I wish to thank Anya Kroth and Sergei Kamascikov for their research assistance. I also wish to acknowledge the valuable advice provided by Thomas Graham, Stephen Meyer, Robert C. Tucker, Charles Van Doren, Richard Williamson, and numerous U.S., Soviet, and Indian government officials. I am grateful for the research support provided by the UCLA Center for Russian and East European Studies, the UCLA Center for International and Strategic Affairs, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

1. In this important respect, Soviet motivations for nonproliferation resemble those of theUnited States. For a discussion of those parallels see William Potter, “Nuclear Export Policy: ASoviet-American Comparison,” in Charles Kegley and Pat McGowan, eds., Foreign Policy: USAIUSSR, Sage Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982),pp. 291–313.

2. Soviet support for nonproliferation also stems from concern that an increase in the numberof states with nuclear weapons would increase the risk of local conflict escalating to a superpowerconfrontation. For a discussion of Soviet nonproliferation incentives see Benjamin Lambeth, “Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy,” in Roman Kolkowicz et al., The Soviet Union and Arms Control (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 70–115; TobyTrister Gati, “Soviet Perspectives on Nuclear Nonproliferation,” California Seminar on Arms Controland Foreign Policy Discussion Paper, No. 66 (November 1975); and Joseph C. Nogee, “Soviet NuclearProliferation Policy: Dilemmas and Contradictions,” Orbis (Winter 1982): 751–69.

3. The Soviet campaign is described by Harold Neiburg in Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964), pp. 90–101.

4. The most detailed analysis of Soviet nuclear exports during this period is provided byLesley J. Fox, Soviet Policy in the Development of Nuclear Power in Eastern Europe, unpublishedmanuscript (1982). See also Gloria Duffy, Soviet Nuclear Energy: Domestic and International Policies, R-2362-DOE (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1979), pp. 3–5; Jaroslav G. Polach, “NuclearPower in East Europe,” East Europe (May 1968): 3–12; and Joseph Wilczynski, “Atomic Energyfor Peaceful Purposes in the Warsaw Pact Countries,” Soviet Studies (October 1974): 568–90.

5. Arnold Kramish, “The Great Chinese Bomb Puzzle—a Solution,” Fortune (June 1966): 246–48.

6. Arthur Steiner has called to my attentiòn a recently declassified document in which Molotov expresses concern, in May 1954, that Eisenhower's “Atoms for Peace” initiative might increase theavailability of fissile material for military purposes. The extent to which Molotov's documents reflectedgenuine Soviet concern about the linkage between peaceful and military uses of nuclear power,as opposed to efforts to obstruct the appeal of U.S. proposals, is difficult to determine.

7. Another indication of Soviet laxness toward safeguards in the mid-1950s is suggested byGeorge Quester's observation that accounting for nuclear materials within the Soviet Union was such that “individual plant managers could have diverted fissionable material without central authoritybeing aware of it.” George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 36. An alternative explanation noted by Gloria Duffy is thatKhrushchev was prepared to accept the nuclear risk in exchange for political benefits. See GloriaDuffy, “Soviet Nuclear Exports,” International Security (Summer 1978): 84–85.

8. Soviet fears about Chinese nuclear weapons were also intensified during the summer of 1958as a consequence of the Taiwan Straits crisis and Mao's display of indifference toward the prospectof nuclear escalation.

9. Duffy, “Soviet Nuclear Exports,” p. 86.

10. See Duffy, Soviet Nuclear Energy, p. 7.

11. See Karel Doçek, “Czechoslovak Uranium and the USSR,” Radio Liberty Dispatch (July 9,1974), p. 3.

12. See Jonsson, Christer, Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case (New York:Columbia University Press, 1979)Google Scholar and Seaborg, Glenn T., Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981)Google Scholar.

13. See Gerhard Wettig, “Soviet Policy on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966–1968, “Orbis (Winter 1969): 1058–84.

14. West Germany signed the Nonproliferation Treaty in November 1969 but did not ratify ituntil May 1975.

15. Toby Trister Gati, for example, maintains that in practice the Soviets have not adopted astrong antiproliferation stance despite their declaratory policy. Her interpretation is not supportedby my study. See Gati, “Soviet Perspectives,” pp. 4–5.

