Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T03:44:38.758Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Alfred R. Mele
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Davidson College

Extract

My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic (or “deterministic,” for short). That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. Compatibilists argue for compatibility, and incompatibilists argue against it. Some incompatibilists maintain that free will and moral responsibility are illusions. But most are libertarians, libertarianism being the conjunction of incompatibilism and the thesis that at least some human beings are possessed of free will and moral responsibility.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable