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Interpreting Corporate Interlocks from Broken Ties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2016

Donald Palmer
Donald Palmer*
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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Extract

Two different theoretical frameworks, the interorganizational and the intraclass, guide empirical research on the origin and function of corporate interlocks. Conclusions from this research often have been used as the basis for more general claims about the structure of power in the American economy. To a great extent, these claims are based on the implicit assumption that a majority of interlocks facilitate one type of interfirm relationship—formal coordination.

This article presents evidence about the continuity of interlocks which have been disrupted accidentally by such events as death and retirement. What happens after an interlock is broken reveals something of the extent and manner in which different types of interlock ties facilitate formal coordination. This in turn provides the basis for assessing the applicability of the interorganizational and intraclass approaches to the phenomenon of interlocking.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Science History , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , Spring 1983 , pp. 217 - 231
Copyright
Copyright © Social Science History Association 1983 

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Footnotes

I thank Maggie McLoughlin and G. William Domhoff for editorial and substantive suggestions that have improved the quality of this manuscript.

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