The idea that Christians have typically considered pride the basic sin is now widely shared in popular piety and historical and systematic theology alike, among both the tradition's critics and its defenders.Footnote 1 Responsibility for this widespread diagnosis of sin is often laid at the feet of Augustine (cf. J. Patout Burns, ‘Augustine on the Origin and Progress of Evil’, Journal of Religious Ethics 16 (1988), p. 24), and there is no doubt that there is some truth in that view. I have come to believe, however, that Augustine did not hold the views about pride often attributed to him; in fact, on the contrary, it was Augustine's Pelagian opponents who believed that all sin is, fundamentally, pride – a view Augustine explicitly rejected.Footnote 2
My aim in this paper is to present a reading of the late Augustine which supports the following hypothesis: while Augustine probably did believe, in his earlier years, that pride is the basic sin, he changed his views during his debates with the Pelagians and advocated instead the thesis that sin, post-fall, does not take on any one form. Discussion of Augustine will show that he made some key, though rarely discussed, statements about the nature of sin which, when his views are put into perspective within his larger doctrine of sin, make it reasonably clear that Augustine did not think all sin can be reduced to pride. Before discussing Augustine, however, it will be helpful to review the roots of recent discussions about the nature of sin, and its relation to pride, as this will introduce the view Augustine is supposed to have held, as well as the criticisms levelled against it.
The critique
Recent discussion about the basic sin began in 1960 with Valerie (Goldstein) Saiving's groundbreaking suggestion that the traditional view of sin and salvation depends on an anthropology that is blind to female experience.Footnote 3 Saiving argued that all people have experienced being male as different from being female (‘The Human Situation’, p. 29). Since boys are different from those who typically raise them, they must actively seek out and attain male identity, whereas girls are defined by inclusion under the mother, making them more passive. This difference in upbringing means a difference in temptations; for women, the temptation is not selfishness or presumption but an underdeveloped self, diffusion and triviality (ibid., p. 37).Footnote 4
In spite of disagreements with Saiving's developmental theories, most feminists have agreed with her concern that woman's typical sin is mischaracterised as pride. Indeed, many recent thinkers have concurred that a one-sided emphasis on pride is a theological mistake.Footnote 5 My aim in this paper is to suggest that, contrary to common opinion, Augustine, too, agrees with this recent consensus that there is no one basic sin.Footnote 6 To my knowledge, however, Augustine does not entertain the view that certain sins are historically gender-specific.
In speaking of traditional views of sin, Saiving herself seems to have had in mind mainly Reinhold Niebuhr and Anders Nygren, both mentioned in her text. Later writers levelled their heaviest critiques against Reinhold Niebuhr, as an influential representative of what has been believed to be a long-standing Augustinian tradition which considers pride the basic sin.Footnote 7 Thus, to see what Augustine is said to have taught, let us turn our attention to feminist criticism of Reinhold Niebuhr's doctrine of sin.
Niebuhr sees two possible sinful responses to the anxiety caused by the dual nature of human life as both finite and free: pride, the attempt to escape finitude, and sensuality, the attempt to escape freedom (Lovin, Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 142). Though he emphasises pride, Niebuhr's definition of sensuality, as the escape from freedom, is compatible with his feminist critics’ understanding of sloth (Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace, pp. 60, 93; Hampson, ‘Niebuhr on Sin’, p. 50; cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, Human Nature (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), pp. 179, 185). He is criticised, then, not for completely ignoring sloth, but for largely ignoring it, narrowing the scope of the sin he calls sensuality, and for making pride the sin from which sensuality is derived (Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace, pp. 61–3, 92; cf. Niebuhr, Human Nature, pp. 228ff.). In short, Niebuhr is criticised for suggesting that all sin can be reduced to self-centredness, sensuality being based on pride and self-interest (Dunfee, ‘Sin of Hiding’, p. 319).
