Despite the renaissance of trinitarian reflection during the last half-century of Christian theology, the doctrine of the immanent Trinity – God's triune being in se as distinct from God's acts or operations ad extra – has suffered significant neglect. Following Karl Rahner's now famous axiom that ‘the “economic” Trinity is the “immanent” Trinity and the “immanent” Trinity is the “economic” Trinity’,Footnote 1 contemporary theologians have focused primarily on the economy of salvation as the means by which God's triune being is known. Speculation about the inner life of God, abstracted from God's own self-revelation, has been eschewed for its tendency to turn the immanent Trinity into a rarified, esoteric doctrine with little influence on practical piety. Thus for most contemporary theologians, the neglect of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity is quite benign.
In his Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity, Paul Molnar vigorously argues that this neglect is anything but benign for, he claims, recovering a doctrine of the immanent Trinity is essential for maintaining both divine and human freedom.Footnote 2 Molnar is careful to note that his recovery of a robust doctrine of the immanent Trinity avoids ‘irrelevant speculation about God's inner nature, abstracted from God's own self-revelation’.Footnote 3 Moreover, he agrees with the emerging theological consensus that the economic Trinity is the basis of our knowledge of God as triune in se. But while this implies for Molnar that we cannot separate the economic from the immanent Trinity, it also means that we must not confuse them. Thus, a robust doctrine of the immanent Trinity must be recovered, he claims, lest God's external actions become a necessity ‘grounded either in transcendental experience, suffering or love or some principle of relationality or communion’.Footnote 4 Both divine and human freedom are at stake.
Molnar's thesis is thus provocative and vigorously pursued; his text is impressively synthetic, yet trenchantly analytic in its style. Nevertheless, there remain questions which emerge from Molnar's discussion of divine freedom and the immanent Trinity which, I think, are worth pondering, if only to take us another step forward in a fuller appreciation of the doctrine of the Trinity for the life of the Christian church. Before I turn to raising these queries, I need to flesh out more of Molnar's argument.
Molnar's argument
Molnar's argument, as I understand it, is briefly stated as follows: contemporary theologians must maintain a doctrine of the immanent Trinity and its ‘clear and sharp’ distinction from the economic Trinity in order to maintain God's freedom in se, the fact of God's free acts of grace ad extra and ultimately genuine, creaturely freedom. Karl Rahner's famous identity axiom, while instrumental in reinvigorating trinitarian theological reflection in the twentieth century, is ultimately unhelpful, according to Molnar, for it collapses this distinction and thus sacrifices God's freedom in se. God then becomes dependent upon or indistinguishable from history, he contends, as in Robert Jenson's implicit Hegelianism or Jürgen Moltmann's panentheism. Moreover, theological reflection tends then to begin with experiential accounts of self-transcendence and thus allows experience, rather than the revealed Word of God, to dictate the meaning of theological categories, as in the case of Rahner and his followers.
When theological reflection fails to begin with Jesus Christ as the revelation of God in history, Molnar posits, it ‘bypasses’ its proper object, source and norm. God consequently becomes who God is, based on our choices, our accounts of experience, our value systems, etc. We create God in our own image and ultimately embrace a form of theological agnosticism in the name of a misguided appeal to vacuous, non-christologically grounded notions of divine incomprehensibility and mystery, as in the work of Elizabeth Johnson and Gordon Kaufman respectively. Moreover, Molnar maintains, any theological method that starts with experience, and not explicitly with the Word of God revealed, threatens a proper perception of both divine and human freedom, for human freedom can only be grounded in and properly understood in the light of God's freedom. Without affirming divine freedom, and thus allowing God to determine what can and cannot be said about God and God's relations with us, Molnar worries that theology is in danger of becoming a conversation with ourselves and thus separated from the source of our own creaturely freedom.
