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Contextualism, Pluralism, and Distributive Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

David Sidorsky
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Columbia University

Extract

THE INAPPLICABILITY THESIS

There is a gap between the idea of distributive justice and the many factors that are morally relevant for decision making on economic issues. Only to a degree can this gap be attributed to the distance between “ideal reach” and “practical grasp,” to the legitimate difference in detail between an abstractly delineated economic scenario and a concrete set of circumstances, and to the disparate idioms and metaphors of theoretical and practical discourse. Rather, the gap indicates a fundamental problem with the concept of distributive justice. The problem, that is here termed the “inapplicability thesis,” is that even if distributive justice in abstract formulation were to be accepted as a value, its application in economic decision making is indeterminate.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1983

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