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Moral Disagreement in a Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2009

Amy Gutmann
Affiliation:
Political Theory, Princeton University
Dennis Thompson
Affiliation:
Political Theory, Harvard University

Extract

Moral disagreement about public policies—issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and health care—is a prominent feature of contemporary American democracy. Yet it is not a central concern of the leading theories of democracy. The two dominant democratic approaches in our time—procedural democracy and constitutional democracy—fail to offer adequate responses to the problem of moral disagreement. Both suggest some elements that are necessary in any adequate response, but neither one alone nor both together are sufficient. We argue here that an adequate conception of democracy must make moral deliberation an essential part of the political process. What we call “deliberative democracy” adds an important dimension to the theory and practice of politics that the leading conceptions of democracy neglect.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1995

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