Much has been written about Locke's Second Treatise, but still, I believe, the book's main line of argument has been left unclear. Some concepts need more prominence — the duty to preserve mankind, the right of war, and private judgment; others need less — consent, majority rule, and property. Locke's aim was not to show that political obligation rests upon consent: that is assumed without argument. What he set out to prove is that there are certain limits to political obligation which not even consent could set aside.

This essay seeks to explain the contribution that Indian tradition can make to development theory and to assess the possibility of evolving a “new” development in India based on some of the basic values of this tradition.

… if all of us who come from Nietzscheism, from nihilism, or from historical materialism, said in public that we were wrong and that there are moral values and that in the future we shall do what is necessary to establish and illustrate them, don't you believe this would be the beginning of a hope?

In recent years many scholars have contributed to the development of Marxist analyses of urban political economy. At the same time, a smaller number of social and political theorists have examined Marx's political theory and identified his theory of public and private life as a central component of his politics. Too often, Marxist analyses of urban political economy do not fully incorporate Marx's political theory. Analyses of Marx's politics, on the other hand, tend to overlook the dimensions of the modern city which illuminate his theory of public and private. This article brings together Marx's urban theory and political theory and suggests that they are, in fact, very much intertwined.

In his 24 September 1981 television address presenting the argument for a second round of budget cuts, President Reagan concluded by citing an old authority:

More than a century ago a Frenchman came to America and later wrote a book for his countrymen telling them what he had seen here. He told them that in America when a citizen saw a problem that needed solving he would cross the street and talk to a neighbor about it and the first thing you know a committee would be formed and before long the problem would be solved. And then he added, “you may not believe this, but not a single bureaucrat would have been involved.”

It has often been noted that opponents of the doctrine of natural law sometimes claim that it is no accident that its principal elaborators and defenders have been Christians who attempt to forge a doctrine that harmonizes reason and revelation, nature and grace. But, the argument goes, natural law theorists achieve that harmony by claiming that reason knows things about nature that wise and reasonable nonbelievers fail to see there. So it is interesting to see one who is a believer and, at least in appearance, a defender of the doctrine of natural law admitting the validity of the nonbeliever's objection, at least on one major point.

Professor Goerner has little or nothing to say about my critical assessment of John Finnis's book, in which I take it he concurs. His main concern is with some incidental remarks that I was led to make regarding the much debated and still unresolved question of the “naturalness” of the natural law as Thomas Aquinas understood it. The purpose of these remarks was twofold. First, since I had raised doubts about the theoretical viability of the modern rights doctrine, I did not wish to leave the reader with the impression that I was advocating a pure and simple return to the old natural law theory, which, although more adequate, is not without serious difficulties of its own.