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Word and Concept

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Extract

If a speaker (S) says something in a language (L) and one of the listeners (A) knows L but another (B) does not, then, normally, A will understand what S said but B will not. What is it, exactly, that A, but not B, succeeds in doing in this case, and how to account for the difference? This is a fundamental problem, which the philosophy of language should be able to solve, yet, to my knowledge, has not done so to date.

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Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1970

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