Judith Plaskow agrees that sloth is active at least in the minimal sense of turning from God. Niebuhr's problem, she says, is that he makes this turn from God a turn to self, not to idols outside the self. Yet women tend to make precisely this turn to idols outside the self, losing themselves in other things (Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace, p. 151). Such a sin, Plaskow holds – one that involves self-forgetfulness – cannot properly be reduced to pride or selfishness. Thus, although Niebuhr allows the possibility that sin takes the form of sensuality, his reduction of sensuality to pride means that he cannot account for sins of sloth which find a centre other than oneself on which to focus.
In continuity with his reduction of sensuality to self-centredness, Niebuhr typically understands sensuality narrowly in practice as physical desire (Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace, pp. 62–3, 152). Susan Dunfee writes, ‘by narrowing the sin of hiding to the sin of sensuality, a theology not only denies a fuller understanding of sin that can judge woman in her escapism and beckon her on to a fuller humanity, it also sets the stage for a patriarchal culture to name her the source of all carnality’ (‘Sin of Hiding’, p. 323).Footnote 8
This critique of Reinhold Niebuhr has often been applied to Augustine, since it is thought that he, too, considers pride the basic sin and reduces sloth to basic sensual desire. In summary, then, the common reading of Augustine contested here is that he conceptualised sin primarily as self-centred self-assertion (pride).
Augustine on the basic sin
It is actually quite easy to show that, at least for a time, Augustine held that not all sin involves pride. In a lamentably overlooked passage, Augustine contests Pelagius’ claim that what was then an oft-quoted scriptural statement, ‘the beginning of all sin is pride’ (Sir. 10:13), is to be understood in the following way: ‘every sin is contempt for God, and all contempt for God is pride’. Augustine claims that those who investigate carefully
will find that the sin of pride was sharply distinguished in the law from other sins. Many sins are, after all, committed out of pride, but not every wrong action is done with pride. Many wrong actions are done by the ignorant, by the weak, and often by persons weeping and groaning. (NG 29.33)Footnote 9
Augustine goes on to grant that there is a pride which exists by itself, without other sins – the pride that cast down the devil, with whom sin originated. The beginning of all sin is pride, then, but Augustine argues that the sin following that first great sin of pride is not necessarily of the same sort. In fact, he clearly states that not every sinful action is done out of pride, since many are done out of ignorance of what is best,Footnote 10 or by those who wish they were not bound to sin. Thus, he indicates that while pride is common it is nonetheless limited to a subset of sins, which implies that the sin prevalent after the fall cannot be reduced to any one form.
His argument about the devil's sin makes use of two crucial distinctions. The first is between the primal sin (the first sin) and all ensuing sin. This distinction is central to Augustine's late discussions of sin, and is found in many places other than Nature and Grace. In his anti-Pelagian writings, and other great late works such as City of God and The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Augustine commonly distinguishes the angelic and human primal sins, which are irrationally committed with knowledge of their evil nature and at least some of their evil consequences, without necessity, and from a ‘deficient’ cause, from all ensuing sin. That ensuing sin is of a different nature from the primal sin, being not merely sin, but also the punishment of that first sin, since it is based in and even made inevitable by the common guilt and inherited fault Augustine calls original sin (OpImp I.46, V.40; CJul V.3.8; GLA 20.41). The primal sin, particularly the angelic primal sin, is best understood as pride, because Augustine believes that is the best explanation for the revolt against God attempted by those who lacked nothing, but ‘secondary’ sin – original sin and the personal sins that follow from it – need not be understood thus.Footnote 11 This distinction between the nature of the first sin and the nature of the sin that ensues after the fall opens the way for a second distinction: the beginning of sin is pride, but pride is not the continual form or source of all other sin. Pride, then, is not the basic sin. And while Augustine believes that scripture clearly teaches about the beginning of sin, he does not indicate that scripture makes it clear what the basic sin is – or, indeed, if there even is one.
