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Rationality and Affectivity: The Metaphysics of the Moral Self*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Laurence Thomas
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Oberlin College

Extract

There is a way of doing moral philosophy which goes something like this: If it can be shown that it is rational for perfectly selfish people to accept the constraints of morality, then it will follow, a fortiori, that it is rational for people capable of affective bonds, and thus less selfish, to do so. On this way of proceeding the real argument – that is, the argument for the actual constraints (theory or principles) to be adopted – proceeds with only fully rational individuals who have no other concern than to maximize their nontuistic (selfish) preferences. Then it is noted that the affective capacities of human beings actually make quite palatable the constraints that the fully rational persons with wholly nontuistic preferences have agreed upon.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1988

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