[188] Our note, signed H.E., on the fifth Congress of Russian Physicists appeared in No. 1 [of this journal] (Gessen & Egorshin Reference Gessen and Egorshin1927a, 134–141 [TN]).

Cde. A. TimiryazevFootnote ³ was displeased with the note, especially with our brief report on the debate over his own report.

We do not consider the pages of our journal to be a suitable place for conducting polemics on special issues in physics. The journal Under the Banner of Marxism Footnote ⁴ has set other tasks for itself. Therefore, we will not enter into a discussion of the purely physical, experimental and technical aspects of the Dayton MillerFootnote ⁵ and Kennedy experiments.Footnote ⁶ Discussion on these matters should be conducted in special physics journals. That part of Cde. Timaryazev’s article devoted to the controversy and to Prof. S.I. Vavilov’sFootnote ⁷ objections, would be most appropriate in the journal where S.I. Vavilov’s article was published.

Therefore, we will focus instead on the fundamental issues raised in Cde. Timiryazev’s article.

For some time now, it has become fashionable to accuse Marxist dialecticians of a disrespectful attitude towards science, of seeking to adapt science to dialectical “schemas,” etc. Such accusations come from the mechanist camp, to which Cde. A.K. Timiryazev belongs. But without special clarifications, it should be clear that this accusation, coming from the mouth of the mechanists, contains a clear contradiction. Dialectical materialism is, in fact, a much broader worldview than mechanistic materialism. While numerous scientific discoveries of the last decades, as Lenin emphasized, have shown all the inadequacy of the narrowly-mechanical worldview, these same discoveries confirm dialectical materialism perfectly. Lenin also showed that ignorance of dialectics causes many natural scientists to fall into the fold of idealism, Machism and other such “schools and sub-schools.” From this, it follows that it would be completely wrong, in criticizing and refuting the many idealistic perversions of science, to return to the views that prevailed fifty years ago. The new dialectical natural science should be a synthesis of the materialistic worldview and the new facts that appeared in modern science.

[189] The mechanists hold to a different point of view. Without adopting dialectics (adopting the name only is not enough!), they might as well simply ignore and indiscriminately deny everything that does not fit into the Procrustean framework of the mechanical worldview. It is clear to everyone that this framework is incomparably narrower and more one-sided than the teachings of dialectics. Lenin expressed this magnificently in his fragment on dialectics: “Dialectics, as living, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing), with an infinite number of shades of every approach and approximation to reality …---here we have an immeasurably rich content as compared with ‘metaphysical’ materialism” (Lenin Reference Lenin, Smith and Dutt1976, 360). Even the “philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggerated, überschwengliches (Dietzgen) development (inflation, distention) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute” (Lenin Reference Lenin, Smith and Dutt1976, 361). Furthermore, “idealism is clerical obscurantism. True. But philosophical idealism is (‘more correctly’ and ‘in addition’) a road to clerical obscurantism through one of the shades of the infinitely complex knowledge (dialectical) of man (Lenin’s emphases)” (Lenin Reference Lenin, Smith and Dutt1976, 360, 361).

So, if anyone can be blamed for trying to ignore science and adjusting it to narrow and rigid schemas, then it is the mechanists alone, not the dialecticians.

The best evidence of this is Cde. A.K. Timiryazev’s article. He maintains that relativity theory and quantum theory are inconsistent with materialism: both are 100% Machist.

“For a significant number of modern theorists,” Cde. Timiryazev writes, “and especially those that are Russian, the ‘philosophy of pure description’ is still the only philosophy of science” (Timiryazev Reference Timiryazev1927a, 187 [TN]).

If one looks closely at all of A.K. Timiryazev’s literary activities, we will see that apart from the “philosophy of pure description,” he does not see any other enemy of materialism. For example, Kantianism in particular does not even seem to exist for him. All the while, since Helmholtz (who A.K. Timiryazev so respects and always cites as an example of the materialist dialectic), the Kantian trend among natural scientists should not at all be disregarded.

But let us set this aside. Let us suppose that we have only the Machist philosophy of “pure description” before us and nothing else. What does relativity theory have to do with it? A.K. Timiryazev’s answer to this question is very clear and unequivocal.

