¹ For a recent influential discussion of the concept-centered problem, see Korsgaard, Christine M., The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Korsgaard, Christine M., “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant,” Journal of Ethics 3, no. 1 (1999): 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar My approach is rather different from hers, as I trace ethical conceptualization to a more social, and less reflective, origin; in this respect it is closer to the approach found in Postema, Gerald J., “Morality in the First Person Plural,” Law and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1995): 35–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For another different approach, one that involves many congenial themes despite supporting noncognitivism, see Gibbard, Allan, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).Google Scholar

² For a sketch of the cognitivist position I defend, see Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip, “Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation,” Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 178 (1995): 20–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Pettit, Philip, “Embracing Objectivity in Ethics,” in Leiter, Brian, ed., Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).Google Scholar For a critique of expressivism and an indirect argument for cognitivism, see Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip, “A Question for Expressivism,” Analysis 58, no. 4 (1998): 239–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ For examples of this sort of approach, see Hurley, S. L., Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Jackson, and Pettit, , “Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation”Google Scholar; and Wedgwood, Ralph, “Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms,” Philosophical Review, forthcoming.Google Scholar

⁴ On design specifications, see Dennett, Daniel C., The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Pettit, Philip, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 1Google Scholar; and Railton, Peter, “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action,” in Cullity, Garrett and Gaut, Berys, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).Google Scholar

⁵ On this point, see Deacon, Terrence W., The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Human Brain (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).Google Scholar

⁶ Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Nidditch, P. H. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), bk. III, chap. 2.Google Scholar

⁷ For a qualified defense of this sort of view, see Pettit, , The Common Mind.Google Scholar For further elaboration of its implications, see Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael, “Freedom in Belief and Desire,” Journal of Philosophy 93, no. 6 (1996): 429–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Pettit, Philip, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).Google Scholar

⁸ For an attempt to deal with some of the issues involved in this problem, see Pettit, , The Common Mind.Google Scholar

⁹ On this claim, however, see ibid., chap. 2.

¹⁰ For more on this approach, see Pettit, Philip, “A Theory of Normal and Ideal Conditions,” Philosophical Studies 96, no. 1 (1999): 21–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ On this point, see McGeer, Victoria and Pettit, Philip, “The Self-Regulating Mind,” forthcoming in Language and Communication.Google Scholar

¹² For discussion of this notion of virtual control, see Pettit, Philip, “The Virtual Reality of Homo Economicus,” The Monist 78, no. 3 (1995): 308–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ I borrow this notion of fault-freedom from Price, Huw, Facts and the Function of Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Anscombe, G. E. M., Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957).Google Scholar

¹⁵ An agent-neutral consideration is expressed in general terms, and can be fully understood independently of who the agent is for whom it is a consideration. An agent-relative consideration is expressed in indexical terms—terms like “me” or “my” or “mine”—and cannot be fully understood independently of who the agent in question is. If you overhear me say that I am moved by a concern for the general happiness, you can know all there is to know about which consideration is in question without knowing who is speaking. If you overhear me say that I am moved by a concern for the welfare of my children, you do not know all there is to know about which consideration is in question without knowing who is speaking, and in particular without knowing which children are to be favored.

¹⁶ On this point, see Pettit, and Smith, , “Freedom in Belief and Desire.”Google Scholar

¹⁷ Darwall, Stephen, “Reciprocal Recognition: The Second-Person Standpoint in Moral Thought and Theory” (manuscript).Google Scholar

¹⁸ It would be entirely hypothetical under the story told in Brandom, Robert B., Making It Explicit (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).Google Scholar

²⁰ On this point, see Pettit, , A Theory of Freedom.Google Scholar

²¹ See Pettit, Philip, “Realism and Response-Dependence,” Mind 100, no. 4 (1991): 587–626Google Scholar; and Pettit, Philip, “Terms, Things, and Response-Dependence,” European Review of Philosophy 3 (1998): 61–72.Google Scholar

²² Strawson, Peter, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Watson, Gary, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).Google Scholar

²³ Hume, David, “Of the Standard of Taste” and Other Essays, ed. Lenz, John W. (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965)Google Scholar; Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, L. A., 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; and Hume, David, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Schneewind, J. B. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983).Google Scholar See also Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, “On Why Hume's ‘General Point of View’ Isn't Ideal — and Shouldn't Be,” Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Darwall, Stephen, The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)Google Scholar; and Schneewind, J. B., The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).Google Scholar Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include Mackie, J. L., Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sainsbury, R. M., “Projections and Relations,” The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Railton, Peter, “Taste and Value,” in Crisp, Roger and Hooker, Brad, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).Google Scholar

²⁴ For a modern development of the Humean approach, see, for example, Smith, Michael, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).Google Scholar Whereas Smith's approach gives prominence to the notion of an ideal point of view, however, it is arguable that Hume relied instead on the notion of a general point of view. For a fine case in support of this interpretation, see Sayre-McCord, , “On Why Hume's ‘General Point of View’ Isn't Ideal.”Google Scholar

²⁵ On obligations and rights, see Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978).Google Scholar On contractualism, see Scanlon, T. M., What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).Google Scholar

²⁶ See Pettit, Philip, “The Consequentialist Perspective,” in Baron, Marcia, Pettit, Philip, and Slote, Michael, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).Google Scholar See also Pettit, Philip and Scanlon, T. M., “Contractualism and Consequentialism,” Theoria (2000): 228–45.Google Scholar