One might wonder, however, whether Augustine always adhered to what he wrote in Nature and Grace in 415. The passage most turn to first when discussing Augustine's view of pride was written between 417 and 419 in City of God, where Augustine famously claims that ‘two cities were created by two kinds of love: the earthly city was created by self-love reaching the point of contempt for God, the Heavenly City by the love of God carried as far as contempt of self’ (CD XIV.28; cf. XII.6). Yet since this passage concerns only the creation of the cities, there is plenty of room for the Augustinian distinction between the beginning of sin and the basic sin: Augustine indicates that self-love was the beginning of sin, but he says nothing about ensuing sins, which could have taken other forms (cf. CD XIV.13). To be sure, Augustine speaks of pride often in this work, but that is because pride is a very common sin, and because a major focus of City of God is diagnosing the sin of the Roman empire, not because Augustine believes all sin must be proud. Augustine also speaks often of the virtue of humility, but that does not imply that all sin is pride, for humble persons who glory in obedience to God are saved from the disorder of ignorance and weakness just as much as superbia. Once we read City of God with these points in mind, it does not provide reason to think Augustine is there retracting the view stated in Nature and Grace. Thus, we must turn to other texts to ferret out whether Augustine was consistent in his view that sin, post-fall, cannot be reduced to pride.
In The Literal Meaning of Genesis, in a passage written around the same time as Nature and Grace, Augustine takes up a second central scriptural passage about sin, 1 Timothy 6:10. He indicates not only that pride is the beginning of all sin but that the Pauline statement that the root of all evil is avarice can be interpreted as saying the same thing, so long as we understand avarice to mean, broadly, desire for more than one is due (GnLit XI.15.19). Augustine also suggests that greed and jealousy come from avarice, and that all are proud. Significantly, however, he does not interpret ‘root’ as meaning ‘continual source’ rather, he assimilates pride as beginning to avarice as root. The ‘root’ of the sinful tree becomes a gateway to wrongdoing – a path opened back then, at the beginning – but not the ever-present font of every sin now committed. In keeping with this approach, Augustine limits his discussion of avarice to the devil, whose primal sin he is in the middle of discussing. In The Literal Meaning of Genesis, then, Augustine endorses an interpretation of the 1 Timothy passage that builds on his interpretation of Sirach 10:13 in Nature and Grace. Here, unlike there, he does not explicitly reject the view that pride is the basic sin, yet he maintains continuity with that view, not only by his failure to use the Timothy passage in support of the thesis that pride is the basic sin, but also by endorsing and even expanding the crucial distinction he made there between the beginning (and now also root) of sin, and the basic sin.
By contrast, in his first anti-Pelagian work, The Punishment and the Forgiveness of Sins – written around 411 – Augustine indicates that those who are damned to hell are damned ‘on account of their sinful pride’ and that the ‘cause of all human failings. . . is pride’ (PeccMer II.17.27). These passages indicate that, at an earlier time, Augustine did hold the view commonly ascribed to him: all sin is fundamentally pride. Yet their contrast with the sentiment Augustine expresses in Nature and Grace is obvious. Is Augustine simply being inconsistent, then, in taking Pelagius to task for espousing the very view he himself had once advocated? It makes more sense, I think, to say that during the course of the Pelagian debate Augustine changed his mind, as he did on other points (for instance, the question of whether there might have been a good sexual desire (i.e. concupiscence) in the garden of Eden).Footnote 12
My working hypothesis, then, is that, while the young Augustine probably did believe that pride is the basic sin, he later changed his view – in part, as I argue below, because of his developing ideas about original sin - advocating instead the thesis that sin, post-fall, takes many forms. Further scrutiny of Augustine's discussions of the basic sin in his major works lends support to this thesis.Footnote 13
About six years after writing Nature and Grace Augustine states that it is unbelief that makes the children of the devil (C2Ep III.3.4). He does not, however, indicate whether unbelief finds a basis in pride, or some other evil, or whether it is primary in itself. The brevity of the reference fails to provide a solid basis on which to build a description of Augustine's understanding of the root of sin. It does, however, suggest that Augustine was not focused simply on pride in his later works, and in the light of what Augustine wrote in Nature and Grace, this passage is suggestive.Footnote 14
A year or two later, Augustine returns to 1 Timothy by speaking of ‘covetousness, the root of bad actions’ (GPO 1.20.21). Though he does not clearly indicate here what he means by speaking of the ‘root’ – does it merely mean the beginning or does it mean a continual source? – he gives us no reason to believe he has changed the views expressed in Nature and Grace and The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Moreover, Augustine provides an important reference to his developing views about sin in this passage, for he does not assimilate covetousness to pride in this passage; on the contrary, he equates covetousness quite broadly with evil desire (carnal concupiscence) by citing 1 John 2:16.Footnote 15 In other late works, especially his Incomplete Work Against Julian, Augustine often speaks of coveting as a fundamental human problem, but rather than associate covetousness with pride, Augustine customarily renders the tenth commandment ‘You shall not desire’ – by which he means that we are not to have disordered and idolatrous desires, but rather order our desires under God. For Augustine, the first and last of the ten commandments can, therefore, be equated. So far, then, we have found no reason to think that Augustine deviates from the position expressed in Nature and Grace, and some reason to think that he kept to it.
