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EXTERNALISM, INTERNALISM, AND LOGICAL TRUTH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2009

CORINE BESSON*
Affiliation:
St Hugh's College, Oxford
*
*ST HUGH'S COLLEGE, OXFORD OX2 6LE, UK, E-mail:corine.besson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

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The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist--internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic is a free logic—a second order logic free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns, while an externalist second-order logic is not free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns—it is existentially committed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2009