Karl Barth, however, stands against the stream of this modern trend, contends Molnar. By starting with the self-revelation of God in Christ, Barth argues that ‘the content of the doctrine of the Trinity is that God is the eternal Father, Son and Holy Spirit and that God's internal relations could not be reduced to God's relations with us as creator, mediator and redeemer’.Footnote 5 Barth thereby vigorously maintains God's freedom, for God is free for us only in Jesus Christ, in his free act of incarnation, the place where God has freely made himself known to us. Following Barth then, Molnar claims, against the current of much contemporary work on the Trinity, that ‘while a proper understanding of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity acknowledges the importance of God's triune relations as the free basis of his actions as creator, reconciler and redeemer, we must insist that relationality does not define God, and we cannot use either the doctrine of the immanent or the economic Trinity to validate a general principle of relationality’.Footnote 6
Moreover, Molnar argues for an ‘irreversible noetic and ontic relation between creator and creatures’ which theologians like Moltmann compromise by introducing a mutually conditioning view of divine and human relations. Such divine/human reciprocity, Molnar contends, sacrifices God's freedom both in se and ad extra. Moltmann, in fact, becomes for Molnar ‘an exceptionally clear instance of what happens when theologians are inconsistent in affirming a properly conceived doctrine of the immanent Trinity’.Footnote 7 Even more sympathetic readers of Barth like Eberhard Jüngel, Alan Torrance, and Colin Gunton, while appreciating the significance of maintaining a distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity, risk subordinating the proper object of revelation to either non-christologically formed notions of communion (Torrance) or non-theological ‘pre-understandings of love’ (Jüngel).Footnote 8
Significant strengths of Molnar's overall discussion include the sheer breadth of the literature surveyed and the depth of reading and documentation that it represents. In addition, Molnar gives his readers interesting and suggestive discussions concerning particular ways of viewing Chalcedonian christology and such attributes as divine impassibility as they pertain to the immanent/economic distinction. He also illustrates how the Ebionite and Docetic heresies help structure and focus key issues for Barth in the relationship between christology and a doctrine of the Trinity, which is reminiscent of a similar, though not identical, structuring role these ‘natural heresies’ play in Friedrich Schleiermacher's theology. (Could there be yet another link here between these two great modern fathers of the Christian church?) Finally, Molnar provides some illuminating readings of Barth, for example, on his support of the filioque clause,Footnote 9 on his claim that the Word assumes ‘sinful flesh’ and yet remains sinless throughout the course of Jesus’ obedience,Footnote 10 and on Barth's defence of the Logos asarkos (over against most contemporary detractors like Jenson) by maintaining that Jesus’ human nature did not exist until a particular time in history.Footnote 11 Each of these readings is controversial at some level and thus deserves even more debate and exploration than I can give them in this response. Given this all too brief summary, I would like now to raise three critical questions concerning Molnar's argument. I offer them in the spirit of inviting more reflection on the important thesis that he has so vigorously presented.
Rereading Rahner
My first question concerns Molnar's reading of Rahner as failing to maintain the priority of God's free acts of self-revelation in Christ by collapsing the distinction between the immanent and the economic Trinity in his famous identity axiom. Is there an alternative to Molnar's reading of Rahner which brings him much closer methodologically to Barth's sense of the immanent Trinity which preserves the priority of divine acts of grace? Given the prominent role Rahner plays in Molnar's account of late twentieth-century trinitarianism, especially in his critique of followers of Rahner like Elizabeth Johnson and Catherine LaCugna, this question of Rahner interpretation is no minor matter but central to Molnar's general thesis about proper approaches to constructing a doctrine of the Trinity. Let me try briefly to develop an alternative and admittedly minority reading of Rahner which avoids Molnar's criticism.Footnote 12
I agree with Molnar that for Rahner a general understanding of the relation between God and creatures – what Molnar calls Rahner's account of transcendental experience – provides the context of intelligibility for christology, for his account of God's self-revelation in Christ and thereby ultimately his account of God's triune identity. In his Foundations of Christian Faith, and in numerous essays on christology throughout the Theological Investigations, Rahner consistently understands Chalcedonian christology through his account of the God/creature relation. For example, he claims that in the incarnation ‘we can verify. . . in the most radical and specifically unique way the axiom of all relationship between God and creature’.Footnote 13 Elsewhere Rahner similarly argues that ‘if in the Incarnation the Logos enters into relationship with a creature, then it is obvious that the ultimate formal determinations of the Creator–creature relationship must also hold in this particular relationship’.Footnote 14 The general principles of the God/creature relation hold true of Christ; Christ, in fact, is their proof.