“Relativity theory and quantum theory,” he says, “have led to a new outbreak of Machism” (Timiryazev Reference Timiryazev1927a, 187 [TN]). There is no reason to argue against this. But this does not in any way imply that relativity theory and quantum theory must be approached from a dismissive point of view and wholesale indiscriminately rejected. In this regard, A.K. Timiryazev does not follow Lenin at all, who in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, in the chapter titled “The Essence and [190] the Significance of ‘Physical’ Idealism,” provided a remarkable analysis of the waverings of Mach, Duhem,Footnote ⁸ Stallo,Footnote ⁹ as well as Rey.Footnote ¹⁰

Even Lenin, the most merciless enemy of Machism, did not indiscriminately reject some of the progressive aspects of physicists such as Duhem, Stallo, etc., who, as Lenin says, waver “in reality … between idealism and dialectical materialism (our emphasis here and below)” (Lenin Reference Lenin, Dutt and Fineberg1977, 310). According to Lenin, they “most energetically combat the atomistic-mechanical conception of nature. They show the narrowness of this conception, the impossibility of accepting it as the limit of our knowledge, the rigidity of many of the ideas of writers who hold this conception. And it is indeed undeniable that the old (Lenin’s emphasis) materialism did suffer from such a defect” (Lenin Reference Lenin, Dutt and Fineberg1977, 310). The matter seems clear.

Cde. Timiryazev likes to cite Lenin, but a citation like the above is nowhere to be found in his writings. Hiding behind Lenin’s broad back, Cde. Timiryazev shoots from the hip at the greatest modern scientists and their theories, by labeling them with monotonously dull epithets like “scientific fashion,” “fashionable theory,” “fanatical followers,” etc. The whole Marxist overcoming of modern natural science, according to Cde. Timiryazev, should consist in going from the “Machist”-Einsteinians - Planck, Sommerfeld, Bohr, etc. - and certainly Einstein himself, back to Helmholtz, Maxwell, Thomson and Boltzmann. In Cde. Timiryazev’s opinion, if you follow these scholars, you will not deviate a single step from consistent (i.e., dialectical) materialism. It is from them that he invites all Marxists to learn both materialism and dialectics.

Cde. Timiriyazev forgets a “small” detail, namely, that even though the old teachers could be materialists, they were not dialectical, but metaphysical, materialists (with traces of dialectics, which is possible, of course, for anyone, even “Black Hundred”Footnote ¹¹ Einstein). As Lenin wrote in the same chapter the following lines to which Cde. Timiryazev devotes none of his attention: “The basic materialist spirit of physics, as of all modern science, will overcome each and every crisis,” (Lenin is speaking of Machism – H.E.), “but only by the indispensable replacement of metaphysical materialism by dialectical materialism (our emphases)” (Lenin Reference Lenin, Dutt and Fineberg1977, 306). We shall let the reader decide whether Cde. Timiryazev’s blatant nihilism and old-school beliefs satisfy this passage.

Apparently, Heisenberg’s theory (quantum mechanics) enjoyed considerable fame last year simply because it was “new” and in “fashion” at the time, whereas now, the same popularity befalls the even newer Schrödinger’s theory, and for the very same reason.Footnote ¹²

[191] It seems that all physicists resemble flirtatious Parisian women and change their views and physical theories as often as ladies update their fashionable wardrobes. And the more Machist a theory is, the more rapaciously physicists rush to adopt it.

In fact, this is not completely the case, or rather, completely not the case. If Heisenberg’s theory has become popular among physicists, this is not because physicists are susceptible to every new, Machist sensation (even though individual followers of such a sensationalism can, of course, be found), but because, despite its abstract character, Heisenberg’s theory represents a step forward in the field of atomic mechanics, as a whole series of experimental data fit within the framework of this theory that were inexplicable from the standpoint of classical quantum theory.

But Heisenberg’s theory is a formal description! It wants to deal only with “fundamentally observable quantities.” It refuses to build any models! What good can such a theory provide, apart from the fact that it pours water on the mill of the “philosophy of pure description”! This is Cde. Timiryazev’s argument.

A few words concerning description: is every description always identical with Machism? We think that the issue here is not so simple. One thing is the “economical description”Footnote ¹³ as a general, methodological and gnoseological principle, but it is quite another thing for description to be a step in the process of physical research.

