Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T07:16:02.780Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

LOGICS FOR PROPOSITIONAL CONTINGENTISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 March 2017

PETER FRITZ*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, University of Oslo
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, CLASSICS, HISTORY OF ART AND IDEAS UNIVERSITY OF OSLO POSTBOKS 1020 BLINDERN 0315 OSLO, NORWAY E-mail: peter.fritz@ifikk.uio.no
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

Robert Stalnaker has recently advocated propositional contingentism, the claim that it is contingent what propositions there are. He has proposed a philosophical theory of contingency in what propositions there are and sketched a possible worlds model theory for it. In this paper, such models are used to interpret two propositional modal languages: one containing an existential propositional quantifier, and one containing an existential propositional operator. It is shown that the resulting logic containing an existential quantifier is not recursively axiomatizable, as it is recursively isomorphic to second-order logic, and a natural candidate axiomatization for the resulting logic containing an existential operator is shown to be incomplete.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2017