But here is where I start to part company with Molnar's reading, for I am not convinced as he is that it is thus ‘factually impossible for Rahner to recognize and to maintain the priority of faith, grace and revelation’ given his account of transcendental experience or the conditions for the possibility of God's self-revelation in Christ.Footnote 15 Rather, I would suggest that, in positing a general understanding of the relation between God and creatures, Rahner is not arguing that what Christians want to say about Christ can only be deduced from these general principles nor does he imply that christological claims have their genesis in more generic beliefs about God's relation to the world. ‘The historical nature of human and also metaphysical knowledge’, Rahner claims in yet another essay on christology, ‘permits us in actual fact to formulate such a formal scheme (of a world process on the way to Christ) only because we already know about the fact of the Incarnation, all of which is possible only post Christum natum’.Footnote 16 In fact, Rahner goes so far as to express this epistemological primacy of Christ ontologically when he speaks of human relations with God generally as ‘deficient modes of the primary Christological relation’.Footnote 17 Thus I suggest that there are good reasons to read Rahner as prioritising epistemologically God's unique revelation in Christ as the ontological condition for the possibility of transcendental experience. In other words, on this reading of Rahner, christology drives anthropology in the order of being and knowing, to use a common medieval distinction – one which Rahner is quite familiar with, while anthropology precedes christology in the order of explication.
It is interesting to note that Molnar's case for Rahner's so-called domestication of God in his account of transcendental experience is based primarily on his reading of the Foundations and supplemented by texts from the Theological Investigations.Footnote 18 This hermeneutical privileging of the Foundations can encourage, I think, what I have argued is a weaker reading of Rahner's theological method. After all, the Foundations is Rahner's textbook in fundamental theology and thus arguably not as doctrinally focused as the Theological Investigations. Its genre is important to its interpretation.
Yet even in the Foundations we get a glimpse of the more Christocentric reading of Rahner that I am suggesting. Consider, for example, what Rahner says near the beginning of his chapter on Christ:
When we say that at least today an a priori doctrine of the God-Man must be developed in a transcendental theology, this does not mean of course that such an a priori doctrine could be developed temporally and historically prior to the actual encounter with the God-Man. We always reflect upon the conditions of possibility for a reality which we have already encountered. But this does not make such a reflection superfluous. It offers a clearer and more reflexive understanding of what we have encountered as real, and it gives an added legitimacy to our intellectual conviction that we have grasped reality as it is.Footnote 19
Thus, even in his fundamental theology, Rahner acknowledges that christology has a certain priority in his account of the transcendental structure of experience, in his notion, for example, of the supernatural existential. Thus Rahner's Foundations with its ‘a priori doctrine of the God-Man’ is explicitly a posteriori to ‘the actual encounter with the God-Man’ – God's self-revelation in Christ.