It is known that Mach considered KirchhoffFootnote ¹⁴ to be his ally and an adherent of “economical description.” In his lectures on mechanics, Kirchhoff identifies the problem of mechanics as follows: “I define the task of mechanics to be the description (Kirchhoff’s emphasis) of the movements occurring in nature; namely the complete and simplest possible description” (Kirchhoff Reference Kirchhoff1897, v [TN]).

And despite this, Lenin defends Kirchhoff from Mach! When Mach says in Knowledge and Error that his principle of economic description and “‘the ‘complete and simplest description’ (Kirchhoff 1874) … with a slight variation, express one and the same idea,’” Lenin ardently defends Kirchhoff: “Is this not a model of confusion? ‘Economy of thought,’ from which Mach in 1872 inferred that sensations alone exist … is declared to be equivalent … to the simplest description (of an objective reality, the existence of which it never occurred to Kirchhoff to doubt!” (Lenin Reference Lenin, Dutt and Fineberg1977, 171, Lenin’s emphases). One kind of description, therefore, is different from the other one!

The point is that for Mach, “economical description” is an epistemological principle; that is, a principle that serves as “the basis for the theory of knowledge,” while for Kirchhoff, “a complete and simplest description is a tool for eliminating from mechanics those concepts whose physical meanings were obscure, first and foremost, the concept of force” (Kirchhoff Reference Kirchhoff1897, v).

In his matrix method, Heisenberg tries to overcome a number of basic, fundamental difficulties in the construction of mechanics of the atom. These difficulties stem from the imperfections of our [192] models and our ideas about atomic processes. Heisenberg’s theory overcomes some of these difficulties, albeit formally.

Therefore, in our report, while pointing out the possibility of drawing Machist conclusions from the principles of Heisenberg’s theory (and Heisenberg himself does draw such conclusions), we still thought that on this ground alone, one should not reject its physical content. We think this is the only correct approach, from the perspective of Marxism, to the evaluation of various physical theories. Description will never be a bogeyman for us. We need to figure out exactly what kind of description. At one time, Balmer’s formulaFootnote ¹⁵ was also just a description, but was it not also a step forward? Bohr came along after Balmer and explained the physical significance of the formula and the meaning of its constants (i.e., the Rydberg ConstantFootnote ¹⁶). So, why do we have to reject Heisenberg’s theory in advance? After all, it is possible that it, too, will receive its physical interpretation.

“Machism,” Comrade Timiryazev writes, “in fact, thrives where we still know little, where we have to temporarily confine ourselves to formal description. Machism also considers this arrangement to be the final answer” (Timiryazev Reference Timiryazev1927a, 187 [TN]). There is no doubt that formal description is most common in those areas where we cannot yet explain molar patterns from molecular patterns. But what if such an explanation is not yet possible in the current stage of science?

Should we just abandon the formulation of a general (mathematical) law altogether, the molecular mechanism of which is unknown, because it is a formal, pure description and Machism?

Let us listen to the opinion of one physicist, who Cde. Timiryazev is unlikely to suspect of Machism. In some cases, he says, we know all the details of all changes:

This is the articulation of the tasks of physics in those areas where the molecular mechanism is unknown to us, by James Clerk Maxwell.

In modern physics, we have, on one hand, a kinetic theory of matter, where the molecular mechanism is more or less known to us, and from which we can explain molar [193] laws and, on the other hand, the area of electromagnetic phenomena, where such explanation is not yet possible.

How nice would it be - and most physicists would have had nothing against it - had it been possible, having accepted the ether with some strictly-defined properties, to build, on this basis, a complete picture of all electromagnetic phenomena. Unfortunately, physics ran into extreme difficulties in following this path, and it was precisely these difficulties that led to a second path pointed out by Maxwell.

Let us provide just one historical example, which shows how great the difficulties are with respect to constructing a theory of electromagnetic phenomena, based on a particular model of the ether.

One of the greatest physicists of the nineteenth century, William Thomson, devoted his whole life to the question of building a theory of electromagnetic phenomena from the ether. And in his speech at the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of his scientific career, this great physicist - a contemporary of Faraday, Helmholtz and Maxwell - literally said the following:

When we talk about the need for a “description,” we do not at all want to say “ignorabimus [we do not know and never will know]” with respect to the ether, but we want to emphasize that the problem is not as simple as Cde. Timiryazev depicts. It is necessary to take into account and analyze these difficulties. Instead, if we consider Machism and the unwillingness to engage with the works of J.J. Thomson to be the sole cause of the formal trend, this point of view cannot move us forward in solving physical problems.