Augustine often argues, in his late works, that the law was given in order to humble sinners, leading them to see their need for grace (e.g. NG 12.13), but such statements do not imply that Augustine takes all sin to be, fundamentally, pride. When he makes such statements, Augustine is simply indicating that he believes the law was given to address pride by its epistemic function, showing how we miss the mark. With his well-known emphasis on the need for grace, however, Augustine makes it clear that the law cannot reform distorted desires for lower goods – it was not given for that purpose. Only the grace available through Jesus Christ, the grace to which Augustine constantly returns, can assist human hearts bound to sinful desires.
Finally, sometime between 418 and 420, Augustine writes in The Trinity that ‘by the apostasy of pride which is called the beginning of sin it [the soul] strives to grab something more’ (DeTrin XII.3.14). This has been interpreted as confirmation that Augustine considers pride the basic sin (e.g. Cavadini, ‘Pride’), but it is not clear that this is the best reading of this confusing passage. The main interpretative question is whether Augustine speaks here of all human souls, or the souls of the first couple. The question arises because the statement quoted comes in the midst of an attempt to understand why St Paul (in 1 Cor. 11) apparently claims that woman is not in the divine image (DeTrin XII.3). Surely, Augustine says, the sexes are equal; so Paul's statement must be metaphorical. Perhaps Paul is using figurative language to speak of two parts of the soul which every human being needs and shares, Augustine suggests – ‘man’ signifying the wisdom of eternal things and ‘woman’ signifying knowledge of temporal things. To test this theory, Augustine quickly works through the Genesis account (arguing, for instance, that ‘woman’ cannot signify bodily senses, because they are common to humans and beasts, whereas Eve is separated from the animals). In particular, he discusses the fall story, attempting to show that his symbolic interpretation of Paul works there too – and this is where the quote above is located. Thus, his statement about pride does not seem to be a statement about all human sin; rather, it applies to the beginning of sin in Adam and Eve, as proof that the fall story can be read in the figurative manner Augustine is trying out. Augustine does make a (tentative) universal claim about humanity in this section of The Trinity: all human beings have metaphorically masculine and feminine parts of the soul, both equal and essential, though not identical. It is not at all clear, however, that he intends to claim here that pride is the basic human sin. At most, then, this passage in The Trinity is an ambiguous turn from the plain statement Augustine makes in Nature and Grace.
I conclude that Augustine's discussions of central sins in his major works support the hypothesis that, after 415, he did not believe that pride is the basic sin. Instead, Augustine inclines towards sharing Mary Potter Engel's thesis that sin is many-headed, a hydra.Footnote 16
Augustine reconsiders the primal sin
The case against the received reading of Augustine's view about sin's fundamental form is further strengthened by the significant fact that Augustine was not even entirely confident that pride is the deepest element of the human primal sin: in Against Julian he raises the question whether foolishness is the root of evil, and responds that it would take elaborate arguments to determine whether foolishness made the first human beings proud or pride made them foolish – a task he declines to take up (CJul V.4.18). Around the same time, in his Enchiridion (ch. 45), Augustine also indicates that many kinds of sin were involved in the primal sin.