Consequently, if this reading of Rahner holds, then Barth and Rahner are much closer methodologically than Molnar suggests, for they both give an ontological (and thereby epistemological) priority to christology over any account of the knowing subject. Are there still differences between the two theologians? Certainly, but those differences strike me as more material rather than formal – differences concerning, for example, whether we have the capacity for hearing the Word of God based in some ‘obediential potency for revelation’, as Rahner maintained, or whether the Word confronts us as strange, as an offence, as ‘completely new and unexpected’ in the case of Barth.Footnote 20 These material differences are crucial, but I would suggest that they are not as closely tied to theological method, especially with respect to the function of doctrine of the immanent Trinity in their respective theologies, as Molnar thinks.Footnote 21
However, it is worth noting here perhaps another crucial difference between Barth and Rahner – one which Molnar might sense but, at least on my reading, mislocates at the level of theological procedure (i.e. of collapsing the self-revelation of God in Christ into our experience of the economy of salvation). While both Barth and Rahner are careful not to separate what happens in Christ from the human experience of grace, both, if my reading of Rahner is correct, are also careful not to collapse what happens in Christ into the human experience of grace. Yet, parallel to their difference concerning the human capacity for the reception of revelation, so too there exists a crucial difference between Barth's insistence on the qualitatively unique act of God in the incarnation – this radical in-breaking of God into time and space – and Rahner's sense of the continuous character of what happens in Christ with what happens throughout creation as the recipient of God's grace.
For Rahner, then, Christ is the climax of the gracious relationship God has with creatures, as that relationship has taken place throughout the history of the world, from its very beginning, by virtue of God's grace. ‘It is not pure fantasy (though the attempt must be made with caution)’, Rahner provocatively suggests, ‘to conceive of the “evolution” of the world towards Christ, and to show how there is a gradual ascent which reaches a peak in him.’Footnote 22 Thus it is not so much that Rahner collapses the self-revelation of God in Christ into the graces offered to creation as a whole through some account of transcendental experience, as Molnar reads him, but rather that those general graces seem to be assimilated by virtue of their continuity into what happens in Christ. So, on my reading, what Molnar sees as collapse in Rahner is really continuity. Perhaps it is continuity at the expense of the qualitative uniqueness of the incarnation, this sense of something completely new and unexpected which Barth would want. Nevertheless, such continuity is not a collapse of God's self-revelation in Christ per se and thus does not support reading his identity axiom as collapsing the distinction between who God is in se with creaturely experience of God's salvific acts.
Before turning to a second question, let me suggest one additional quarrel with Molnar's interpretation of Rahner. Molnar reads Rahner's trinitarian axiom (or at times claims that it has the potential to be readFootnote 23) as an identity axiom in the strong, ontological sense. This ontological sense of identity, Molnar claims, has the potential to collapse the ‘clear and sharp’ distinction between immanent and economic Trinity necessary for maintaining divine freedom such that potentially the immanent Trinity is nothing more than a description of our own experiences within the economy of salvation. I do not dispute the claim that some who have embraced Rahner's axiom have taken it in that way (e.g. Moltmann) and thus entail some of the disastrous results that Molnar points out (e.g. a loss of God's aseity, impassibility, etc., in favour of an implicit, mutual, dependent relationship with the world). My suspicion, though, is that Rahner did not view it as an identity claim, but rather saw it affirming an epistemological or methodological claim – the consistency of God's revelation, the utter reliability that the God we encounter ad extra in God's economic acts identifies the God in se.Footnote 24
It reflected, moreover, his attempt to bring together systematic theology with the church's worship and proclamation of the triune God. How else could we read Rahner's rigorous defence of divine impassibility, for example, if he thought that the immanent and economic Trinity were identical in this strong, ontological sense? Moreover, this denial of God/creature reciprocity must at least raise a question of how he took the ‘vice versa’ language of the axiom – what Molnar calls the ‘bane of contemporary theology’Footnote 25 – and what the hypostatic union specifically means with respect to the unique hypostasis of the Son. And if what I have argued concerning a more Christocentric reading of Rahner's method is correct, then it might be highly suggestive to look at the Chalcedonian language of ‘unmixed and therefore not identical, distinguished but also not separated’ as our guide to understanding both the axiom and its ‘vice versa’ clause.