This is the criterion with which we approach the evaluation of Heisenberg’s and Schrödinger’s theories.

Let us now turn to the question of relativity theory. Here, Cde. Timiryazev has such an extremely one-sided point of view that he had to spend considerable currency to justify it and therefore, we understand his persistence and firmness.

Cde. Timiryazev continues to hold the view that relativity theory is completely incompatible with materialism. In this case, it is permissible to ask: imagine that the physical side of relativity theory is justified by experiment (Lenin has already said everything about the absurdities of philosophical, idealistic relativism), if Einstein, the physicist, turns out to be right - what then? Would the whole materialistic worldview collapse? Should idealism and clericalism take its place? If we adopt this understanding, if materialism is inseparable from Newtonian mechanics, it would mean valuing materialism too little. It would mean changing an entire worldview (materialism into idealism) depending on some new, and in turn, transient, scientific theories.

[194] But, this is exactly how Cde. Timiryazev sees materialism. In the article printed here, we read:

Either materialism, and then relativity theory is excluded, —, or relativity theory triumphs, and with it, also Machism. Such is the dilemma put before the mass of readers.

By contrast, we think, following Lenin and Engels, that “with each epoch-making discovery even in the sphere of natural science [‘not to speak of the history of mankind’], materialism has to change its form” (Lenin Reference Lenin, Dutt and Fineberg1977, 251; Engels Reference Engels, Tartakovsky and Jacbos2010, 369–370 [TN]). If, at present, Einstein’s theory is not yet rigorously, experimentally proven, then Marxist methodology must await the resolution of the physical question by physical methods and cut off any hand that attempts to use this question (both before and after experimental confirmation) for the benefit of Machist, fictional or any other idealistic philosophy. If it is confirmed that matter does not move according to the laws of Newton, but according to the laws of Einstein, the matter will not cease to be an objective reality, despite Cde. Timiryazev’s totally fabricated claim that in this case, inevitably, “matter disappears and only equations remain” (Timiryazev Reference Timiryazev1927a, 187 [TN]).

At one time, idealism used an electron theory for its own purposes by claiming that it contradicts materialism. So, how worth it would it have been for a “materialist,” at the time when experiments were being made on electromagnetic mass, to have cried out at every crossroad: “Help! Materialism is dying! Materialism is hanging in the balance!” This would be genuine obscurantism, diametrically opposite to the materialist path taken by Lenin. He was not afraid to “revise” the form of materialism, as it was given by Engels, and clarify the definition of matter and, under these conditions, electron theory turned out to be, not at all a refutation, but, a brilliant confirmation of dialectical materialism.

If Lenin, the philosopher, had to grasp the essence of these discoveries to evaluate the latest scientific discoveries, then this is the primary duty of a Marxist naturalist. He must study the physical aspect of a new theory and, only after such a test, accept or reject it. As for Cde. Timiryazev, his approach to relativity theory can be called nihilistic, as it has been for a long time, independently of the Dayton-Miller experiments.

We believe that it is too early for Marxists to cast their verdict on relativity theory, and in our note on the congress of physicists, we support neither A.I. Ioffe’sFootnote ¹⁷ point of view nor [195] A.K. Timiryazev’s point of view. We think that physics does not yet have any final answers, no experimentum crucis [definitive experiment]. But, we consider it beyond doubt that Newtonian mechanics is insufficient and will have to be updated one way or the other - on this, we disagree with Cde. Timiryazev. Whether this update comes from Einstein’s theory or from some other theory, physics will decide, and neither of them can crush materialism.

We think that most of those materialistic physicists who now adopt the standpoint of relativity theory, and who Cde. Timiryazev assigns to the idealist camp with incredible ease only for relativity theory, agree with this view. Take, for instance, Planck. This famous physicist, who fought hard against Machism for many years, is now, according to Cde. Timiryazev, a Machist. Meanwhile, M. Planck recently wrote the following:

Every Marxist physicist cannot but agree with this approach. What does Cde. Timiryazev see here that is Machist? The same implication permeates an article in Pravda by the academician, A.F. Ioffe, from 1 January of this year, which A.K. Timiryazev already labeled idealistic and Machist.Footnote ¹⁸

Of course, Cde. Timiryazev can reject even the physical aspect of relativity theory. It is even possible that relativity theory in its present form will be refuted.

