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Moral Change and Social Relativism*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2009

Joseph Raz
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Balliol College, Oxford University

Extract

I could not write the essay I hoped to write. I hoped to write about cultural pluralism and moral epistemology by assuming that the first is the case and exploring what implications this may have for the second. But I soon realized that I do not know what cultural pluralism is. I do not mean that I have just belatedly discovered that the phrase “cultural pluralism” is used in different ways on different occasions. I mean that I realized that I myself did not know in what sense the phrase may be used which makes it relevant to the inquiry suggested by the general topic of this volume. So the following reflections are based on one assumption: The fact of multiculturalism cannot have much bearing on moral epistemology unless it bears on moral truths.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1994

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