Trinity and revelation
My second question concerns the dogmatic location of the doctrine of the Trinity within a doctrine of revelation. Are there negative theological implications for developing an account of the Trinity (immanent or otherwise), as Barth does (at least in the early volumes of the Church Dogmatics Footnote 26) and as Molnar clearly affirms, within the context of a doctrine of revelation? As Molnar suggests, what Barth has to say about the doctrine of the Trinity is inseparable from what he has to say about the doctrine of revelation since revelation, the very source and norm of theology, is nothing other than the self-revelation of God as triune. Revelation is not the manifestation by God of realities other than God; rather divine revelation is self-revelation and as such is trinitarian in character. Barth even insists that the doctrine of the Trinity itself is simply a sustained exegesis of the statement ‘God reveals Himself as the Lord’.Footnote 27 As Rowan Williams suggests, revelation for Barth ‘is fundamentally the impartation of God's self-knowledge: we participate by revelation in this ultimate epistemological security’.Footnote 28
One important implication follows from this binding together of Trinity and revelation, namely, that ‘revelation’ as a theological category thus furnishes the basic conceptuality through which Barth expounds the being of God as Father, Son and Spirit in the opening volume of the Church Dogmatics. This pushes Barth towards speaking of God as Father, Son and Spirit through the idiom of self-manifestation, self-communication, and that idiom appears to press Barth further into expounding the doctrine of the Trinity by tracing the logic of a single, self-manifesting ‘I’, a ‘singular subject’.
What follows from this self-manifestation, self-communication idiom? Despite Molnar's claims to the contrary, this idiom forces Barth, especially in Church Dogmatics, I/1, to give divine unity conceptual priority over divine triunity. The divine essence is God's singularity as Lord, the ‘I’ who encounters us in divine self-communication. As such, Barth has an underdeveloped sense, again early in the Church Dogmatics, of the relations between the divine persons, the fellowship or mutuality between Father, Son and Spirit. Here, again following Rowan Williams, Barth fails to see that ‘relation’ is not something only to be predicated of God as a singular communicative subject encountering humanity in the act of revelation; it describes also that which characterises the nature of God godself. For Williams, when the doctrine of the Trinity is expounded as an answer to the problem of revelation, namely, ‘how do human beings come to hear the Word?’ especially when we as sinful humanity have no capacity for hearing the Word, then the divine economy is no longer seen as a fellowship of mutual interaction into which the history of the world is drawn into saving communion, but as the cognitive self-bestowal of the Revealer.Footnote 29
Thus, building on this criticism, a certain irony develops in Molnar's account of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity as a safeguard to genuine human freedom when that account of the Trinity is located within the broader concerns of a doctrine of revelation. For Molnar human freedom is possible only if God's being in se is distinguished from God's ad extra acts of salvation. God then is in no way dependent upon creation since God's acts ad extra – acts that essentially involve the creation and its redemption – are distinct, though revelatory, of God's being in se. Human freedom, likewise, is preserved since the distinction between God and creation that the doctrine of the immanent Trinity maintains grants autonomy to creation. This autonomy does not entail a lack of dependence of creation upon God as its creator; on the contrary, it entails such dependence precisely because creation is distinct from God's being in se. Thus human acts of response to God can be genuinely human acts and not some panentheistic mixture of God and creation in mutually dependent relationship.