Augustine's late reading of the human fall demonstrates his developing ideas about the complexity of the primal sin: Augustine argues that, once Adam knew Eve had eaten the fruit, he partook because he loved her, and did not want to be separated from her (GnLit XI.42; CD XIV.11; Gary A. Anderson, ‘Is Eve the Problem?’, in Christopher Seitz and Kathryn Greene-McCreight (eds), Theological Exegesis: Essays in Honor of Brevard Childs (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 105–6, 122–3; Gary Wills, Saint Augustine: A Penguin Life (New York: Viking Penguin, 1999), pp. 13–15). Augustine also suggests that Eve sinned partly in ignorance, because she was (as he believes) less wise than Adam, and simply because of her finitude. This understanding of the first couple's sin renders pride less than basic to both Adam and Eve's sin, since Adam's sin looks more slothful than proud, aimed as it was at an idol outside himself, and Eve's sin is not as proud as it might be, since its disobedience is reduced by her ignorance.
As we have seen, Augustine also affirms that both the human and demonic primal sins must have been proud around the same time as he wrote the passages mentioned above. So the late Augustine is not settled on this issue. Nevertheless, his equivocation about the human primal sin is significant, since it indicates that Augustine is by no means as committed to the thesis that all sin is pride as he has been taken to be; he himself speculates that pride is not the sole beginning of all human sin.Footnote 17
Implications of Augustine's doctrine of sin
The case for the new reading of Augustine advocated here does not depend solely on individual texts; likewise, the traditional misunderstanding of Augustine's view of the basic sin is based not only on misreading (or overlooking) individual passages but on a misreading of the implications of Augustine's wider doctrine of sin. Thus, it is essential to recognise that Augustine's late doctrine of sin actually distances him from the idea that pride is the basic sin. The views he expresses so clearly in Nature and Grace fit with, and indeed were probably motivated by, major elements in Augustine's late doctrine of sin, and his doctrine of sin as a whole supports the notion that sin (post-fall, at least) is not all of a piece. This case has, in fact, already begun to be made, since we have seen that Augustine's dual distinctions between the primal sin and ensuing sin, and between the beginning of sin and the basic sin, provide conceptual tools that are both important to his wider doctrine of sin and enable him to take biblical statements about the beginning/root of sin seriously while rejecting the Pelagian view that every sin is pride.
No less important is the fact that the conviction that sin takes many forms accords with Augustine's metaphysics of evil. According to Augustine's privation account of sin, sin is a culpable falling away from what is good. In God, of course, Augustine believes that good is one, unified.Footnote 18 The good is also multi-valenced, however, and many-coloured. Finite as we are, human beings cannot have all the good at once; and after the fall, in particular, we have the good and are good only haltingly, and in pieces. Thus, when fallen human beings sin they do so in many different ways. Each post-lapsarian sin is a privation of some aspect of the fragmented good which human beings possess, and sin must therefore take as many forms as goodness, though always in reverse. Hence, Augustine's doctrine that sin is a privation provides a natural ontological grounding for the view that sin is not all of a kind. For finite and fallen human creatures, sin is as many-sided, and just as fragmented, as the good.
Finally, and most tellingly, the logic of Augustine's mature account of original sin actually implies that there is no basic sin – that sin is not fundamentally one thing. According to Augustine, all sin after the primal sin is not simply sin, but also a divinely instituted punishment for that first sin, a binding of all humanity to the wretchedness of not knowing or loving God properly, which Augustine considers an ironic but just turnabout which gives a disobedient race what it requested. Most sinners do not see the irony of their situation, of course; but Christians know how ridiculous the human lot really is, because they have begun to want to desire something other than sin, even though they find it impossible to follow through on that want consistently. Thus, they find themselves sinning even when they do not want to – they do what they do not want to do.