16. V. S. Emelianov cited by Duffy, Soviet Nuclear Energy, p. 12.

17. See, for example, A. Mikhailov, “Effective Control Over Nuclear Exports,” InternationalAffairs (June 1982): 19–25; Emelianov, V., Problems of the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons(Moscow: Nauka Press, 1982)Google Scholar; I. Dmitriev, “Postavit’ nadezhnyi bar'er,” Pravda (July 8, 1977); and Davydov, V. F., Nerasprostranenie iadernogo oruzhiia i politika (Moscow: Nauka, 1980)Google Scholar.

18. See William C. Potter, “U.S.-Soviet Cooperation for Nonproliferation,” The WashingtonQuarterly (Winter 1985), pp. 141–54.

19. Quester, Politics, p. 23.

20. See Murrey Marder and Dan Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviets Acted to Defuse SouthAfrican A-test,” Washington Post (August 28, 1977). For a Soviet account of the episode see V F.Davydov, “Iadernaia ugroza u mysa Dobroi Nadezhdy,” SShA (December 1977): 48–49.

21. On this point see Joseph Nye, “The U.S. and Soviet Stakes in Nuclear Nonproliferation, “P.S. (Winter 1982): 36.

22. See Nuclear Proliferation Factbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Government Printing Office, September 1980), pp. 281–83, 294–99, and Joseph Pilat and Warren H. Donnelly, “Policies forNuclear Exports, Cooperation and Nonproliferation of Seven Nuclear Supplier States,” CongressionalResearch Service Report No. 82–100S (May 1982), pp. 37–43.

23. The issue of shoring up the trigger list was addressed at a series of unpublicized meetingsin June and November 1982 and January and July 1983, involving some but not all of the membersof the Nuclear Exporters (Zangger) Committee. Although not invited to the June meeting, theSoviets participated in the November and January sessions and supported the U.S. initiative to pluggaps related to gas centrifuge technology.

24. See Vneshniaia torgovlia (April 1982), pp. 48–49.

25. This information was obtained through interviews with U.S. government and IAEA officialswho were in contact with representatives of the State Committee. The Soviet offer was first madein July 1982.

26. These talks focused on a wide range of proliferation problem areas, including the role ofthe IAEA, the international system of nuclear export controls, and specific problem countries. Bilateraltalks were held on December 15–16,1982 in Washington, D.C.; June 14–16,1983 in Moscow;February 16–18, 1984 in Vienna; November 28–30, 1984 in Moscow; and April 15–19, 1985 in Helsinki.At the November 1984 meeting the two sides publicly announced the bilateral nonproliferationtalks for the first time and agreed to meet every six months.

27. This section relies extensively on interviews conducted by the author in Washington, D.C.in June 1983, in Vienna in July 1983, and in New Delhi in September 1983.

28. In fairness to the Soviet Union it must be said that the initial U.S. response was alsorestrained.

29. See TASS, May 18, 1974 as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Source Daily Report(Soviet Union), May 20, 1974, p. J–l.

30. See F. I. Kozhevnikov and V. A. Mazov, “Nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress; nekotorye problemymezhdunarodnogo prava,” Voprosy istorii (January 1974): 58–74.

31. The size of the shipment was variously reported at between 200 and 240 tons. Approximately230 tons were needed for the initial charge of RAPP II.

32. See Thomas O'Toole, “Soviet Sale Raises Questions on India's Nuclear Plans,” WashingtonPost (December 12, 1976), p. F–7 and Don Oberdorfer, “Soviets Agree to Sell India Heavy Waterfor Reactors,” Washington Post (December 8, 1976), p. 1.

33. Western accounts differ on whether or not the U.S. and Canadian intervention occurredprior to or following Soviet shipment of the first 55 tons.

34. Pursuit refers to the application of safeguards to all facilities in which the sensitive material(i.e., heavy water) or its byproducts may be introduced. Perpetuity refers to the permanent applicationof safeguards to the facility, even after the initial safeguarded material is consumed or removed.

35. This point was emphasized by a high-ranking Indian official engaged in the negotiations.See also “Heavy Water Deal with USSR in Difficulties,” Indian Express (March 18, 1977).

36. The most detailed published account of the Soviet-Indian deal indicates that under theSeptember 1976 arrangement, the Soviet Union agreed to supply 200 tons of heavy water in installmentsover a three year period. Each installment was to be separately contracted. According to thisaccount, 55 tons was shipped to India in 1976. A second contract for a total of 75 tons was thennegotiated and signed in December 1977—following the conclusion of the Indian-IAEA safeguardsagreement. A third contract for the delivery of the remaining 70 tons was then concluded in 1978.See G. G. Mirchandani and P. K. S. Namboodiri, Nuclear India: A Technological Assessment (NewDelhi: Vision Books, 1981), pp. 68 and 142.