But note then the irony of locating this proper distinction between God and creation that preserves creaturely freedom within the context of a doctrine of the immanent Trinity, which itself is situated within a concept of God as revealer. The point of creaturely freedom seems to be undermined, or at best underdeveloped, for this seems to be purely noetic or cognitive. Humans can thus be the recipients, the hearers of the Word as the Triune God reveals. But is that all that creaturely freedom is intended for? What about what Williams calls this ‘fellowship of mutual interaction into which the history of the world is drawn’ – a mutual interaction that need not entail a dependency of God on creatures or a reciprocity between God and creation but nevertheless is the basis for a free relationship, a communion between God and creatures? The irony then is that, in an attempt to preserve creaturely freedom, Molnar potentially presents an impoverished account of such freedom, devoid of mutual interaction, lacking response to God, given the controlling context of a doctrine of revelation for his understanding of the being of God.Footnote 30
Freedom and love
My third and final question also relates to this concern of what sort of implications Molnar's account of the immanent Trinity has for being in relation with the triune God. Does Molnar privilege God's freedom over and at the expense of God's love, for eaxample, in his reading of Barth's doctrine of the immanent Trinity? As I have noted, Molnar's principal aim in this text is to protect divine freedom from its collapse into reciprocity with creation by arguing for the importance of the ‘clear and sharp’ distinction of the immanent Trinity, God's in se reality, from God's acts of salvation ad extra. Barth is the hero of Molnar's story of modern trinitarian theology since Barth maintains that the self-revealing God is this one, Creator (the ‘Lord of our existence’Footnote 31), Reconciler (‘the Lord in the midst of our enmity towards Himself’Footnote 32), and Redeemer (the ‘Lord who sets us free’Footnote 33), and is so antecedently, independent of our apprehension of God and therefore in utter freedom.
Yet, given Barth's later christological reinterpretation of election, it seems quite unlikely that Barth would function with such an unqualified notion of divine freedom, or at least as unqualified as Molnar presents it – a ‘void of bare potentiality’ as Williams calls it.Footnote 34 In fact, Barth describes God's freedom as ‘God's being as He who lives and loves’. Thus for Barth God's freedom cannot be defined simply as utter independence or, to coin a term, ‘unconstrainedness’; rather divine freedom is ‘the freedom proper to and characteristic’ of God, the One who loves in freedom.Footnote 35 So God is free, for example, from origination and from conditioning from outside by what is not God, but God's freedom, in light of its identity as exhibited in the self-revelation of God in Christ, is inseparable from God's love. Divine freedom, in other words, since it is not abstract but takes form in the acts of creation, reconciliation and redemption, is the freedom in which God loves. Freedom is not exterior to God's love but its depth; divine love is the actuality (not the surrender or compromise) of divine freedom.
Moreover, gaining some clarity on the relation between divine freedom and love in Barth is also important since Barth structures the dogmatic presentation of the divine attributes or ‘perfections’, as he preferred to call them, around his notions of divine freedom and love. The divine perfections are set out first under the rubric of the perfections of divine loving (CD II/1, §30) and then under the perfections of divine freedom (CD II/1, §31). Then, within this arrangement, the perfections are paired, one of the pair giving greater (though not exclusive) profile to the divine loving, and the other similarly emphasising the divine freedom. Thus grace and holiness, mercy and righteousness, patience and wisdom, represent the perfections of divine loving while unity and omnipresence, constancy and omnipotence and eternity and glory are the perfections of the divine freedom.
Now, if this interpretation of the relationship of divine freedom and love and their structural importance in Barth's doctrine of God is correct, then it is odd that the notion of divine love does not play a more prominent role in Molnar's account of the immanent Trinity. While Molnar does discuss the contrasts between, for example, Moltmann's ‘panentheistic principle of suffering love discovered in a relational metaphysics’Footnote 36 or Jüngel's ‘pre-understanding of what love is’Footnote 37 with the love we encounter in the economic self-revelation of God in Christ, he says little more than to call God's love ‘the inconceivable action ad extra of God in the Son and Spirit’.Footnote 38 Certainly Molnar's focus on preserving divine freedom accounts for some of this arguably disproportionate emphasis and is further encouraged by his typically allergic reactions to such concepts as ‘relationality’ and ‘communion’ when they are used by other theologians in non-christologically informed ways.Footnote 39 But, even in light of these concerns, if Barth believes that divine freedom and love are inseparable, then presumably divine love deserves more play in Molnar's account than he gives it, both in his account of Barth and, more broadly, in his own retrieval of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity – the One who loves in freedom.Footnote 40