With this tragic situation as the backdrop for his late discussion of sin, it should not come as much of a surprise to hear that pride is not Augustine's main focus in his writings against the Pelagians. When pride is discussed, it is often in a theodical context, where Augustine argues that God has allowed certain earthly evils to humble the proud, or in a rhetorical context, where Augustine accuses the Pelagians of pride for rejecting the absolute necessity of prevenient grace. But such claims do not imply that all sin is proud, and in his anti-Pelagian works Augustine writes most often of disordered loves and ignorance, inherited yet nonetheless sinful ways of being which need not have the contours of pride. Indeed, Augustine has substantial motivation not to major in pride, since presumably it is Pelagius’ wish to discredit Augustine's ideas about sins of ignorance and weakness which leads him to emphasise pride, citing Sirach 10:13. It seems, then, that it was Augustine's desire to defend his doctrine of original sin which led him to reject the view that pride is the basic sin.
Let us consider the controversial sins Augustine was defending more closely, starting with the one he discusses least: Augustine believes that ignorance can lead to, or even be in itself, sin. Thus he claims that epistemic blindness is a sin in itself: those who do not know God's law do not go without punishment (GLA 3.5). It seems obvious, however, that such ignorance need not be proud – after all, it is a weakness, as Augustine is fond of pointing out. Sins of ignorance forced themselves on Augustine most painfully as he himself attempted to live a faithful Christian life: ‘We all sin in many ways, while we think that what we do pleases or at least does not displease the God whom we love. And then afterward. . . we learn it did not please him, and we repent and pray for his forgiveness’ (SL 36.64; cf. NG 67.81; OpImp I.104–5).Footnote 19
A more significant theme for Augustine in his doctrine of original sin is carnal concupiscence, a penalty that Augustine calls ‘sin that is the punishment of sin’, imposed on the entire human race (save Christ) because of our participation in the primal sin (OpImp I.46; cf. CJul V.3.8; GLA 20.41). To understand that penalty, it is essential to be aware that ‘concupiscence’, in Augustine's hands, means, broadly, desire in general. And though Augustine usually speaks of concupiscence in a negative light, he does not always do so. For instance, he claims that ‘At times. . . one ought to boast over what is called concupiscence, because there is also the concupiscence of the spirit against the flesh, and there is the concupiscence of wisdom’ (DNC II.10.23; cf. CJul II.10.33; V.15.63). So desire can be good as well as evil, for Augustine. In his later works he often marks the distinction between good and evil concupiscence by calling the latter ‘carnal’ or ‘fleshly’ concupiscence.Footnote 20
In The Perfection of Human Righteousness Augustine writes that ‘there is sin either where there is not the love that ought to exist or where it is less than it ought to be, whether or not this can avoided by the will’ (6.15). This states a principle from which Augustine never deviates – indeed, it is central to his thinking. We relate through our loves, and sin is a misrelation to God, as well as the good things that God has made; sin is a fundamental disorientation. Carnal concupiscence is Augustine's multi-purpose term for this vitiated orientation.Footnote 21
Augustine defines carnal concupiscence in the following passage: ‘concupiscence is, of course, recognized in whichever sense of the body the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit’ (OpImp IV.28). Concupiscence, then, when spoken of in a bad sense, simply means evil desire. Evil desires can be sexual, but they need not be, and Augustine lists non-sexual desires which stem from carnal concupiscence, including the desire to eat food simply for the taste, and not for nourishment, greed for money, and lust for power (CJul IV.14.65–74). Thus, many kinds of distorted desires are included within the purview of carnal concupiscence; not all are sensual, and not all are proud. Pride is certainly one of the things Augustine means to include when he speaks of carnal concupiscence, but he never suggests that carnal concupiscence is always proud. In fact (in agreement with Plaskow), he makes it clear that the idolatry involved in disordered desires need not find its object in oneself; it may just as well find its object outside (GnLit XI.7).
Thus, Augustine's mature doctrine of sin grounds his belief that sin, post-fall, takes many forms. For Augustine, the sin of original sinners is an inherited privation of a fragmented good, and as such it has too many faces to be reduced to pride. Augustine believes that sin is as deeply foolish, ignorant and weak as proud. Moreover, the sin that is a punishment for sin is a kind of moral disaster that befalls the children of Adam and Eve, and as such it cannot simply count as self-assertion.
