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The first person: problems of sense and reference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2010

Extract

0 Consider ‘I’ as used by a given speaker and some ordinary proper name of that speaker: are these two coreferential singular terms which differ in Fregean sense? If they could be shown to be so, we might be able to explain the logical and epistemological peculiarities of ‘I’ by appeal to its special sense and yet feel no temptation to think of its reference as anything more exotic than a human being.

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Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2000

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