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How Many Selves Make Me?1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Extract

The answer to the title question which I want to defend in this paper is ‘none’. That is: I doubt strongly that the notion of ‘a self’ has any use whatsoever as part of an explanans for the explanandum ‘person’.

Put another way: I shall argue that the question itself is misguided, pointing the inquirer in quite the wrong direction by suggesting that the term ‘self’ points to something which can sustain a philosophically interesting or important degree of reification.

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Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1991

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