Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T13:42:52.007Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

PROPOSITIONAL CONTINGENTISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2015

PETER FRITZ*
Affiliation:
University of Oslo
*
*POSTBOKS 1020 BLINDERN 0315 OSLO, NORWAY E-mail: peter.fritz@ifikk.uio.no
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

According to propositional contingentism, it is contingent what propositions there are. This paper presents two ways of modeling contingency in what propositions there are using two classes of possible worlds models. The two classes of models are shown to be equivalent as models of contingency in what propositions there are, although they differ as to which other aspects of reality they represent. These constructions are based on recent work by Robert Stalnaker; the aim of this paper is to explain, expand, and, in one aspect, correct Stalnaker’s discussion.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2015