individual natural force. Their original natural freedom from any authority other than their own is perfect. Their insecurity is equally perfect. In the formation of a civil society, they bring into being a government in which the power of all can defend each. But the government possesses such power only because each contracting member has agreed to join with his fellow citizens in forming that power.
Let us reflect on this first and most fundamental element of the social contract. First, we must see that this agreement is unanimous. Whoever does not join is no part of the community. Whoever does join is entitled to the same protection as every other contracting member who is now a fellow citizen. Here is the origin of the seminal doctrine of the equal protection of the laws. No one, on this basis, can assert that his life or liberty or property is more deserving of protection than anyone else's. Nor can anyone assert that his obligation to join in the common defense is less than anyone else's. The very formation of the political community makes everyone a member of its militia. And no one's property is less liable to support the common defense than anyone else's. That is to say, the obligation to pay taxes for the common defense is equal to the obligation to bear arms in the common defense. These are the broad general conclusions to be drawn from the fundamental proposition that all human beings are equally endowed by their creator with unalienable rights, and that they enter into a unanimous agreement for the mutual protection of those rights. The aforesaid agreement, however, is barren until implemented by the formation of government. In making the decisions leading to the formation of government, and in the operation of the government, unanimity is impossible. The nearest practicable approach to unanimity is majority rule. Let us understand, however, that the aforesaid unanimity limits and defines the legitimate scope of majority rule. We must understand that its purpose is to implement the equal protection of the rights of individual human beings, rights which are antecedent to the political community. There can be no lawful decision by the majority to benefit the majority at the expense of the minority. The rule of the majority is, therefore, understood to be in behalf of the minority no less than of the majority. The minority may differ from the majority on the question of means, but not of ends. Strictly speaking, there are no majority rights or minority rights; there are only the rights with which each human being is endowed by his creator. In the forefront of the deliberations leading to the majority is the question of the common good. The political health of the community, like the physical health of the citizens, is not served equally by anyone, but by those whose character, intelligence, experience, and education best qualifies them for the offices. In principle, the political process is that by which a democracy is transformed into an aristocracy.
Next let us consider briefly the relationship of the rights of fellow citizens to those of human beings outside the political community. The government of fellow citizens has an equal obligation to protect the rights of each, but it has no such obligation to those outside the community. But we must remember that prior to the social contract, each one of the now fellow citizens recognized himself and every other human being everywhere to be created equal. The American cause in the American Revolution was first articulated for the nation by the Continental Congress on July 6, 1775, in the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms. The Congress declares that it is impossible for men “who exercise their reason to believe that the divine Author of our existence intended a part of the human race to hold an absolute property in, and an unbounded power over others … as the objects of a legal domination never rightfully resistible, however severe and oppressive.” A year before the Declaration of Independence, and more explicitly than in the Declaration itself, the Congress denounces the very idea of the possibility of human beings, being created equal, having property in each other. Moral obligation, apart from political obligation, extends to all members of the human race. Participation in the human race belongs to all who “exercise their reason.” The fact that slavery and unjust inequality, in many forms, have long characterized the human condition only means that reason has failed hitherto to govern mankind. As I have written before, and often, the United States was (so far as I know) the first nation in the world to claim a right to independence not because of any virtue peculiar to itself, but on the basis of rights that it shared with all men everywhere. Contrast this with the Athenian belief in autochthony, reproduced by Plato as one of the noble lies of the Republic, and the biblical belief in a right to a land because it was promised to them by their God. In both cases, the right claimed, whether by Athenians or Israelites, entitled them to kill or enslave anyone who stood in the way of their possession of the land they claimed.
The transformation from the law of the ancient city to that of the constitutionalism inherent in the Declaration of Independence took place because of the social contract. Before such a contract could be envisaged, the polytheism of the classical world had to be replaced by the monotheism of Christianity. Christianity transformed the covenant of God with Abraham, a patriarchal covenant with a particular people, into a covenant with all mankind, or least to anyone of all mankind who accepted the covenant. The invisible community of believers did not constitute a polity in this world. But it had a decisive, or rather catastrophic, effect on the polities of this world. Kings thought it their responsibility as God's anointed representatives to shepherd their subjects through the gates of salvation, while protecting them from contamination by false prophets. That belief involved their subjects in domestic or civil wars against heretics and foreign wars against infidels. These wars dominated European politics in the centuries before the American Founding. The minds of the Founders were governed by the determination to create a politics free from sectarian religious passions. Such a politics was absolutely necessary if there was to be constitutional government. Constitutional government, flowing from human equality and the social contract, requires majority rule as its instrument. But the majority can have no lawful power that entitles a majority of Catholics to determine the religion of Protestants, or Protestants of Catholics, or Christians of Jews, or Jews of Muslims, or those of any religious persuasion to determine the faiths of others. We have already noted that the first impulse to remove our relationship with God from political government came from Jesus’ reply to the Pharisee. A more proximate source would be Locke's Letters on Toleration. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, followed by Jefferson's Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, was a by-product of Locke's Letters. The essential unity of Locke's political thought and Aristotle's, across the broad spectrum of the ancient and modern worlds, may be seen here. The problem of reconciling religious freedom with political freedom did not exist in the world of Aristotle's polis. Each city had its own gods, and accepting or professing to accept one's own city's god, was no more sectarian than reciting the oath of allegiance. Certainly no one was burned at the stake for heresy, or for not worshipping in the prescribed manner. The peaceful coexistence of the different faiths, as well as different ethnicities, became possible only as the acceptance of human equality—that all men are created equal—brought human rationality into the formation of government. The rationality of this solution is what makes it prudent, and what makes it prudent makes it no less Aristotelian than Lockean. I would add that it makes it no less Straussian. I conclude with one of Strauss's familiar sayings, that Socrates had more in common with any intelligent American than he had with any stupid Athenian. The principles of political philosophy relate to a human condition that, like the human soul itself, is not located in time or place.