37. See IAEA Information Circular 211.

38. One U.S. participant in the discussions with the Soviets in 1976 maintains that initiallyneither the Foreign Ministry nor the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy wereaware of these three possibilities of circumventing the safeguards.

39. The Soviets had endorsed the principle of full-scope safeguards at the discussions of theLondon Group but indicated they would not apply them unilaterally.

40. See Paul Power, “The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy,” Asian Survey (June 1979):574–96.

41. See “The Text of the Agreement of 17 November 1977 Between the Agency and India forthe Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of Heavy Water from the Soviet Union, “IAEA Information Circular, 260 (July 1978).

42. Section 25 provides that the application of safeguards “shall commence only upon introductioninto the heavy water system of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station of any of the heavywater supplied by the Soviet Union.” At the time of the 1976 sale and the 1977 IAEA agreementIndia was still optimistic that it would soon be able to produce a substantial amount of its own heavywater. India may thus have purchased the Soviet water primarily for insurance purposes and withthe hope that its use and the attendant safeguards might be avoided.

43. An offer of an additional 200 tons of heavy water was first made in March 1979 by Kosyginduring a visit to India. At that time the Soviet Union also offered to build a 1000 megawatt powerplant. RAPP II went critical in October 1981 but did not begin commercial operation until April1982.

44. I am not aware of any public record of the terms of the 1980 sale but was told by numerousIndians that the same safeguards were in effect.

45. Soviet-Indian nuclear trade discussions recently have focused on the issue of light-waterreactors. See Worldwide Report: Nuclear Development and Proliferation (July 30, 1984), p. 29.

46. For accounts of Libya's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons see Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books, 1981), pp. 53–65, and Zivia S. Wurteleet al., Nuclear Proliferation Prospects for the Middle East and South Asia, A report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy by Pan Heuristics, June 1981, pp. 2–24 to 2–29.

47. Pravda (May 31, 1975), p. 4.

48. The 1975 agreement reportedly called for construction of an atomic research center, provisionof a small research reactor, and training in the Soviet Union of Libyan technicians for thecenter. See Joseph V. R. Micallef, “A Nuclear Bomb for Libya?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists(August/September 1981): 14–15.

49. See Weissman and Krosney, The Islamic Bomb, pp. 90–91.

50. This information is based on interviews conducted in Washington, D.C. in June 1983.

51. Duffy, Soviet Nuclear Energy, p. 84.

52. See, for example, N. Zagladin, “Atomic Blackmail,” New Times, no. 37 (1978): 21–22;V. F. Davydov, “Problema nerasprostraneniia iadernogo oruzhiia: pozitsiia Amerikanskikh politologov, “SShA (September 1980): 96–104; and Iu. Tomilin, “Nerasprostranenie iadernogo oruzhiia—velenie vremeni,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (December 1980), p. 48.

53. An estimate of the plutonium production capability of the Soviet reactor is provided byMicallef, A Nuclear Bomb, p. 14.

54. British Broadcasting Corporation, “Summary of World Broadcasts: Soviet Union, “February 18, 1976.

55. See, for examaple, Thomas O'Toole, “Libya Said to Buy Soviet A-Power Plant,” WashingtonPost (December 12,1977); Komsomolets (Erevan) reported in “Soviet Nuclear Plant for Libya Seemsto be Going Ahead,” in Energy in Countries with Planned Economies (August 2, 1979), p. 16; “USSR-Libya Nuclear Pact,” Worldwide Report: Nuclear Development and Proliferation (April 15,1981); Robin Miller, “Libya's Peaceful Nuclear Plans,” Jamahiriyah Review (March 1982), p. 17; andNucleonics Week (March 31, 1983), p. 11.

56. The Libyan news agency reported in October 1984 that Libyan authorities were still negotiatingwith Soviet officials for the construction of Libya's first nuclear power station. See Los AngelesTimes (October 22, 1984), p. 2.

57. IAEA, INFCIRC 282 (October 1980). Libya was in technical violation of Article 3 of theNonproliferation Treaty by not concluding a safeguards agreement within two years of the entry intoforce of the treaty. A large number of parties to the treaty, however, have been delinquent in thisrespect.

