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Truth-Conditions and Necessary Existence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2009

Extract

My objectives are twofold. I want first to show (mainly following John Hick) that there is a conception of necessary existence or aseity, distinct from a conception of ‘logically necessary being’, which is at least prima facie plausible and second to show, with respect to this specific conception, that there are relevant questions about stating truth-conditions which are unsatisfied and perhaps even in principle unsatisfiable, and that these are questions which must be met before such a prima facie plausible conception can be taken to give us the basis of a satisfactory theological elucidation of what it is to speak of God. I shall argue that it is doubtful whether these questions about truth-conditions can be met.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 1974

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