Sins of passivity
This last point – that, for Augustine, the sin which is the punishment of sin is not to be reduced to self-assertion – is worth expanding on, both because it highlights important continuities between Augustine's late view of sin and that of many modern feminists, and because it further situates Augustine's views concerning the basic sin within his doctrine of original sin.
For many feminists, behind the contention that sin does not only take the form of pride, lies a structural analysis of sin. In their struggle to understand how women have been implicated in patriarchy, feminists have criticised the idea that we are independent selves, and some have even rejected autonomy as mythical. The truth about us, they have said, is that we are persons in relation, who become who we are in relationships which shape us as we grow.Footnote 22 Feminists recognise, then, that we do not build our selves by ourselves. In a fallen and sinful world, we are born into a situation determined by structures of sin, and our thoughts, desires and intentions are shaped into sinful patterns. Moreover, we learn to subjectively affirm our constitution as sinners. Thus, Dorothee Sölle writes, ‘I am responsible for the house I did not build but live in’ (Thinking about God (Philadelphia: Trinity Press, 1990), p. 55).
This developmental view of the self suggests that sinners can be at once passive and active in sin: women born into patriarchal societies internalise their complex, oppressive dynamics. As they live out lives formed by evil attitudes and systems, they typically not only fail to resist but perpetuate the sinful dynamics which helped make them who they are. Since their selves are shaped in sinful ways, their personal powers are put in the service of sin in a way which is at once willing and out of their hands. Thus they are born and raised into their sin, a sin that is a willing inclination flowing naturally from their socially constructed selves.
Those ensnared in sin of this sort – what I have been calling the sin of sloth – are not simply passive in their situation. The slothful are bound and harmed by their socialisation into oppressive social systems, but they are not mere victims. Plaskow writes, for instance, that ‘woman is active, precisely in losing herself’ (Sex, Sin, and Grace, p. 23, cf. p. 151; Hampson, ‘Niebuhr on Sin’, pp. 48 and 56; Vaughn, Sociality, Ethics, and Social Change, p. 198). The picture drawn for us is of persons whose wills have been bound and put into the service of perpetuating the very systems which oppress them. As not only victims but perpetuators, both active and passive, such persons are accountable, and must be called to account (cf. Mary McClintock Fulkerson, ‘Sexism as Original Sin: Developing a Theacentric Discourse’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 59(4): 653–75; Christine E. Gudorf, Victimisation: Examining Christian Complicity (Philadelphia, PA: Trinity Press International, 1992); Roger Haight, ‘Sin and Grace’, in Francis Schussler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (eds), Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1991); Serene Jones, Feminist Theory and Christian Theology, ch. 5).
Augustine's late view of sin has some important similarities with such developments of feminist thought.Footnote 23 He agrees, first of all, that we do not make ourselves, but have our identities in relationships. Of course, his account of those identities, and how we have them, differs from many feminist analyses: Augustine believes that all human beings have a mystical solidarity with Adam which makes his sin that of the entire race, everyone born of sexual generation having sinned with and in Adam. Odd and unsettling as that view is to most of us, it is nevertheless a relational view of the self; for Augustine, human beings have a communal identity. Original sin (like divine grace) is a social construction of the self. In spite of their differences, then, Augustine agrees with leading feminist scholars that we do not build selves by ourselves; indeed, he believes that we are constituted by powers outside ourselves in such a way that we are the natures, histories and potentialities that have been given us (cf. C2Ep I.10.20; CJul VI.10.28; GLA 21.42).
Augustine further agrees, in his doctrine of original sin, that human wills are bound by a sin that is an inherited weakness: after the fall, misplaced loves and false knowledge characterise all human beings as sinners. This is not a voluntary condition, in the sense that it was not chosen by those who are born into the state of sin; it is a necessity imposed on them by the construction of their selves by Adam and Eve's prior sin. Yet this constructed state of sin is not simply forced upon them, because they did not exist prior to being constructed as sinners – their identities are wrapped up with the sin in which they find themselves (OpImp V.64).Footnote 24 Moreover, sin is perpetuated through the wills of those born with idolatrous loves and foolish minds, and it is therefore a state that sinners have willingly. Augustine believes that we choose what we love; those who love evil do so naturally, and without being forced by anything other than their own beliefs and desires. Thus, even though there is a clear element of passivity in the sin of those born with original sin, since they do not choose their deepest disordered desires, Augustine also finds original sinners active in willingly loving wrongly, in loving their evil desires, and in choosing on the basis of those loves.
