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ON TRUTH-FUNCTIONALITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2010

DANIEL J. HILL*
Affiliation:
University of Liverpool
STEPHEN K. McLEOD*
Affiliation:
University of Liverpool
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL, 7 ABERCROMBY SQUARE, LIVERPOOL L69 7WY, UNITED KINGDOM. E-mail:djhill@liv.ac.uk, skmcleod@liv.ac.uk
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL, 7 ABERCROMBY SQUARE, LIVERPOOL L69 7WY, UNITED KINGDOM. E-mail:djhill@liv.ac.uk, skmcleod@liv.ac.uk
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Abstract

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Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is immune from the counterexamples that Schnieder proposes and is preferable to Schnieder’s alternative.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2010