[196] But in this case, Cde. Timiryazev should have defended his ideas first of all and above all, among physicists. But we have not seen any article by him in specialized physics journals to present this point of view. Cde. Timiryazev obviously thinks that with his articles in the journal Under the Banner of Marxism or in Pravda he will triumph over all “Machist”-physicists. In our opinion, this hope is unfounded.

It is true that Cde. Timiryazev’s report at the Physics Congress represented such an attempt. But, first, this was his only attempt; and, secondly, it was poorly presented at the congress, if solely because the report was read only in a section (there were five sections in total at the congress, which met at the same time) and not at the plenary session.

If Cde. Timiryazev sets himself the goal of seriously opposing relativity theory, under no circumstances should he neglect the task of upholding his views among physicists.

We now turn to another question that Cde. Timiryazev touched upon in his article against us - about the new quantum mechanics.

“Methodologically, Schrödinger’s theory is just as formal as Heisenberg’s theory. According to this theory, waves that do not have a material carrier form electrons - matter. This is a classic illustration of Lenin’s words ‘an attempt to think of motion without matter’” (Timiryazev Reference Timiryazev1927a, 187).

First and foremost, nowhere in our previous note did we claim that Schrödinger’s theory in its present form is unconditionally acceptable to dialectical materialism. Classical physics and the old quantum theory proved powerless before the task of explaining nature. And we see new theories emerging that are trying to avoid a dead end. Some of these theories, too, may be found unsuccessful, but this does not at all cancel the collapse of the old, mechanical physics.

Second, we did not deny the formal nature of Schrödinger’s theory. We ourselves pointed out that the derivation of Schrödinger’s equation requires further discussion (Gessen & Egorshin Reference Gessen and Egorshin1927a, 140). The most important thing that we emphasized was that Schrödinger’s theory is an attempt to provide a synthesis of molar and molecular mechanics. We pointed out the difference between Schrödinger and Heisenberg. We noted that some of Heisenberg’s fundamental assumptions, which led him to doubt the degree of the electron’s reality, are unacceptable. The methodological foundation of Schrödinger’s theory is of a quite different nature. His task, as we emphasized, is to “build … such a theory of matter and such a mechanics that would embrace both molecular and molar laws of motion, i.e. that would be a synthesis of Newtonian and quantum mechanics” (Gessen & Egorshin Reference Gessen and Egorshin1927a, 139).

Cde. Timiryazev himself acknowledged that Newtonian mechanics is insufficient and that such a synthesis is necessary, as he wrote the following in his article “‘Quantum’ Theory and Contemporary Physics”: “The task is to connect the new with the old. We need to find the limits of the applicability of classical mechanics and electrodynamics and find out those general laws that should unite and supplement them, since it is clear that “quanta” introduce something new” (Timiryazev Reference Timiryazev1925a, 138).

[197] Third, we already have attempts in the literature to provide a visual interpretation of Schrödinger’s equation by means of a material carrier and it turns out that this leads to an expansion of our idea of the electron and these ideas are very close to those defended by Cde. Timiryazev himself.

It is not so easy to answer the question about Schrödinger’s theory!

In classical quantum theory, there were many strange and incomprehensible positions, above all the expression of quantum conditions in integers.

In his article “Recent Attempts to Revive Teleology in Physics,” Cde. Timiryazev himself reproaches Bohr for only half-overcoming Mach, since his theory did not provide an account of the mechanism of electron hopping and the essence of quantum conditions. Schrödinger’s theory attempts to clarify a discrete set of integers in quantum conditions by using wave processes as the basis of mechanics (Timiryazev Reference Timiryazev1925b, 321). Only in this way is it possible to understand why there is a need for integer numbers in quantum theory.

This is how Comrade Timiryazev himself explains this fact, as can be read in his article “‘Quantum’ Theory and Contemporary Physics.” So in this respect, Schrödinger’s theory represents a step forward in explaining phenomena. This is how, for instance, W. WienFootnote ¹⁹ evaluates it. Here is what he says in a speech delivered in 1926: “What was particularly strange about quantum theory was its complete break with old physical theories, irrational integers and the inability to have an idea of the processes occurring in reality. And now, Schrödinger has made an attempt to present the whole problem as a problem of the oscillatory process, making the theory more intuitive and closer to our understanding” (Wien Reference Wien1926, 14). Yes, but it conceives motion without matter!

