Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-15T15:11:16.150Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Communities of Judgment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Allan Gibbard
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Michigan

Extract

Walk across a campus on a beautiful fall day and observe what a conversing species we are. Chimpanzees can be taught to talk a little, in sign language. Put educated chimpanzees together, though, and they turn out to have nothing to say to each other. We humans are different; we can even find silence awkward.

Language does many things for us; conveying straight information is the most obvious. I want to stress, though, some of the ways that talk adjusts our terms for living together. What I say will be speculative and some of it will no doubt be wrong, but I suspect it is not completely off-base. Much of talk we can see as securing and adjusting terms of association – terms, among other things, of cooperation and mutual restraint. In part, this is a matter of governing our feelings toward each other. Feelings tend toward action; they can make for social glue or social bombshells. Nature, in the form of Darwinian evolution, has given us various ways to mesh feelings, and some of these. I think, are a matter of language.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable