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Agency and Freedom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2010

Extract

Moore in Ethics (1912), ch. vii, writes – if I understand him right – that our basic experience of free-will resides in our certain feeling, in regard to our past actions, that we could have acted differently if we had so chosen; more exactly, that we should have acted differently if we had so chosen, which precisely means that we could have acted differently. He adds the qualifying adverb ‘sometimes’; I think we may well say always, keeping in mind, of course, (i) that we are only concerned here with ‘actions’ proper, as contrasted with involuntary movements, twitchings, starts, fits, etc., and also with wholly habitual, routine-like movements or manipulations performed without any attention and without the slightest deliberation, and (ii) that only such actions are meant here as are within our range of physical or psycho-physical power, which is anyhow implicit in the concept of choice: there is no sense in my saying that I might here and now ‘choose’ to carry this building on my back to Paris, to dismiss the present Government or to continue writing in impeccable Japanese. However, Moore is aware of the clearly meaningful objection that ‘acting as we choose’ (within those obvious limits) would not establish the fact of free-will unless it were also the case that our choice itself is (often) free, in other words that we not only choose to act so instead of acting differently but also choose to choose so instead of choosing differently. He argues that this too is indeed (often) the case, emphasising in this context our experience of the unpredictability, even by ourselves, of our future choices (or of many or most of them). He concludes, though, on a note of doubt which shows that he is not quite sure in his own mind to have definitively disposed of the objection.

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Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1968

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