58. John Cooley, “Libya Shopping for Nuclear Fuel?” Christian Science Monitor (August 29,1978).

59. It is important to note that the purchase and operation of safeguarded nuclear power orresearch reactors or fuel for them by Nonprohferation Treaty parties is sanctioned by the treaty. Thispoint was emphasized by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in its response to criticism ofthe Soviet-Libyan deals by the Federation of American Scientists. ACDA also acknowledged thatthe Soviet Union had advised the United States of its intention to abide by the London Supplierguidelines in its nuclear dealings with Libya. Letter from ACDA's Non-Proliferation Bureau to theFederation of American Scientists (November 3, 1978).

60. Duffy, Soviet Nuclear Energy, pp. 84–85.

61. See “Moscow to Libya: Pay Your Bills,” Newsweek (October 4, 1982), p. 9.

62. Reported in Nucleonics Week (March 31, 1983), p. 11.

63. See Analyses of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities of India, Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan, Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983),pp. 11–12.

64. See “Percde possible pour la coopération nucléaire beige avec les pays arabes,” Le Soir(August 8, 1981).

65. This information is based on interviews with U.S. government nonprohferation analysts.

66. Gloria Duffy (Soviet Nuclear Energy, p. 88) mentions the arrangement for the return ofspent fuel as applicable to Libya. Although I am not aware of a corroborating source which identifiesthat arrangement for Libya specifically, the Soviets have often told U.S. officials in bilateral meetingson nonproliferation that return of spent fuel to the USSR is part of their general nuclear exportpolicy.

67. See Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, “The Cuban Nuclear Power Program,” Cuban Studies/EstudiosCubanos (January 1979): 1.

68. Indicative of the slow pace is the fact that Cuba did not become a member of the JointInstitute for Nuclear Research in Dubna (near Moscow) until June 1976.

69. See Granma (December 7, 1974), p. 2.

70. Cited in Perez-Lopez, “The Cuban Nuclear Power Program,” p. 15.

71. Illustrative news reports include “CMEA to Build Nuclear Power Station in Cuba,” TASS(January 5, 1977); “Cuba Signs Agreement on Nuclear Research Center,” TASS (May 16, 1980);B. G. Kolodkov, “SSSR-Kuba: 20 let torgovoekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva,” Latinskaia Amerika(May 1980), p. 128–32; A. Castro Bias, “CMEA Role in Promoting Nuclear Service, Technologyin Cuba,” Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo Stran-chlenov SEV (May 1980), pp. 5–19; and “TwoUnit Station Planned for Cuba,” Nuclear Engineering International (June 1982), p. 7. According toa report in Pravda (June 22,1983) the first stage of the Cienfuegos nuclear power plant is scheduledto start operation in 1987, followed by the second stage in 1989. On July 26, 1984 Castro announcedthat Cuba had begun building a nuclear power plant with the help of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.See Los Angeles Times (July 27, 1984), p. 6.

72. See Perez-Lopez, “The Cuban Nuclear Power Program,” pp. 13 and 16.

73. It is likely that the reactor vessels eventually shipped to Cuba will be produced at the Škoda Works in Czechoslovakia since the Soviet Union is phasing out production of 440 megawatt pressurizedwater reactors in favor of the 1000 megawatt variety. See Perez-Lopez, “Nuclear Power inCuba: Opportunities and Challenges,” Orbis (Summer 1982), p. 505.

74. Perez-Lopez, “The Cuban Nuclear Power Program,” p. 27.

75. See IAEA, “The Text of the Agreement of 5 May 1980 Between the Agency and CubaRelating to the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Supply of a Nuclear Power Plant, “INFCIRC 291 (June 1980).

76. See IAEA, “The Text of the Agreement of 25 September 1980 Between Cuba and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of a Nuclear ResearchReactor from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” INFCIRC 298 (August 1982).

77. The provision of the zero power reactor in 1969 occurred prior to the issuance of the ZanggerCommittee “trigger list. “

78. INFCIRC 281, p. 2. Similar provisions exist with respect to safeguards for the Soviet researchreactor. See INFCIRC 298.

79. See, for example, O. A. Zhirnov and P. P. Iakovlev, “Atom i politika,” Latinskaia Amerika, no. 2 (1981): 33–48, and V G. Kolokov, “SSSR-Kuba,” pp. 128–32.