These issues raise deep and controversial questions about the nature of responsibility for sin (is it really fair to call the evil of those who are constructed with evil loves sin?), questions that cannot be taken up here.Footnote 25 The main point, at present, is that the points of agreement sketched above lay the ground for an unexpected alliance between Augustine and feminist treatments of sin, both understanding sin as a power that not only overcomes us but also makes us who we are, constructing human identities after the fall in ways that are sinful. Sin is thus both passive and active, and far too complex to be reduced to pride.
Conclusion
A number of continuities between Augustine's thought about the nature of sin and that of feminists, often taken to be his critics, have now come to light. Following some implications of his privation view of evil, Augustine does not reduce all sin to pride; his understanding of concupiscence does not reduce evil desire to selfish sensuality; and in his doctrine of original sin Augustine shares with feminists a view of the human self as constructed under the power of evil, which makes it difficult for him to view pride as the common element in all sin. Of course, there remains much about which Augustine and many feminists would disagree – not least Plaskow's (Sex, Sin, and Grace, p. 156) suggestion that one may need to be Pelagian to be faithful to women's experience, lest one's doctrine of grace encourage a ‘feminine’ passivity.Footnote 26 In addition, I have not argued that Augustine, or anyone else, is right to take the views attributed to him above; my aim has been to raise questions about a widespread reading of both Augustine and the implications of his doctrine of sin. In the process we have discovered that feminists have less reason to be critical of Augustine than is often believed, but the value of this rereading of Augustine is not only to be found in this unexpected meeting of minds. It is important in itself to have learned that, once he worked out the implications of his overall doctrine of sin, what Augustine finally appears to have concluded about the basic sin is that there isn't one.
Abbreviations for Augustine's works
- CD
De Civitate Dei: Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans (413), trans. Henry Bettenson (New York: Penguin Books, 1972).
- C2Ep
Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum: Answer to the Two Letters of the Pelagians (420–1), The Works of Saint Augustine, I/24, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1998).
- CJul
Contra Julian: Answer to Julian (421), The Works of Saint Augustine, I/24, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1998).
- DeTrin
De Trinitate: The Trinity (400–20), The Works of Saint Augustine, I/5, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1991).
- DNC
De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia: Marriage and Desire (418–21), The Works of Saint Augustine, I/24, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1998).
- DPS
De Praedestinatione Sanctorum: The Predestination of the Saints (427/8?), The Works of Saint Augustine, I/26, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1999).
- Enchiridion
Enchiridion (423), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, vol. 3, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1993).
- Ep
Epistulae: Letter 6* (421), in St. Augustine on marriage and sexuality, ed. Elizabeth Clark (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 99–105).
- GLA
De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio: Grace and Free Choice (426), The Works of Saint Augustine, I/26, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1999).
- GnLit
De Genesi ad Litteram: The Literal Meaning of Genesis (416), On Genesis. The works of St. Augustine, I/13, ed. John E. Rotelle trans. Edmund H: ll (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2002).
- GPO
De Gratie et Peccato Originali: The Grace of Christ and Original Sin (418), The Works of Saint Augustine, I/23, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1997).
- NG
De Natura et Gratia: Nature and Grace (415), The Works of Saint Augustine, I/23, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1997).
- OpImp
Contra Julian Opus Imperfectum: Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian (421). The Works of Saint Augustine, I/24, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1998).
- PeccMer
De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione: The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins and the Baptism of Little Ones (411–12), The Works of Saint Augustine, I/23, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1997).
- SL
De Spiritu et Littera: The Spirit and the Letter (412/13), The Works of Augustine, I/23, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1997).
