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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
In a recent review of Wasiolek’s work on Dostoevski’s major writings Joseph Frank criticized the idea of moral ambiguity as “unquestionably the most dubious“ in the book. Although he regards the idea as useful and relevant, Frank feels that Wasiolek makes the “ambiguity more radical than it really is.” What is this concept and how radical is it in Dostoevski’s work?
The notion is a more subtle and far-reaching version of the common view that things are not necessarily what they seem to be. It says that situations and actions are in themselves neutral and meaningless; any value or meaning is imposed by us. Expressed thus, moral ambiguity seems a rarefied concept, but in Dostoevski’s hands it becomes a vivid, if still confusing, reality. It is best illustrated at first by specific and limited incidents.