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Corrective Justice and Property Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2009

Jules L. Coleman
Affiliation:
Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Yale Law School

Extract

Suppose the prevailing distribution of property rights is unjust as determined by the relevant conception of distributive justice. You have far more than you should have under that theory and I have far less. Then I defraud you and in doing so reallocate resources so that our holdings ex post more closely approximate what distributive justice requires. Do I have a duty to return the property to you?

There are many good reasons for requiring me to return to you what I have taken. One is that while you may have no right in justice to all that you own, it does not follow that I do, or that I have a right to take it. Thus, requiring me to return the property to you is a way of recognizing that I had no right to take it from you in the first place.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1994

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