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Group Minds and Explanatory Simplicity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2015

Mark Sprevak*
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh
David Statham*
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh
*
Mark Sprevak (mark.sprevak@ed.ac.uk)
David Statham (d.statham@ed.ac.uk)
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Abstract

This paper explores the claim that explanation of a group's behaviour in term of individual mental states is, in principle, superior to explanation of that behaviour in terms of group mental states. We focus on the supposition that individual-level explanation is superior because it is simpler than group-level explanation. In this paper, we consider three different simplicity metrics. We argue that on none of those metrics does individual-level explanation achieve greater simplicity than a group-level alternative. We conclude that an argument against group minds should not lay weight on concerns of explanatory simplicity.

Information

Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2015