Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
Historians of late imperial Russia have been categorical in asserting that Russian peasants lacked any form of national identity. Scholars as diverse as Orlando Figes, Geoffrey Hosking, John Keep, Bruce Lincoln, Richard Pipes, Robert Service, Ronald Suny, and Allan Wildman have agreed that Russian peasants were too rooted in Gemeinschaft, too particularistic in their social identities, to be capable of identifying with the polity and territory of Russia. John Keep expresses the consensus concisely when he writes:
At the beginning of the twentieth century the Russian people lagged behind many others in the tsarist realm (Poles, Finns, even Baits and Ukrainians) in the development of a modern national consciousness. The social elite identified with the multinational empire; in the terminology of the day their thinking was rossiiskii rather than russkii. Ordinary folk either opted for a social class orientation or else had none at all, in that their horizons were limited to the local community. This helps to explain why Russia was defeated in World War One, why the Bolsheviks with their Utopian internationalist creed won mass support in 1917 and why the Whites failed to worst the Reds in the ensuing civil war.
1. Figes, Orlando, A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924 (London, 1996), 75 ; Lincoln, W. Bruce, Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution, 1914-1918 (New York, 1986), 45–46 ; Pipes, Richard, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1990), 203 ; Service, Robert, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia (London, 1997), 10 ; Suny, Ronald Grigor, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR and the Successor States (Oxford, 1998), 32 ; Wildman, Allan, The End of Russian Imperial Army (Princeton, 1980), 1:76–77.
2. Keep, John, The Last of the Empires (Oxford, 1996), 284.
3. Pipes, Russian Revolution, 203.
4. As Josh Sanborn points out, the claim that peasants lacked any sense of nationhood almost always comes from intellectuals, who fail to recognize any sense of nationhood other than their own. Yet if we accept that renditions of the nation are always plural, we can begin to investigate peasant notions without prejudice. In her account of peasants in Sierra de Puebla in Mexico, Florencia Mallon argues that “few nineteenth-century social groups, whether in Latin America or elsewhere” could be defined as possessing national identity if the nation is understood as “an already defined, integrated community with territory, language and accepted set of historical traditions.” She suggests that such aversion of the nation is that of the victors who seek to suppress the contests over citizenship and liberty that go on in the attempt to expand and make real the universal promises of nationalism and democracy. She shows how, beginning with the 1858-61 civil war and continuing through the French intervention, peasant guerrillas forged an alternative vision of the Mexican nation in which property rights were tempered by a commitment to solidarity and social justice while the status of citizen was tied to honorable actions rather than to birth, social class, or education. Mallon, Florencia E., Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru (Berkeley, 1995), 3, 9.
5. Smith, Anthony D., Nationalism and Modernism (London, 1998).
6. Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, 1983); Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Re/lections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983); Hobsbawm, E.J., Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, Eng., 1990).
7. Seton-Watson, Hugh, Nations and States (London, 1977), 6–13 . For a vigorous defense of the premodern “nation,” see Hastings, Adrian, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge, Eng., 1997).
8. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 14,46,47.
9. Ibid., 50-51.
10. Geoffrey Hosking recognizes the existence of “proto-national awareness” and discusses it in an illuminating fashion, but he, too, insists on a radical disjunction between this and modern national identity. Moreover, he emphasizes the dichotomy between two kinds of Russianness: russkii, which was connected with the people, the language, and preimperial principalities, and rossiiskii, which was associated with the territory, the multinational empire, the European great power. To my mind, the relationship between these two terms was at times closer than Hosking suggests—since rossiiskii could serve as a way of politicizing russkii. Hosking, Geoffrey, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917 (London, 1997), 210, xix.
11. Fedotov, G. P., The Russian Religious Mind, vol. 1, Kievan Christianity: Tlie Tenth to the Thirteenth Centuries (1946; reprint, Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 316 ; Cherniavsky, M., “Russia,“ in Ranum, O., ed., National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe (Baltimore, 1975), 118-43.
12. Pushkin, A. S., “Zametki po russkoi istorii XVIII veka,” in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 16 vols. (Moscow, 1949), 11:18.
13. Senchakova, L. T., Prigovory i naknzy rossiiskogo krest'ianstva, 1905-1907gg. (Moscow, 1994), 208.
14. Buganov, A. V., Russkaia istoriia v pamiati krest'ian XIX veka i natsional'noe samosoznanie (Moscow, 1992), 148-72. My view of national identity in Russia has been significantly shaped by this pathbreaking work, which is the first empirical study of what I call “protonational identity,” but which the author calls “national consciousness.” He concludes that there was a “relatively high level of national consciousness” among Russian peasants by the nineteenth century.
15. Kelly, Catriona, Petrushka: The Russian Carnival Puppet Theatre (Cambridge, Eng., 1990), 27–28.
16. Nekrylova, A. F., Russkie narodnye gorodskie prazdniki, uveseleniia izrelishcha (Leningrad, 1988), 116-25.
17. Engelgardt, Aleksandr Nikolaevich, Letters from the Country, 1872-1887, ed. and trans. Frierson, Cathy A. (New York, 1993), 135.
18. Brooks, Jeffrey, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literatures, 1861- 1917 (Princeton, 1985), chap. 6.