80. Perez-Lopez, “Nuclear Power in Cuba,” p. 513.

81. Although a number of analysts imply that the Soviets will require the return of spent fuelfrom Cuba, it is doubtful that the issue has been settled. This may be inferred from continued U.S.efforts in ad hoc meetings on nonproliferation with the Soviets to gain assurances on this point. Todate, the Soviets have only been prepared to state that the return of spent fuel is their generic policywithout specifying its applicability to Cuba. Nucleonics Week (March 31, 1983) reports that “oneoption under consideration would have the fuel held in on-site cooling ponds for longer than the twoyears that is normal for Soviet-supplied plants” (p. 11). Western reports suggesting that the Sovietswill require the return of spent fuel include John Redick, “The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferationin Latin America,” International Organization (Winter 1981): 107; Perez-Lopez, “NuclearPower in Cuba,” p. 515; and Duffy, Soviet Nuclear Energy, p. 88. It is also suggested by V. Emelianov,Problems, p. 66.

82. See “Official Reports,” Izvestiia (March 29, 1980) in FBIS Worldwide Report (April 9,1980), p. K–2, and “1st Step on the Way to Nuclear Cooperation Between Argentina and USSR, “TASS News Agency (April 14, 1980) in Energy in Countries with Planned Economies (April 1980),p. 25.

83. March 10, 1980 was the cutoff date mandated by the NNPA.

84. See Edward Schumacher, “Argentina and Soviets are No Longer Just Business Partners, “New York Times (July 13, 1981), p. E-4; Nucleonics Week (November 11, 1982), p. 1; and “SovietExperts Aid in Argentine Nuclear Tube Manufacture,” Worldwide Report: Nuclear Development andProliferation (March 28, 1980), p. 11.

85. “Soviet Enrichment Services Procured,” Nuclear Engineering International (June 1982).

86. “CNEA Official, Soviet Comment on Uranium Deal,” Worldwide Report: Nuclear Developmentand Proliferation (April 18, 1982), p. B–14.

87. Nucleonics Week (November 11, 1982), p. 1.

88. Ibid.

89. IAEA, INFC1RC 297 (February 1982), p. 2.

90. See IAEA, INFCIRC 303 (July 1983), p. 3.

91. One Argentine account (Clarin [January 14, 1981], p. 11) reports that five tons of Sovietheavy water were in Argentina in January 1981, although the safeguards agreement did not takeeffect until October 1981.

92. Indeed there is little reference in Soviet writings on nonproliferation to Argentina's nuclearprogram. The most extensive coverage is provided in the journal Latinskaia Amerika.

93. For critical Soviet commentary on Brazil's nuclear program with specific reference to theGerman deal see Iurii Kharlanov, “Blagopriiatnye peremeny,” Pravda (July 6, 1975), p. 6. Thegreater concern over Brazil's nuclear program may stem from Brazil's West German nuclear connectionand the Soviet Union's more limited economic leverage in Brazil than in Argentina.

94. See Peter Clausen, “The Reagan Nonproliferation Policy: A Critical Midterm Look,” ArmsControl Today (December 1982).

95. See “Reagan Administration Approves Sales of Heavy Water to Argentina,” Latin AmericaEnergy Report (August 30, 1983), p. 136.

96. See, for example, I. G. Sinel'schikova, “Inostrannyi kapital v iadernoi energetike LatinskoiAmeriki,” Latinskaia Amerika, no. 5 (1981): 57–68 and A. I. Utkin, “Mezhatlanticheskaia bor'bapo voprosam iadernoi energetiki,” SShA (May 1978), pp. 33–34.

97. “China Is Open to Proposals From All Vendors,” Nucleonics Week (November 3, 1983),p. 4.

98. “East Bloc Adds Spent Fuel Storage Space As Soviet Reprocessing Sags,” Nucleonics Week(September 22, 1983), p. 1.

99. There are some indications of an internal debate in the Soviet Union over the issue ofcooperation with the United States in preparation for the 1985 Nonprohferation Treaty ReviewConference. See, for example, “SShA narushaiut svoi mezhdunarodnye obiazatel'stva,” Pravda(January 30, 1984); P. Vladimirskii (a pseudonym for V. Petrovskii), “Vashnyi bar'er: Ukrepliatrezhim nerasprostraneniia iadernogo oruzhiia,” Pravda (March 19, 1984), p. 4; Iu. Rostov, “Vashingtorii nerasprotranenie: opasanaia tendentsiia,” SShA (March 1984): 59–65; V. Lukin, “Nerasprostranenieiadernogo oruzhiia: slova i dela zapada,” Izvestiia (April 12, 1984); and A. Petrosiants, “Atom—dlia sozidaniia,” Pravda (June 12, 1984).