¹ Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War, trans. Michael, Howard and Peter, Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.610Google Scholar. I have benefited as well from Huntington, Samuel P., “Tocqueville's Annies and Ours,” text of remarks delivered at the University of Chicago, 15 February 1985.Google Scholar

² See Aron, Raymond, Pensee la Guerre, Clausewitz, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), vol. 1, p.39Google Scholar for a particularly acute comparison; also, see p.65. In addition, see Paret, Peter, Clausewitz and the State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp.351–3.Google Scholar

³ See Book I, ch. 1, sec. 28. Clausewitz, On War, p.89.

⁴ For a brief summary of Tocqueville's activities in Algeria see Jardin, Andre, Alexis de Tocqueville (Paris: Hachette, 1984), pp.302–327.Google Scholar His report on Algeria can be found in De Tocqueville, Alexis, Oetwres, 9 vols., ed. Mary, De Tocqueville (Paris: Michel Levy 1866), vol. 9, pp.423–438, 469–480.Google Scholar (Note: the more recent and complete edition of Tocqueville's works was not available to me in writing this article.) See also Richter, Melvin, “Tocqueville on Algeria,” Review of Politics vol. 25 (July 1963), pp.362–398.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Finally, for a miscellany of Tocqueville's observations on these matters see M.C.M., Simpson, ed., Correspondence and Conversation of Alexis de Tocqueville with Nassau William Senior, 2 vols. (London: Henry S. King, 1872), vol. 1, pp.118, 225–243Google Scholar; vol. 2, pp.8–9, 93–103, 126, 179–183.

⁵ Tocqueville, Alexis De, Democracy in America, trans. George, Lawrence (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), vol. 2, pt. 3, chs. 22–23, pp.645–654.Google Scholar

⁶ Clausewitz, On War, bk. 1, ch. 1, p.87.

⁷ Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 22, p.646.

⁸ ibid., ch. 24, p.657.

⁹ For Clausewitz's analysis of escalation, see On War, bk. 1, ch. 1, p.77.

¹⁰ See the exchange of speeches between Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz, New York Times, 29 November 1984 and 10 December 1984.

¹¹ Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 22, p.648.

¹² ibid.

¹³ See Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), ch. 6, pp. 143–162.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Franklin, D. Margiotta, ed., The Changing World of the American Military (Boulder: Westview, 1978), pp.37–70.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 24, p.656.

¹⁶ For a recent (and heated) example of this debate, see Armed Forces Journal International (September 1984), and the spate of letters and articles which followed this issue, which contained a discussion of the Army's personnel management system.

¹⁷ Foot, M.R.D., Men in Uniform (New York: Praeger, 1961), p.30.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Gaulle, Charles De, The Edge of the Sword, trans. Gerard, Hopkins (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), p.67.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 24.

²⁰ Rommel, Erwin, The Rommel Papers, trans. Paul, Findlay (New York: Harcourt Brace, and Co., 1953), p.521.Google Scholar

²¹ See Stouffer, Samuel A., el al, The American Soldier, vol. 1, Adjustment During Army Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp.362–429.Google Scholar

²² As the author discovered by personal experience (1980–1983). Most armies, including the American, rely heavily on peer evaluations during officer training courses, and even (in some cases) for picking out promising enlisted men (communications with senior American and Israeli military officials, including commanders of basic training brigades). On the use of peer evaluations, see Janowitz, Morris, Sociology and the Military Establishment, 3rd ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974), pp.76–77.Google Scholar In the Swiss and Israeli armies officers are selected from the ranks, in part by use of peer evaluations. See Haltiner, Karl and Meyer, Ruth, “Aspects of the Relationship between Military and Society in Switzerland,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 6 (Fall 1979), pp.57–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Quoted in Marshall, S.L.A., Men Against Fire (New York: William Morrow, 1947), p.106.Google Scholar

²⁴ Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 25.

²⁵ For personal recollections, see Roskill, Stephen, The Art of Leadership (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1965), pp. 69–70Google Scholar and Moran, Lord, The Anatomy of Courage (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 166.Google Scholar

²⁶ See department of the Army, Military Leadership, Field Manual 22–100 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1973), ch. 7, pp.7–1–7–5.

²⁷ Polybius, , The Rise of the Roman Empire, trans. Ian, Scott-Kilvert (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), pp.318–338.Google Scholar

²⁸ Keegan, John, The Face of Battle (New York: Viking, 1976), p.324.Google Scholar

²⁹ The transformation of the Civil War army is one case in point; the purge of the officer corps of the National Guard in 1940 is another. See Weigley, Russell, History of the United Slates Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp.229–230, 427–428.Google Scholar Informal election, however, continues on the battlefield. “In a battle crisis, a majority of Americans present will respond to any man who has the will and the brains to give them a clear, intelligent order. They will follow the lowest ranking man present if he obviously knows what he is doing and is morally the master of die situation, but they will not obey a chuckle-head if he has nothing in his favor but his rank.”; Marshall, S.L.A., The Armed Forces Officer (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1975), p. 192.Google Scholar

³⁰ Keegan, The Face of Battle, pp.189–192. For a detailed comparison of officers and enlisted men, see Moskos, Charles C., The American Enlisted Man (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), pp.38–62.Google Scholar

³¹ This is discussed (if not indeed hammered home) in Department of the Army, Military Leadership, ch. 2.

³² Hauser, William L., “The Will To Fight,” Sam, C. Sarkesian, ed., Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), p.193.Google Scholar

³³ ibid.

³⁴ In neither army did massive social reform (change in the composition of the officer corps) accompany tactical and organizational reform. See Cohen, Eliot A., Citizens and Soldiers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp.50–55.Google Scholar

³⁵ Allon, Yigal, The Making of Israel's Army (New York: Universe Books, 1970), pp.249–269.Google Scholar

³⁶ Keegan, The Face of Battle.

³⁷ Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 18, p.616.

³⁸ ibid., p.626.

³⁹ Marshall, Armed Forces Officer, p.1.

⁴⁰ I differ from Huntington in describing the military ethos as aristocratic, where he calls it conservative. The implied tensions between officer and society are, if anything, stronger in the former view. See Moskos, American Enlisted Man, pp.8–9, for a discussion of the Doolittle Board reforms, which addressed the caste issue directly.

⁴¹ See Margiotta, Changing World.

⁴² I make this point in a minor way with reference to the Israeli campaign in Lebanon in 1982: Cohen, Eliot A., “Peace for Galilee: Success or Failure?” Commentary, vol. 78 (November 1984), pp.24–30.Google Scholar

⁴³ The best book on the Dardanelles is still Rhodes James, Robert, Gallipoli (London: Batsford, 1965).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ For a recent inside account of the difficulties of strategy-making in Vietnam, see General Palmer, Bruce Jr., The 25—Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For a good introduction to the military reform debate, see Clark, Asa, et al., The Defense Reform Debate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984).Google Scholar