Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-8p88z Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-19T16:45:53.434Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Gender Question in Criminal Law*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Extract

Over the past decade, both the doctrine and the practice of criminal law have come under intensely critical review by feminist scholars and reformers. The territory under reexamination by or because of feminists spans the problems of women as witnesses, defendants, and prisoners in the criminal justice system; it extends to the situation of women as potential victims and offenders in diverse offense circumstances. Crimes in which the defendant or victim is typically female (e.g., prostitution, rape) are predictable subjects of feminist concern, but attention has extended as well to the dynamics of women's experience (arguably distinctive and certainly neglected) in connection with such offenses as assault, shoplifting, drug offenses, and even armed robbery.

Feminist criticism and reform efforts have focused for the most part at the level of specific rules or particular areas of practice. In this paper I want to comment on the structure of the feminist critique and to compare its underlying assumptions to those of criminal law as it has been traditionally understood and practiced. In at least some of its prominent versions, feminism entails orientations and commitments incompatible with those of the received criminal law tradition. To the extent that this is true, criminal law, constructed and expounded almost exclusively by males, can fairly be characterized (descriptively) as “sexist” or at least “gendered” (that is, male-oriented) in its core assumptions. Moving to normative ground, I suggest that if the descriptive claims of the feminist movement are true to any substantial extent, then criminal law – conceived in terms seemingly uncongenial to a large part of our population – would require thorough reexamination.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1990

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable