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Bargaining and Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

David Gauthier
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh

Extract

My concern in this paper is with the illumination that the theory of rational bargaining sheds on the formulation of principles of justice. I shall first set out the bargaining problem, as treated in the theory of games, and the Nash solution, or solution F. I shall then argue against the axiom, labeled “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” which distinguished solution F, and also against the Zeuthen model of the bargaining process which F formalizes.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1985

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