Such a conclusion is, perhaps, too hasty. Above, we indicated the difficulties encountered in physics on the question of the ether. Schrödinger’s equation is derived on the basis of formal analogies between geometric and physical optics. But why should one conclude that this theory, in principle, methodologically rules out a material carrier for oscillatory processes? One can see from the following facts that this is not the case: Madelung,Footnote ²⁰ for example, is trying to provide a “visual interpretation of Schrödinger’s equation” (Madelung Reference Madelung1926, 1004; Madelung Reference Madelung1927, 322).

This interpretation relies on the idea that the electron is taken to be a fluid that continuously fills the entire space with a certain density and flows at a certain speed. “Thus,” Madelung says, “the quantum theory of the stationary states of an atom is reduced to the hydrodynamics of continuously distributed electricity. In the case where there are several electrons in an atom, one must accept that they mutually penetrate each other, but do not merge” (Madelung Reference Madelung1926, 1004; Madelung Reference Madelung1927, 322 [TN]). One cannot, of course, accept this interpretation as final, but it shows that Schrödinger’s theory does not necessarily conceive motion without matter. Additionally, [198] this interpretation leads to a new conceptualization of the electron, which undoubtedly expands our ideas. And these ideas are reminiscent of those of … J.J. Thomson, an exemplary materialist according to Cde. Timiryazev. Here is what we read in the latter:

Is this really so different from Madelung’s interpretation?

For this reason alone, Comrade Timiryazev should not dismiss Schrödinger’s theory simply as a “new fashion.”

Even more recently, we have had other interpretations of Schrödinger’s theory, for example, Darwin’s from his article in Nature from 22 November 1927 (Darwin Reference Darwin1927a, 282–284; Darwin Reference Darwin1927b, 227–253).

As for Schrödinger himself, his view on the material carrier of wave movements essentially coincides with Madelung’s views (Schrödinger Reference Schrödinger1927, §2 and §7).

We do not at all claim that Madelung’s and Schrödinger’s interpretations are the ultimate conceptions of material substance. It is possible that much will have to be fundamentally changed. But, the fact remains that Schrödinger’s theory does not exclude the material carrier of movement. If we note that Madelung published his interpretation in November 1926, then in March 1927, it is absolutely incorrect to speak about Schrödinger’s theory as a “classical example of thinking of motion without matter.”Footnote ²¹

Finally, the last question.

“In his article,” Cde. Timiryazev writes, “Cdes. H.E. praise Russian theorists for the fact that they follow Schrödinger and refuse to accept the formal Heiseinberg theory” (Timiryazev Reference Timiryazev1927a, 187 [TN]). In our note on the congress, as any impartial reader can see, we “praised” Russian theorists not for the fact that they followed Schrödinger, but for the fact that the majority of speakers dissociated themselves from the Machist tendencies present [199] in Heisenberg. It seems that this is not the same thing. Cde. Timiryazev is reading something that is not written.

If he wants to raise the fundamental question about Marxists’ attitude toward Russian physicists, there is one of two things here: either Cde. Timiryayev agrees with us in our assessment of Russian physicists as “being without a deliberately and consciously scientific ‘reactionary character’” and that “generally speaking, Marxists would be able to work with most Russian scientists,” then his ironic remarks about “praise” and so on are completely incomprehensible and unnecessary; or Cde. Timiryazev did not like our words that Marxists could work together with Russian physicists and that the latter have spontaneous, materialistic tendencies (Gessen & Egorshin Reference Gessen and Egorshin1927a, 140 [TN]). In this case, Cde. Timiryazev must clearly and unambiguously declare that he considers most Russian physicists to be reactionary, unconditionally foreign to us and incapable of accepting the ideas of modern materialism, not to mention the task of Soviet, socialist construction.

Here we come to such conclusions, where theory becomes intertwined with practical politics. We, together with the Party and Soviet power, adhere to the unshakable opinion that we need to work together with the representatives of modern science, that we can make them dialectical materialists only by collaborating with them, and we maintain that the nihilistic standpoint would bring irreparable harm to Marxism and to the revolution.