19. Rieber, Alfred J., “Russian Imperialism: Popular, Emblematic, Ambiguous,” Russian Review 53 (July 1994): 333.
20. This is how I read the evidence put forward in the innovative piece by Yulia Mikhailova, “Images of Enemy and Self: Russian ‘Popular Prints’ of the Russo-Japanese War,” Acta SlavicaJaponica 16 (1998): 30-53. She shows how “traditional” elements, such as Ivan Krylov's fables, were mobilized in the discourse of national defense.
21. Ascher, Abraham, The Revolution of 1905, vol. 1, Russia in Disarray (Stanford, 1988), 267.
22. Senchakova, Prigovory, 109, 111-24.
23. Ascher, Abraham, The Revolution of J905, vol. 2, Authority Restored (Stanford, 1992), 5.
24. Even among the Cossacks, detachment from the ideal of service to the person of the tsar was perceptible, if only embryonically. Shane O'Rourke, “The Don Cossacks during the 1905 Revolution: The Revolt of Ust-Medvedevskaia Stanitsa,” Russian Review 57 (October 1998): 583-98. After 1905 advocates of military reform contrasted the “patriotism, enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of Japanese private soldiers” with their Russian counterparts and urged a militarization of the school curriculum. See William C. Fuller, Civil- Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-1914 (Princeton, 1985), 195, 198. For a general argument that military factors were as important as economic ones in promoting national integration, see Barry R. Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power,” injohn L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern, eds., Perspectives on Nationalism and War, International Studies in Global Change, vol. 7 (Luxembourg, 1995), 135-85.
25. Hosking, Russia, 376, 397.
26. Mark von Hagen, “The Russian Empire,” in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and HabsburgEmpires (Boulder, Colo., 1997), 58-72.
27. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 84.
28. Nairn, T., The Break-up of Britain (London, 1977), 340.
29. Mann, M., The Sources of Social Power (Cambridge, Eng., 1993), 2:215.
30. I stress that I am not arguing that national and class identities are mutually exclusive. There are plenty of historical examples where national and class identities have been mutually constitutive. In the democratic states of western Europe and the United States, for example, labor movements promoted the interests of their members largely through the political structures of the nation-state; see Vogler, Carolyn M., The Nation Stale: The Neglected Dimension of Class (Aldershot, 1985), xii.
31. Manning, Roberta T., “The Zemstvo and Politics, 1864-1914,” in Emmons, Terence and Vucinich, Wayne S., eds., The Zemstvo in Russia (Cambridge, Eng., 1982), 133-76.
32. Home, John, “Remobilizing for ‘Total War': France and Britain, 1917-18,” in Home, John, ed., State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge, Eng., 1997), 205.
33. For more examples, see I. Odinskii, “Iz dnevnika krest'ianina,” Ezhemesiachnyi zhurnal, February 1915, no. 2:130-32; S. Semenov, “Derevnia vo vremia voiny,” Ezhemesiachnyi zhurnal, March 1915, no. 3:63-74. This journal carried a regular “Diary from the Countryside” throughout the war.
34. Dnevnik Totemskogo krest'ianina A. A. Zamaraeva, 1906-22 gg. (Moscow, 1995), 138-39.
35. Jahn, Hubertus F., “Patriots or Proletarians? Russian Workers and the First World War,” in Zelnik, Reginald E., ed., Workers and Intelligentsia in Late Imperial Russia: Realities, Representations, Reflections (Berkeley, 1999), 330-47.
36. Moon, David, “Peasants into Russian Citizens? A Comparative Perspective,” Revolutionary Russia 9, no. 1 (June 1996): 43–81.
37. Struve, P. V., “Istoricheskii smysl russkoi revoliutsii i natsional'nye zadachi,” Izglubiny: Sbornik statei o russkoi revoliutsii (1918; reprint, Moscow, 1990), 235.
38. This theme is developed in S. Smit [S. A. Smith], “Klass, natsiia i obshchestvennaia politika v russkoi revoliutsii 1917 goda,” Vestnik Omskogo universiteta, 1996, no. 2:57-66.
39. Leonard V. Smith, “Remobilizing the Citizen-Soldier through the French Army Mutinies of 1917,” in Home, ed., State, Society and Mobilization, 144-59.
40. Breuilly, John, “Nation and Nationalism in Modern German History,” Historical Journal, no. 3 (1990): 659-75.
41. Hughes, Michael, Nationalism and Society: Germany, 1800-1945 (London, 1988); Blackbourn, David, The Long Nineteenth Century: The Fontana History of Germany, 1780-1918 (London, 1997), 424 ; Breuilly, John, “The National Idea in Modern German History,” in Fulbrook, Mary, ed., German History since 1800 (London, 1997), 569.
42. Hughes, Nationalism and Society, 14.
43. John Home, “Introduction: Mobilizing for ‘Total War,’ 1914-18,” in Home, ed., State, Society and Mobilization, 5.
44. Ibid., 16.
45. Breuilly, “National Idea,” 572.
46. Wilhelm Deist, ‘The German Army, the Authoritarian Nation-State and Total War,” in Home, ed., Stale, Society and Mobilization, 170.
47. Blackbourn, Long Nineteenth Century, 266; Breuilly, “National Idea,” 570.
48. Gatrell, Peter, “Poor Russia: Environment and Government in the Long-Run Economic History of Russia,” in Hosking, Geoffrey and Service, Robert, eds., Reinterpreting Russia (London, 1999), 89–106.
49. William G. Rosenberg, “The Zemstvo in 1917 and Its Fate under Bolshevik Rule,“ in Emmons and Vucinich, eds., Zemstvo in Russia, 415.