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Moral Individualism: Agent-Relativity and Deontic Restraints*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Eric Mack
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Tulane University

Extract

My goal in this essay is to say something helpful about the philosophical foundations of deontic restraints, i.e., moral restraints on actions that are, roughly speaking, grounded in the wrongful character of the actions themselves and not merely in the disvalue of their results. An account of deontic restraints will be formulated and offered against the backdrop of three related, but broader, contrasts or puzzles within moral theory. The plausibility of this account of deontic restraints (and of the conception of moral rights which are correlative to these restraints) rests in part on how well this account resolves the puzzles or illuminates the contrasts which make up this theoretical backdrop.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1989

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